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From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V . Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	joao.moreira@intel.com, John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
	kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org,
	jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/39] x86/cet: Add user control-protection fault handler
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2022 15:29:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220929222936.14584-8-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220929222936.14584-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>

From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

A control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer
attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints.
For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy
on the shadow stack.

There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel
IBT. Refactor this fault handler into sparate user and kernel handlers,
like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode.

The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general
protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal
handler.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>

---

v2:
 - Integrate with kernel IBT fault handler
 - Update printed messages. (Dave)
 - Remove array_index_nospec() usage. (Dave)
 - Remove IBT messages. (Dave)
 - Add enclave error code bit processing it case it can get triggered
   somehow.
 - Add extra "unknown" in control_protection_err.

v1:
 - Update static asserts for NSIGSEGV

Yu-cheng v29:
 - Remove pr_emerg() since it is followed by die().
 - Change boot_cpu_has() to cpu_feature_enabled().

Yu-cheng v25:
 - Change CONFIG_X86_CET to CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK.
 - Change X86_FEATURE_CET to X86_FEATURE_SHSTK.

 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c         |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c       |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c       |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c      |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c              |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c            | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c        |  2 +-
 arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S             |  2 +-
 include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h |  3 +-
 12 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index ea128e32e8ca..fa47b8754624 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_rseq_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
  */
 static_assert(NSIGILL	== 11);
 static_assert(NSIGFPE	== 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 10);
 static_assert(NSIGBUS	== 5);
 static_assert(NSIGTRAP	== 6);
 static_assert(NSIGCHLD	== 6);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
index 9ad911f1647c..81b13a21046e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
@@ -1166,7 +1166,7 @@ void __init minsigstksz_setup(void)
  */
 static_assert(NSIGILL	== 11);
 static_assert(NSIGFPE	== 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 10);
 static_assert(NSIGBUS	== 5);
 static_assert(NSIGTRAP	== 6);
 static_assert(NSIGCHLD	== 6);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c
index 4700f8522d27..bbd542704730 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ void compat_setup_restart_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
  */
 static_assert(NSIGILL	== 11);
 static_assert(NSIGFPE	== 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 10);
 static_assert(NSIGBUS	== 5);
 static_assert(NSIGTRAP	== 6);
 static_assert(NSIGCHLD	== 6);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
index dad38960d1a8..82da8a2d769d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_sys32_sigstack(u32 u_ssptr, u32 u_ossptr, unsigned long sp)
  */
 static_assert(NSIGILL	== 11);
 static_assert(NSIGFPE	== 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 10);
 static_assert(NSIGBUS	== 5);
 static_assert(NSIGTRAP	== 6);
 static_assert(NSIGCHLD	== 6);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
index 570e43e6fda5..b4e410976e0d 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long orig_i0, unsigned long
  */
 static_assert(NSIGILL	== 11);
 static_assert(NSIGFPE	== 15);
-static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 9);
+static_assert(NSIGSEGV	== 10);
 static_assert(NSIGBUS	== 5);
 static_assert(NSIGTRAP	== 6);
 static_assert(NSIGCHLD	== 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 72184b0b2219..6768c9d4468c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_DF,	xenpv_exc_double_fault);
 #endif
 
 /* #CP */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_CP,	exc_control_protection);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
index a58c6bc1cd68..90cce3614ead 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/idt.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {
 	ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC,		asm_exc_machine_check, IST_INDEX_MCE),
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)
 	INTG(X86_TRAP_CP,		asm_exc_control_protection),
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
index 879ef8c72f5c..d441804443d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal_compat.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static inline void signal_compat_build_tests(void)
 	 */
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGILL  != 11);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGFPE  != 15);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 9);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGSEGV != 10);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGBUS  != 5);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGTRAP != 6);
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(NSIGCHLD != 6);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index d62b2cb85cea..b7dde8730236 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -211,12 +211,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_overflow)
 	do_error_trap(regs, 0, "overflow", X86_TRAP_OF, SIGSEGV, 0, NULL);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
-
-static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
-
-extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void); /* code label defined in asm below */
-
 enum cp_error_code {
 	CP_EC        = (1 << 15) - 1,
 
@@ -229,16 +223,74 @@ enum cp_error_code {
 	CP_ENCL	     = 1 << 15,
 };
 
-DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+static const char * const control_protection_err[] = {
+	"unknown",
+	"near-ret",
+	"far-ret/iret",
+	"endbranch",
+	"rstorssp",
+	"setssbsy",
+};
+
+static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(cpf_rate, DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_INTERVAL,
+			      DEFAULT_RATELIMIT_BURST);
+
+static void do_user_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
+					     unsigned long error_code)
 {
-	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
-		pr_err("Unexpected #CP\n");
-		BUG();
+	struct task_struct *tsk;
+	unsigned long ssp;
+
+	/* Read SSP before enabling interrupts. */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, ssp);
+
+	cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
+
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "User-mode control protection fault with shadow support disabled\n");
+
+	tsk = current;
+	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_CP;
+
+	/* Ratelimit to prevent log spamming. */
+	if (show_unhandled_signals && unhandled_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV) &&
+	    __ratelimit(&cpf_rate)) {
+		unsigned int cpec;
+
+		cpec = error_code & CP_EC;
+		if (cpec >= ARRAY_SIZE(control_protection_err))
+			cpec = 0;
+
+		pr_emerg("%s[%d] control protection ip:%lx sp:%lx ssp:%lx error:%lx(%s)%s",
+			 tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk),
+			 regs->ip, regs->sp, ssp, error_code,
+			 control_protection_err[cpec],
+			 error_code & CP_ENCL ? " in enclave" : "");
+		print_vma_addr(KERN_CONT " in ", regs->ip);
+		pr_cont("\n");
 	}
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs) || (error_code & CP_EC) != CP_ENDBR))
-		return;
+	force_sig_fault(SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, (void __user *)0);
+	cond_local_irq_disable(regs);
+}
+#else
+static void do_user_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
+					     unsigned long error_code)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "User-mode control protection fault with shadow support disabled\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+
+static __ro_after_init bool ibt_fatal = true;
+
+extern void ibt_selftest_ip(void); /* code label defined in asm below */
 
+static void do_kernel_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
 	if (unlikely(regs->ip == (unsigned long)&ibt_selftest_ip)) {
 		regs->ax = 0;
 		return;
@@ -283,9 +335,29 @@ static int __init ibt_setup(char *str)
 }
 
 __setup("ibt=", ibt_setup);
-
+#else
+static void do_kernel_control_protection_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "Kernel-mode control protection fault with IBT disabled\n");
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_control_protection)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
+	    !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+		pr_err("Unexpected #CP\n");
+		BUG();
+	}
+
+	if (user_mode(regs))
+		do_user_control_protection_fault(regs, error_code);
+	else
+		do_kernel_control_protection_fault(regs);
+}
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK) */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
 void handle_invalid_op(struct pt_regs *regs)
 #else
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 0ed2e487a693..57faa287163f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static struct trap_array_entry trap_array[] = {
 	TRAP_ENTRY(exc_coprocessor_error,		false ),
 	TRAP_ENTRY(exc_alignment_check,			false ),
 	TRAP_ENTRY(exc_simd_coprocessor_error,		false ),
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)
 	TRAP_ENTRY(exc_control_protection,		false ),
 #endif
 };
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
index 6b4fdf6b9542..e45ff6300c7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ xen_pv_trap asm_exc_page_fault
 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_spurious_interrupt_bug
 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coprocessor_error
 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_alignment_check
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) || defined(CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK)
 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_control_protection
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
index ffbe4cec9f32..0f52d0ac47c5 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {
 #define SEGV_ADIPERR	7	/* Precise MCD exception */
 #define SEGV_MTEAERR	8	/* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */
 #define SEGV_MTESERR	9	/* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */
-#define NSIGSEGV	9
+#define SEGV_CPERR	10	/* Control protection fault */
+#define NSIGSEGV	10
 
