From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>,
Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>,
Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>,
DRI Development <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
Linux Media Mailing List <linux-media@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-samsung-soc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PULL] topic/iomem-mmap-vs-gup
Date: Mon, 10 May 2021 10:50:31 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210510135031.GF2047089@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wgjO8-f1bUwQB=5HGzkvSS+aGACR9+H5CkkDhRgud+3MA@mail.gmail.com>
On Sat, May 08, 2021 at 09:46:41AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> I think follow_pfn() is ok for the actual "this is not a 'struct page'
> backed area", and disabling that case is wrong even going forward.
Every place we've audited using follow_pfn() has been shown to have
some use-after-free bugs like Daniel describes, and a failure to check
permissions bug too.
All the other follow_pfn() users were moved to follow_pte() to fix the
permissions check and this shifts the use-after-free bug away from
being inside an MM API and into the caller mis-using the API by, say,
extracting and using the PFN outside the pte lock.
eg look at how VFIO wrongly uses follow_pte():
static int follow_fault_pfn()
ret = follow_pte(vma->vm_mm, vaddr, &ptep, &ptl);
*pfn = pte_pfn(*ptep);
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
// no protection that pte_pfn() is still valid!
use_pfn(*pfn)
v4l is the only user that still has the missing permissions check
security bug too - so there is no outcome that should keep
follow_pfn() in the tree.
At worst v4l should change to follow_pte() and use it wrongly like
VFIO. At best we should delete all the v4l stuff.
Daniel I suppose we missed this relation to follow_pte(), so I agree
that keeping a unsafe_follow_pfn() around is not good.
Regards,
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-10 13:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-03 19:15 [PULL] topic/iomem-mmap-vs-gup Daniel Vetter
2021-05-06 22:30 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-05-07 15:53 ` Daniel Vetter
2021-05-08 16:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-05-10 7:16 ` Daniel Vetter
2021-05-10 7:29 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-05-17 15:29 ` Daniel Vetter
2021-05-17 22:04 ` Stephen Rothwell
2021-05-10 13:50 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2021-05-10 14:55 ` Daniel Vetter
2021-05-10 15:34 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2021-05-10 17:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-05-10 18:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
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