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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 17/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack
Date: Thu,  6 Jun 2019 13:06:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190606200646.3951-18-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190606200646.3951-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

can_follow_write_pte/pmd look for the (RO & DIRTY) PTE/PMD to
verify an exclusive RO page still exists after a broken COW.

A shadow stack PTE is RO & PAGE_DIRTY_SW when it is shared,
otherwise RO & PAGE_DIRTY_HW.

Introduce pte_exclusive() and pmd_exclusive() to also verify a
shadow stack PTE is exclusive.

Also rename can_follow_write_pte/pmd() to can_follow_write() to
make their meaning clear; i.e. "Can we write to the page?", not
"Is the PTE writable?"

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c         | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/asm-generic/pgtable.h |  4 ++++
 mm/gup.c                      |  8 +++++---
 mm/huge_memory.c              |  8 +++++---
 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 8ff54bd978f3..2a89c168df7b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -913,4 +913,22 @@ inline bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags)
 {
 	return (vm_flags & VM_SHSTK);
 }
+
+inline bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pte_dirty_hw(pte);
+	else
+		return pte_dirty(pte);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
+inline bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		return pmd_dirty_hw(pmd);
+	else
+		return pmd_dirty(pmd);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_INTEL_SHADOW_STACK_USER */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
index 4940411b8e1c..3324e30bb07f 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/pgtable.h
@@ -1192,10 +1192,14 @@ static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)
 #define pte_set_vma_features(pte, vma) pte
 #define pmd_set_vma_features(pmd, vma) pmd
 #define arch_copy_pte_mapping(vma_flags) false
+#define pte_exclusive(pte, vma) pte_dirty(pte)
+#define pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma) pmd_dirty(pmd)
 #else
 pte_t pte_set_vma_features(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 pmd_t pmd_set_vma_features(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 bool arch_copy_pte_mapping(vm_flags_t vm_flags);
+bool pte_exclusive(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
+bool pmd_exclusive(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _ASM_GENERIC_PGTABLE_H */
diff --git a/mm/gup.c b/mm/gup.c
index ddde097cf9e4..7d11fff1e8c3 100644
--- a/mm/gup.c
+++ b/mm/gup.c
@@ -178,10 +178,12 @@ static int follow_pfn_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pte's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pte(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pte_t pte, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pte_write(pte) ||
-		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pte_dirty(pte));
+		((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		 pte_exclusive(pte, vma));
 }
 
 static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -219,7 +221,7 @@ static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	}
 	if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
 		goto no_page;
-	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write_pte(pte, flags)) {
+	if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !can_follow_write(pte, flags, vma)) {
 		pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
 		return NULL;
 	}
diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c
index eac1ee2f8985..d65970b9ece6 100644
--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1441,10 +1441,12 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_wp_page(struct vm_fault *vmf, pmd_t orig_pmd)
  * FOLL_FORCE can write to even unwritable pmd's, but only
  * after we've gone through a COW cycle and they are dirty.
  */
-static inline bool can_follow_write_pmd(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags)
+static inline bool can_follow_write(pmd_t pmd, unsigned int flags,
+				    struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	return pmd_write(pmd) ||
-	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) && pmd_dirty(pmd));
+	       ((flags & FOLL_FORCE) && (flags & FOLL_COW) &&
+		pmd_exclusive(pmd, vma));
 }
 
 struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
@@ -1457,7 +1459,7 @@ struct page *follow_trans_huge_pmd(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 
 	assert_spin_locked(pmd_lockptr(mm, pmd));
 
-	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write_pmd(*pmd, flags))
+	if (flags & FOLL_WRITE && !can_follow_write(*pmd, flags, vma))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Avoid dumping huge zero page */
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-06 20:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-06 20:06 [PATCH v7 00/27] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 21:18   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-06 22:04     ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 22:08       ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-06 22:10         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07  1:54         ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07  7:07   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07 16:14     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/27] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 12/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 13/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 14/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 15/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07  7:30   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 16/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 18/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07  7:43   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07  7:47     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07 16:16       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 22/27] binfmt_elf: Extract .note.gnu.property from an ELF file Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07  7:58   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-07 16:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07 18:01   ` Dave Martin
2019-06-10 16:29     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-10 16:57       ` Dave Martin
2019-06-10 17:24       ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-11 11:41         ` Dave Martin
2019-06-11 19:31           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-12  9:32             ` Dave Martin
2019-06-12 19:04               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-13 13:26                 ` Dave Martin
2019-06-17 11:08               ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-17 12:20                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-06-18  9:12                   ` Dave Martin
2019-06-18 12:41                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18 12:47                       ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 12:55                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-18 13:32                           ` Dave Martin
2019-06-18 14:58                             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-18 15:49                               ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 15:53                                 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-18 16:05                                   ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 16:00                                     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-18 16:20                                       ` Dave Martin
2019-06-18 16:25                                         ` Florian Weimer
2019-06-18 16:50                                           ` Dave Martin
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 23/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-07  7:54   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 24/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 25/27] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-11 17:55   ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-11 19:22     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-06-06 20:06 ` [PATCH v7 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2019-11-01 14:03   ` Adrian Hunter
2019-11-01 14:17     ` Yu-cheng Yu

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