From: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Cc: kbuild-all@lists.01.org,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
airlied@linux.ie, daniel@ffwll.ch, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
keescook@chromium.org, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] uaccess: Rename user_access_begin/end() to user_full_access_begin/end()
Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2020 15:17:16 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202004041553.uP3dQtU7%lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <42da416106d5c1cf92bda1e058434fe240b35f44.1585898438.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
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Hi Christophe,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on linus/master]
[also build test ERROR on next-20200403]
[cannot apply to powerpc/next drm-intel/for-linux-next tip/x86/core v5.6]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help
improve the system. BTW, we also suggest to use '--base' option to specify the
base tree in git format-patch, please see https://stackoverflow.com/a/37406982]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Christophe-Leroy/uaccess-Add-user_read_access_begin-end-and-user_write_access_begin-end/20200404-080555
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git 5364abc57993b3bf60c41923cb98a8f1a594e749
config: i386-allyesconfig (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-7 (Ubuntu 7.5.0-6ubuntu2) 7.5.0
reproduce:
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make ARCH=i386
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c: In function 'save_v86_state':
>> arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c:116:7: error: implicit declaration of function 'user_access_begin'; did you mean 'user_access_end'? [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
if (!user_access_begin(user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ?
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
user_access_end
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +116 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 95
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 96 void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval)
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 97 {
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-19 98 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-19 99 struct vm86plus_struct __user *user;
9fda6a0681e070 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 100 struct vm86 *vm86 = current->thread.vm86;
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 101
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 102 /*
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 103 * This gets called from entry.S with interrupts disabled, but
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 104 * from process context. Enable interrupts here, before trying
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 105 * to access user space.
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 106 */
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 107 local_irq_enable();
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 108
1342635638cba9 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 109 if (!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86) {
1342635638cba9 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 110 pr_alert("no user_vm86: BAD\n");
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 111 do_exit(SIGSEGV);
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 112 }
decd275e62d5ee arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 113 set_flags(regs->pt.flags, VEFLAGS, X86_EFLAGS_VIF | vm86->veflags_mask);
1342635638cba9 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 114 user = vm86->user_vm86;
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-19 115
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 @116 if (!user_access_begin(user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ?
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-19 117 sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct) :
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 118 sizeof(struct vm86_struct)))
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 119 goto Efault;
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 120
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 121 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.bx, &user->regs.ebx, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 122 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.cx, &user->regs.ecx, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 123 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.dx, &user->regs.edx, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 124 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.si, &user->regs.esi, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 125 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.di, &user->regs.edi, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 126 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.bp, &user->regs.ebp, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 127 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.ax, &user->regs.eax, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 128 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.ip, &user->regs.eip, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 129 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.cs, &user->regs.cs, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 130 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.flags, &user->regs.eflags, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 131 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.sp, &user->regs.esp, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 132 unsafe_put_user(regs->pt.ss, &user->regs.ss, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 133 unsafe_put_user(regs->es, &user->regs.es, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 134 unsafe_put_user(regs->ds, &user->regs.ds, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 135 unsafe_put_user(regs->fs, &user->regs.fs, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 136 unsafe_put_user(regs->gs, &user->regs.gs, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 137 unsafe_put_user(vm86->screen_bitmap, &user->screen_bitmap, Efault_end);
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 138
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 139 user_access_end();
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 140
da51da189a24bb arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Andy Lutomirski 2017-11-02 141 preempt_disable();
9fda6a0681e070 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 142 tsk->thread.sp0 = vm86->saved_sp0;
ed0b2edb61ba4e arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-19 143 tsk->thread.sysenter_cs = __KERNEL_CS;
252e1a0526304f arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Joerg Roedel 2018-07-18 144 update_task_stack(tsk);
bd7dc5a6afac71 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Andy Lutomirski 2017-11-02 145 refresh_sysenter_cs(&tsk->thread);
9fda6a0681e070 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 146 vm86->saved_sp0 = 0;
da51da189a24bb arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Andy Lutomirski 2017-11-02 147 preempt_enable();
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 148
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 149 memcpy(®s->pt, &vm86->regs32, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
49d26b6eaa8e97 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Jeremy Fitzhardinge 2006-12-07 150
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 151 lazy_load_gs(vm86->regs32.gs);
49d26b6eaa8e97 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Jeremy Fitzhardinge 2006-12-07 152
5ed92a8ab71f88 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Brian Gerst 2015-07-29 153 regs->pt.ax = retval;
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 154 return;
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 155
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 156 Efault_end:
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 157 user_access_end();
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 158 Efault:
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 159 pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86 info\n");
a37d01ead405e3 arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c Al Viro 2020-02-15 160 do_exit(SIGSEGV);
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 161 }
^1da177e4c3f41 arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c Linus Torvalds 2005-04-16 162
:::::: The code at line 116 was first introduced by commit
:::::: a37d01ead405e3aa14d72d284721fe46422b3b63 x86: switch save_v86_state() to unsafe_put_user()
:::::: TO: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
:::::: CC: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-04-04 7:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-04-03 7:20 [PATCH v2 1/5] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end Christophe Leroy
2020-04-03 7:20 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] uaccess: Selectively open read or write user access Christophe Leroy
2020-05-29 4:20 ` Michael Ellerman
2020-04-03 7:20 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] drm/i915/gem: Replace user_access_begin by user_write_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2020-05-29 4:20 ` Michael Ellerman
2020-04-03 7:20 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] powerpc/uaccess: Implement user_read_access_begin and user_write_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2020-05-29 4:24 ` Michael Ellerman
2020-04-03 7:20 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] uaccess: Rename user_access_begin/end() to user_full_access_begin/end() Christophe Leroy
2020-04-03 18:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-04-03 20:52 ` Al Viro
2020-04-21 2:49 ` Al Viro
2020-04-21 9:12 ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2020-04-21 18:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-04-05 18:47 ` Christophe Leroy
2020-04-04 6:20 ` kbuild test robot
2020-04-04 7:17 ` kbuild test robot [this message]
2020-05-29 4:20 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] uaccess: Add user_read_access_begin/end and user_write_access_begin/end Michael Ellerman
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