From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v5 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2018 08:15:18 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181011151523.27101-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181011151523.27101-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
When setting up a signal, the kernel creates a shadow stack
restore token at the current SHSTK address and then stores the
token's address in the signal frame, right after the FPU state.
Before restoring a signal, the kernel verifies and then uses the
restore token to set the SHSTK pointer.
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c | 13 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h | 5 +
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 15 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 261 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
index 86b1341cba9a..cea28d2a946e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/ia32/ia32_signal.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <asm/sigframe.h>
#include <asm/sighandling.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
/*
* Do a signal return; undo the signal stack.
@@ -108,6 +109,9 @@ static int ia32_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
err |= fpu__restore_sig(buf, 1);
+ if (!err)
+ err = restore_sigcontext_ext(buf);
+
force_iret();
return err;
@@ -234,6 +238,10 @@ static void __user *get_sigframe(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs,
if (fpu->initialized) {
unsigned long fx_aligned, math_size;
+ /* sigcontext extension */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
+
sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, 1, &fx_aligned, &math_size);
*fpstate = (struct _fpstate_32 __user *) sp;
if (copy_fpstate_to_sigframe(*fpstate, (void __user *)fx_aligned,
@@ -277,6 +285,8 @@ int ia32_setup_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
if (ia32_setup_sigcontext(&frame->sc, fpstate, regs, set->sig[0]))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fpstate))
+ return -EFAULT;
if (_COMPAT_NSIG_WORDS > 1) {
if (__copy_to_user(frame->extramask, &set->sig[1],
@@ -384,6 +394,9 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
regs, set->sig[0]);
err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
+ if (!err)
+ err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fpstate);
+
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index c952a2ec65fe..3af544aed800 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -19,10 +19,15 @@ struct cet_status {
int cet_setup_shstk(void);
void cet_disable_shstk(void);
void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
+int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
+int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
#else
static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return -EINVAL; }
static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
+static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return -EINVAL; }
+static inline int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor,
+ unsigned long *new_ssp) { return -EINVAL; }
#endif
#define cpu_x86_cet_enabled() \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
index bd26834724e5..23014b4082de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
@@ -17,4 +17,9 @@ void signal_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *frame, char *where);
int setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc, void __user *fpstate,
struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long mask);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+int setup_sigcontext_ext(struct ksignal *ksig, void __user *fpu);
+int restore_sigcontext_ext(void __user *fpu);
+#endif
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_SIGHANDLING_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
index 844d60eb1882..e3b08d1c0d3b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h
@@ -196,6 +196,21 @@ struct _xstate {
/* New processor state extensions go here: */
};
+/*
+ * Sigcontext extension (struct sc_ext) is located after
+ * sigcontext->fpstate. Because currently only the shadow
+ * stack pointer is saved there and the shadow stack depends
+ * on XSAVES, we can find sc_ext from sigcontext->fpstate.
+ *
+ * The 64-bit fpstate has a size of fpu_user_xstate_size, plus
+ * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE when XSAVE* is used. The struct sc_ext
+ * is located at the end of sigcontext->fpstate, aligned to 8.
+ */
+struct sc_ext {
+ unsigned long total_size;
+ unsigned long ssp;
+};
+
/*
* The 32-bit signal frame:
*/
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index ec256ae27a31..2000e5e87f8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
#include <asm/compat.h>
#include <asm/cet.h>
+#include <asm/special_insns.h>
static int set_shstk_ptr(unsigned long addr)
{
@@ -46,6 +47,80 @@ static unsigned long get_shstk_addr(void)
return ptr;
}
+#define TOKEN_MODE_MASK 3UL
+#define TOKEN_MODE_64 1UL
+#define IS_TOKEN_64(token) ((token & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == TOKEN_MODE_64)
+#define IS_TOKEN_32(token) ((token & TOKEN_MODE_MASK) == 0)
+
+/*
+ * Verify the restore token at the address of 'ssp' is
+ * valid and then set shadow stack pointer according to the
+ * token.
+ */
+static int verify_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
+ unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+ unsigned long token;
+
+ *new_ssp = 0;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (get_user(token, (unsigned long __user *)ssp))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Is 64-bit mode flag correct? */
+ if (ia32 && !IS_TOKEN_32(token))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else if (!IS_TOKEN_64(token))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ token &= ~TOKEN_MODE_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * Restore address properly aligned?
+ */
+ if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(token, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(token, 4))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Token was placed properly?
+ */
+ if ((ALIGN_DOWN(token, 8) - 8) != ssp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *new_ssp = token;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a restore token on the shadow stack.
+ * A token is always 8-byte and aligned to 8.
+ */
+static int create_rstor_token(bool ia32, unsigned long ssp,
+ unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ *new_ssp = 0;
+
+ if ((!ia32 && !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 8)) || !IS_ALIGNED(ssp, 4))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ addr = ALIGN_DOWN(ssp, 8) - 8;
+
+ /* Is the token for 64-bit? */
+ if (!ia32)
+ ssp |= TOKEN_MODE_64;
+
+ if (write_user_shstk_64(addr, ssp))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ *new_ssp = addr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
int cet_setup_shstk(void)
{
unsigned long addr, size;
@@ -107,3 +182,54 @@ void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
}
+
+int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp)
+{
+ unsigned long new_ssp;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = verify_rstor_token(in_ia32_syscall(), ssp, &new_ssp);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return set_shstk_ptr(new_ssp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup the shadow stack for the signal handler: first,
+ * create a restore token to keep track of the current ssp,
+ * and then the return address of the signal handler.
