linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [RFC, PATCH 21/22] x86/mm: Introduce page_keyid() and page_encrypted()
Date: Tue, 6 Mar 2018 11:57:51 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180306085751.tvozsfe6hogh37pd@node.shutemov.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <61041640-435e-1a67-177f-a75791130514@intel.com>

On Mon, Mar 05, 2018 at 09:08:53AM -0800, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 03/05/2018 08:26 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> > +static inline bool page_encrypted(struct page *page)
> > +{
> > +	/* All pages with non-zero KeyID are encrypted */
> > +	return page_keyid(page) != 0;
> > +}
> 
> Is this true?  I thought there was a KEYID_NO_ENCRYPT "Do not encrypt
> memory when this KeyID is in use."  Is that really only limited to key 0.

Well, it depends on what we mean by "encrypted". For memory management
pruposes we care if the page is encrypted with KeyID different from
default one. All pages with non-default KeyID threated the same by memory
management.

So far we don't have users for the interface. We may reconsider
the meaning once we get users.

-- 
 Kirill A. Shutemov

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

  reply	other threads:[~2018-03-06  8:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-03-05 16:25 [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 01/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel Total Memory Encryption cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 02/22] x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 03/22] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel PCONFIG cpufeature Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 04/22] x86/pconfig: Detect PCONFIG targets Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 05/22] x86/pconfig: Provide defines and helper to run MKTME_KEY_PROG leaf Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 06/22] x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 07/22] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 15:55   ` Punit Agrawal
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 08/22] mm: Introduce __GFP_ENCRYPT Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-22 16:02   ` Punit Agrawal
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 09/22] mm, rmap: Add arch-specific field into anon_vma Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 10/22] mm/shmem: Zero out unused vma fields in shmem_pseudo_vma_init() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:25 ` [RFC, PATCH 11/22] mm: Use __GFP_ENCRYPT for pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 12/22] mm: Do no merge vma with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 13/22] mm, rmap: Free encrypted pages once mapcount drops to zero Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:12   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:18     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:13   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:27     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 14:59       ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 15:00         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 14/22] mm, khugepaged: Do not collapse pages in encrypted VMAs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 15/22] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 16/22] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:09   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:30     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 17/22] x86/mm: Implement vma_is_encrypted() and vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 18/22] x86/mm: Handle allocation of encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:03   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:34     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:36     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 19/22] x86/mm: Implement free_encrypt_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:00   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:38     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 19:07   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:54     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 13:52       ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:09         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-20 12:50     ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-27 14:44       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 20/22] x86/mm: Implement anon_vma_encrypted() and anon_vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 21/22] x86/mm: Introduce page_keyid() and page_encrypted() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 17:08   ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06  8:57     ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2018-03-06 14:56       ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-06 14:58         ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-06 15:04           ` Dave Hansen
2018-03-05 16:26 ` [RFC, PATCH 22/22] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-03-05 18:30 ` [RFC, PATCH 00/22] Partial MKTME enabling Christoph Hellwig
2018-03-05 19:05   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-03-06  8:58     ` Kirill A. Shutemov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180306085751.tvozsfe6hogh37pd@node.shutemov.name \
    --to=kirill@shutemov.name \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=kai.huang@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).