 /*
  * SIGBUS si_codes
-- 
2.17.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-29 22:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 240+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-29 22:28 [PATCH v2 00/39] Shadowstacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30  3:41   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-09-30 13:33     ` Jonathan Corbet
2022-09-30 13:41       ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-03 16:56         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  2:16           ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-05  9:10           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05  9:25             ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-05  9:46               ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-03 19:35     ` John Hubbard
2022-10-03 19:39       ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04  2:13       ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-10-03 17:18   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 19:46     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  0:02   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 12:19   ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 16:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-10 16:51       ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-12 12:29       ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-12 15:59         ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-12 16:54           ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-13 21:28         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-13 22:15           ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-26 21:59           ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:28 ` [PATCH v2 02/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 13:40   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 19:53     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 17:25   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 19:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 19:42   ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-03 19:50     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-12 20:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-13  0:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-13  9:21       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:26   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 16:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14 19:35     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05  0:55   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-14 17:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-14 18:15     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14 19:44       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:40   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-15  9:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-10-17 18:57     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-17 19:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:48   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:05     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  4:05       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 14:18       ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04 16:13         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` Rick Edgecombe [this message]
2022-10-03 14:01   ` [PATCH v2 07/39] x86/cet: Add user control-protection fault handler Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 18:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:04   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:33     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 22:51   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-03 23:09     ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-10-03 23:11     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  1:20   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 22:44     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  9:39   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05 22:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 14:17   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-05  1:31   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 11:16     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-05 12:34       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:06   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30 15:16   ` Jann Horn
2022-10-06 16:10     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 16:26   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 21:36     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 21:54       ` Jann Horn
2022-10-03 22:14       ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-05  2:17   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 14:08     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-05 23:06       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 23:01     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 11:33   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14  9:41   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:52     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14  9:42   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 18:06     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:43   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-03 18:11   ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 18:51     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-03 22:28     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 23:17       ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:20         ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:25           ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-03 23:38             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  0:40               ` Nadav Amit
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 13/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:11   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 18:24   ` Peter Xu
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 14/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 17:47   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04  0:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:17   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 15/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:20   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 10:07   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:51     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 16/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:22   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:53   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-14 15:32   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 17/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:24   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:56   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04 16:15     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  1:56   ` Nadav Amit
2022-10-04 16:21     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-14 15:52   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-14 15:56     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 18/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:30   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05  2:30     ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 12:33       ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 13:32         ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-10 13:40           ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 13:56             ` Andrew Cooper
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 19/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 18:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  0:03   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2022-10-04  0:32     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 20/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 21/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 22/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-30 19:16   ` Dave Hansen
2022-09-30 20:30     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-30 20:37       ` Dave Hansen
2022-09-30 23:00     ` Jann Horn
2022-09-30 23:02       ` Jann Horn
2022-09-30 23:04       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 18:39   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:49     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04  4:21       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 23/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for CET enabling Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:01   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:51     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-06 18:50       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-10 10:56   ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 16:28     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-12 12:18       ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-12 17:30         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 24/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:43   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 20:04     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04  4:04       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 16:25         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 10:17       ` David Laight
2022-10-04 19:32         ` Kees Cook
2022-10-05 13:32           ` David Laight
2022-10-20 21:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-20 22:54       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 25/39] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 10:36   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-03 16:57     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 20:29   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:09     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 26/39] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 20:44   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:13     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05  2:43   ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-05 22:47     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-05 22:58       ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-20 21:51         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 27/39] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 20:52   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 22:08     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-20 22:57       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 28/39] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:23   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 22:56     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 23:16       ` H.J. Lu
2022-10-10 11:13   ` Florian Weimer
2022-10-10 14:19     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 29/39] x86/cet/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 23:00     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04  4:37       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-06  0:38         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-06  3:11           ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  8:30     ` Mike Rapoport
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 30/39] x86: Expose thread features status in /proc/$PID/arch_status Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:37   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 22:45     ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04  4:18       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 31/39] x86/cet/shstk: Wire in CET interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 22:41   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 32/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:56   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [PATCH v2 33/39] x86/cpufeatures: Limit shadow stack to Intel CPUs Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:57   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  0:09     ` Dave Hansen
2022-10-04  4:54       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04 15:47         ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-04 19:43           ` John Allen
2022-10-04 20:34             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 20:50               ` Nathan Chancellor
2022-10-04 21:17                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2022-10-04 23:24                   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-11-03 17:39                     ` John Allen
2022-10-20 21:22                 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  8:36       ` Mike Rapoport
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/CLEANUP v2 34/39] x86: Separate out x86_regset for 32 and 64 bit Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/CLEANUP v2 35/39] x86: Improve formatting of user_regset arrays Rick Edgecombe
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 19:07   ` Chang S. Bae
2022-10-04 23:05     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 37/39] x86/cet: Add PTRACE interface for CET Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:59   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  8:44     ` Mike Rapoport
2022-10-04 19:24       ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 38/39] x86/cet/shstk: Add ARCH_CET_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-04  0:00   ` Kees Cook
2022-09-29 22:29 ` [OPTIONAL/RFC v2 39/39] x86: Add alt shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-10-03 23:21   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 16:12     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04 17:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-04 18:04         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-03 17:04 ` [PATCH v2 00/39] Shadowstacks for userspace Kees Cook
2022-10-03 17:25   ` Jann Horn
2022-10-04  5:01     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-04  9:57       ` David Laight
2022-10-04 19:28         ` Kees Cook
2022-10-03 18:33   ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-10-04  3:59     ` Kees Cook

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