+ */
+int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor_addr,
+ unsigned long *new_ssp)
+{
+ unsigned long ssp;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ ssp = get_shstk_addr();
+ err = create_rstor_token(ia32, ssp, new_ssp);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (ia32) {
+ ssp = *new_ssp - sizeof(u32);
+ err = write_user_shstk_32(ssp, (unsigned int)rstor_addr);
+ } else {
+ ssp = *new_ssp - sizeof(u64);
+ err = write_user_shstk_64(ssp, rstor_addr);
+ }
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ set_shstk_ptr(ssp);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 92a3b312a53c..a0cee6ba99a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
#include <asm/sigframe.h>
#include <asm/signal.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
#define COPY(x) do { \
get_user_ex(regs->x, &sc->x); \
@@ -152,6 +153,10 @@ static int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
err |= fpu__restore_sig(buf, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32));
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ err |= restore_sigcontext_ext(buf);
+#endif
+
force_iret();
return err;
@@ -237,6 +242,17 @@ static unsigned long align_sigframe(unsigned long sp)
return sp;
}
+static unsigned long alloc_sigcontext_ext(unsigned long sp)
+{
+ /*
+ * sigcontext_ext is at: fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size +
+ * FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE, then aligned to 8.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+ sp -= (sizeof(struct sc_ext) + 8);
+ return sp;
+}
+
static void __user *
get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
void __user **fpstate)
@@ -266,6 +282,7 @@ get_sigframe(struct k_sigaction *ka, struct pt_regs *regs, size_t frame_size,
}
if (fpu->initialized) {
+ sp = alloc_sigcontext_ext(sp);
sp = fpu__alloc_mathframe(sp, IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32),
&buf_fx, &math_size);
*fpstate = (void __user *)sp;
@@ -493,6 +510,9 @@ static int __setup_rt_frame(int sig, struct ksignal *ksig,
err |= setup_sigcontext(&frame->uc.uc_mcontext, fp, regs, set->sig[0]);
err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
+ if (!err)
+ err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fp);
+
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -576,6 +596,9 @@ static int x32_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig,
regs, set->sig[0]);
err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
+ if (!err)
+ err = setup_sigcontext_ext(ksig, fpstate);
+
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -707,6 +730,80 @@ setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int copy_ext_from_user(struct sc_ext *ext, void __user *fpu)
+{
+ void __user *p;
+
+ if (!fpu)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p = fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+ p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(ext, p, sizeof(*ext)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int copy_ext_to_user(void __user *fpu, struct sc_ext *ext)
+{
+ void __user *p;
+
+ if (!fpu)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ext->total_size != sizeof(*ext))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p = fpu + fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE;
+ p = (void __user *)ALIGN((unsigned long)p, 8);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(p, ext, sizeof(*ext)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int restore_sigcontext_ext(void __user *fp)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && fp) {
+ struct sc_ext ext = {0, 0};
+
+ err = copy_ext_from_user(&ext, fp);
+
+ if (!err)
+ err = cet_restore_signal(ext.ssp);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+int setup_sigcontext_ext(struct ksignal *ksig, void __user *fp)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && fp) {
+ struct sc_ext ext = {0, 0};
+ unsigned long rstor;
+
+ rstor = (unsigned long)ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
+ err = cet_setup_signal(is_ia32_frame(ksig), rstor, &ext.ssp);
+ if (!err) {
+ ext.total_size = sizeof(ext);
+ err = copy_ext_to_user(fp, &ext);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+#endif
+
static void
handle_signal(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-11 15:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-11 15:14 [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control Flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 16:45 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-15 17:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 15:14 ` [PATCH v5 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-17 10:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-17 22:39 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-17 22:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-17 23:17 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 9:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-18 9:31 ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-18 12:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-18 18:33 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-18 9:24 ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 18:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-08 20:40 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 23:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-11 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-11 19:02 ` Pavel Machek
2018-11-08 20:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 21:01 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-08 21:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 21:31 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-11-08 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-08 22:18 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2018-11-08 21:48 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-08 22:00 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-08 23:35 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09 0:32 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-09 0:45 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-09 17:13 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09 17:17 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-11-09 17:20 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-09 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-11 11:31 ` Pavel Machek
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-13 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-13 21:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-14 18:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-14 20:19 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-14 20:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 07/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 20:39 ` Jann Horn
2018-10-11 20:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 20:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-12 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-12 13:17 ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-11 20:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-12 10:24 ` Florian Weimer
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 08/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 10/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 11/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 12/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 13/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 14/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 15/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 16/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 17/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 18/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 19/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-06 18:43 ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-06 18:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-06 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 15:15 ` [PATCH v5 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-11 19:21 ` [PATCH v5 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2018-10-11 19:29 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).