From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
x86@kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC 3/3] x86/mm/encrypt: Convert sme_me_mask to patchable constant
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 17:59:13 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180207145913.2703-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180207145913.2703-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
We only change sme_me_mask very early in boot. It may be a candidate for
conversion to patchable constant.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/kernel/patchable_const.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 15 ++++-----------
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 22c5f3e6f820..4131ddf262f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -18,10 +18,13 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/patchable_const.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-extern u64 sme_me_mask;
+#define sme_me_mask_DEFAULT 0
+DECLARE_PATCHABLE_CONST_U64(sme_me_mask);
+#define sme_me_mask sme_me_mask_READ()
void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/patchable_const.c b/arch/x86/kernel/patchable_const.c
index 8d48c4c101ca..1bf2980d91b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/patchable_const.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/patchable_const.c
@@ -90,11 +90,13 @@ int patch_const_u64(unsigned long **start, unsigned long **stop,
}
PATCHABLE_CONST_U64(__PHYSICAL_MASK);
+PATCHABLE_CONST_U64(sme_me_mask);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
/* Add an entry for a constant here if it expected to be seen in the modules */
static const struct const_u64_table const_u64_table[] = {
{"__PHYSICAL_MASK", __PHYSICAL_MASK_DEFAULT, &__PHYSICAL_MASK_CURRENT},
+ {"sme_me_mask", sme_me_mask_DEFAULT, &sme_me_mask_CURRENT},
};
__init_or_module __nostackprotector
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 5135b59ce6a5..c93b5c5eeccf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -36,13 +36,6 @@ static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on";
static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
-/*
- * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
- * reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed out when the .bss
- * section is later cleared.
- */
-u64 sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(sme_me_mask);
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_enable_key);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_enable_key);
@@ -997,7 +990,7 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
return;
/* SEV state cannot be controlled by a command line option */
- sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+ sme_me_mask_SET(me_mask);
sev_enabled = true;
return;
}
@@ -1028,11 +1021,11 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)))
- sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+ sme_me_mask_SET(me_mask);
else if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)))
- sme_me_mask = 0;
+ sme_me_mask_SET(0);
else
- sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
+ sme_me_mask_SET(active_by_default ? me_mask : 0);
if (__PHYSICAL_MASK_SET(__PHYSICAL_MASK & ~sme_me_mask)) {
/* Can we handle it? */
--
2.15.1
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-07 14:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-07 14:59 [RFC 0/3] x86: Patchable constants Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-02-07 14:59 ` [RFC 1/3] x86: Introduce patchable constants Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-02-07 14:59 ` [RFC 2/3] x86/mm/encrypt: Convert __PHYSICAL_MASK to patchable constant Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-02-07 14:59 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-02-07 16:25 ` [RFC 0/3] x86: Patchable constants Peter Zijlstra
2018-02-07 17:12 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-02-07 17:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07 17:13 ` hpa
2018-02-07 20:20 ` H. Peter Anvin
2018-02-07 20:43 ` H. Peter Anvin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180207145913.2703-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--to=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).