From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org,
dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org,
linux-media@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Yishai Hadas <yishaih@mellanox.com>,
Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>,
Alexander Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@amd.com>,
Christian Koenig <Christian.Koenig@amd.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>,
Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com>,
Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>, enh <enh@google.com>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>,
Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@arm.com>,
Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@arm.com>,
Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@arm.com>,
Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 02/16] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 11:07:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906101106.3CA50745E3@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190610175326.GC25803@arrakis.emea.arm.com>
On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 06:53:27PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 03, 2019 at 06:55:04PM +0200, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > index e5d5f31c6d36..9164ecb5feca 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> > @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si
> > return ret;
> > }
> >
> > -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size)
> > +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size)
>
> I'm going to propose an opt-in method here (RFC for now). We can't have
> a check in untagged_addr() since this is already used throughout the
> kernel for both user and kernel addresses (khwasan) but we can add one
> in __range_ok(). The same prctl() option will be used for controlling
> the precise/imprecise mode of MTE later on. We can use a TIF_ flag here
> assuming that this will be called early on and any cloned thread will
> inherit this.
>
> Anyway, it's easier to paste some diff than explain but Vincenzo can
> fold them into his ABI patches that should really go together with
> these. I added a couple of MTE definitions for prctl() as an example,
> not used currently:
>
> ------------------8<---------------------------------------------
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> index fcd0e691b1ea..2d4cb7e4edab 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
> @@ -307,6 +307,10 @@ extern void __init minsigstksz_setup(void);
> /* PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS prctl */
> #define PAC_RESET_KEYS(tsk, arg) ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(tsk, arg)
>
> +/* PR_UNTAGGED_UADDR prctl */
> +int untagged_uaddr_set_mode(unsigned long arg);
> +#define SET_UNTAGGED_UADDR_MODE(arg) untagged_uaddr_set_mode(arg)
> +
> /*
> * For CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
> *
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
> index c285d1ce7186..89ce77773c49 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h
> @@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk);
> #define TIF_SVE 23 /* Scalable Vector Extension in use */
> #define TIF_SVE_VL_INHERIT 24 /* Inherit sve_vl_onexec across exec */
> #define TIF_SSBD 25 /* Wants SSB mitigation */
> +#define TIF_UNTAGGED_UADDR 26
>
> #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING)
> #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
> @@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk);
> #define _TIF_FSCHECK (1 << TIF_FSCHECK)
> #define _TIF_32BIT (1 << TIF_32BIT)
> #define _TIF_SVE (1 << TIF_SVE)
> +#define _TIF_UNTAGGED_UADDR (1 << TIF_UNTAGGED_UADDR)
>
> #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \
> _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 9164ecb5feca..54f5bbaebbc4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si
> {
> unsigned long ret, limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit;
>
> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_UNTAGGED_UADDR))
> + addr = untagged_addr(addr);
> +
> __chk_user_ptr(addr);
> asm volatile(
> // A + B <= C + 1 for all A,B,C, in four easy steps:
> @@ -94,7 +97,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __range_ok(const void __user *addr, unsigned long si
> return ret;
> }
>
> -#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(untagged_addr(addr), size)
> +#define access_ok(addr, size) __range_ok(addr, size)
> #define user_addr_max get_fs
>
> #define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> index 3767fb21a5b8..fd191c5b92aa 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
> @@ -552,3 +552,18 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
>
> ptrauth_thread_init_user(current);
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * Enable the relaxed ABI allowing tagged user addresses into the kernel.
> + */
> +int untagged_uaddr_set_mode(unsigned long arg)
> +{
> + if (is_compat_task())
> + return -ENOTSUPP;
> + if (arg)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + set_thread_flag(TIF_UNTAGGED_UADDR);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
I think this should be paired with a flag clearing in copy_thread(),
yes? (i.e. each binary needs to opt in)
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-10 18:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-03 16:55 [PATCH v16 00/16] arm64: untag user pointers passed to the kernel Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 01/16] uaccess: add untagged_addr definition for other arches Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 17:02 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-06-03 17:06 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 17:24 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-06-03 17:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2019-06-03 18:17 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-06-04 11:45 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 02/16] arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-10 17:53 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-10 18:07 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-10 18:53 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-10 20:36 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-11 14:57 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-11 17:09 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2019-06-12 9:32 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-12 11:52 ` Vincenzo Frascino
2019-06-11 17:09 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-11 17:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-12 11:03 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-12 11:04 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 03/16] lib, arm64: untag user pointers in strn*_user Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:48 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-11 20:06 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 04/16] mm: untag user pointers in do_pages_move Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:49 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-11 20:18 ` Khalid Aziz
2019-06-12 11:08 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 05/16] arm64: untag user pointers passed to memory syscalls Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-10 14:28 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-11 15:35 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-11 17:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-12 11:13 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 06/16] mm, arm64: untag user pointers in mm/gup.c Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:59 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 07/16] mm, arm64: untag user pointers in get_vaddr_frames Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 4:00 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-10 14:29 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 08/16] fs, arm64: untag user pointers in copy_mount_options Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 4:02 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-11 14:38 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-12 11:36 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 09/16] fs, arm64: untag user pointers in fs/userfaultfd.c Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 4:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-12 10:45 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 10/16] drm/amdgpu, arm64: untag user pointers Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 11/16] drm/radeon, arm64: untag user pointers in radeon_gem_userptr_ioctl Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 12/16] IB, arm64: untag user pointers in ib_uverbs_(re)reg_mr() Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-03 17:46 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-06-04 12:18 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-04 12:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-06-04 12:45 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-04 13:02 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2019-06-04 13:09 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-12 11:01 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 13/16] media/v4l2-core, arm64: untag user pointers in videobuf_dma_contig_user_get Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 14/16] tee, arm64: untag user pointers in tee_shm_register Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-07 5:33 ` Jens Wiklander
2019-06-08 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 15/16] vfio/type1, arm64: untag user pointers in vaddr_get_pfn Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:58 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-12 10:38 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-03 16:55 ` [PATCH v16 16/16] selftests, arm64: add a selftest for passing tagged pointers to kernel Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-08 3:56 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-10 22:08 ` shuah
2019-06-11 15:01 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-11 17:18 ` Andrey Konovalov
2019-06-11 17:50 ` Catalin Marinas
2019-06-12 11:14 ` Andrey Konovalov
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