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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, "H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [RFC 6/9] x86/uaccess: Remove tags from the address before checking
Date: Fri,  5 Feb 2021 18:16:27 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210205151631.43511-8-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210205151631.43511-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

The tags must not be included into check whether it's okay to access the
userspace address.

__chk_range_not_ok() is at the core or access_ok() and it's handly to
strip tags there.

get_user() and put_user() don't use access_ok(), but check access
against TASK_SIZE direcly in assembly. Strip tags, before calling into
the assembly helper.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index c9fa7be3df82..ee0a482b2f1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
  */
 static inline bool __chk_range_not_ok(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size, unsigned long limit)
 {
+	/* Remove tags from the address before comparing to the limit */
+	addr = untagged_addr(addr);
+
 	/*
 	 * If we have used "sizeof()" for the size,
 	 * we know it won't overflow the limit (but
@@ -152,7 +155,12 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
  * Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
  * On error, the variable @x is set to zero.
  */
-#define get_user(x,ptr) ({ might_fault(); do_get_user_call(get_user,x,ptr); })
+#define get_user(x,ptr)							\
+({									\
+	__typeof__(*(ptr)) *__ptr_clean = untagged_ptr(ptr);		\
+	might_fault();							\
+	do_get_user_call(get_user,x,__ptr_clean);			\
+})
 
 /**
  * __get_user - Get a simple variable from user space, with less checking.
@@ -249,7 +257,11 @@ extern void __put_user_nocheck_8(void);
  *
  * Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
  */
-#define put_user(x, ptr) ({ might_fault(); do_put_user_call(put_user,x,ptr); })
+#define put_user(x, ptr) ({						\
+	__typeof__(*(ptr)) *__ptr_clean = untagged_ptr(ptr);		\
+	might_fault();							\
+	do_put_user_call(put_user,x,__ptr_clean);			\
+})
 
 /**
  * __put_user - Write a simple value into user space, with less checking.
-- 
2.26.2



  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-05 15:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-05 15:16 [RFC 0/9] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 1/9] mm, arm64: Update PR_SET/GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL interface Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-11 16:57   ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-11 17:06     ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-11 18:26       ` Catalin Marinas
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [QEMU] x86: Implement Linear Address Masking support Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 2/9] x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 3/9] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 4/9] x86/mm: Introduce TIF_LAM_U57 and TIF_LAM_U48 Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 5/9] x86/mm: Provide untagged_addr() helper Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 7/9] x86/mm: Handle tagged memory accesses from kernel threads Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 8/9] x86/mm: Make LAM_U48 and mappings above 47-bits mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [RFC 9/9] x86/mm: Implement PR_SET/GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL with LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:42   ` H.J. Lu
2021-02-07  8:07     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-02-07 14:09       ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-07 14:11         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-02-05 15:16 ` [QEMU] x86: Implement Linear Address Masking support Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 15:49 ` [RFC 0/9] Linear Address Masking enabling Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-05 16:01   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-02-05 16:19     ` Peter Zijlstra
2021-02-07  8:24 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-02-07 14:11   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-09-21 16:52     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-09-21 17:15       ` H.J. Lu
2021-09-22  1:15         ` Zhang, Xiang1
2021-09-22 12:54           ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-09-22 20:03             ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-09-22 21:33               ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2021-09-23  0:15               ` H.J. Lu
2021-09-23  5:35                 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2021-09-23  0:07             ` H.J. Lu

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