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From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
	Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
	Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
	Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv9 02/14] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking
Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2022 17:47:46 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220930144758.30232-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220930144758.30232-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

Enumerate Linear Address Masking and provide defines for CR3 and CR4
flags.

Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h          | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h      | 2 ++
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 235dc85c91c3..73c0cf5bd8a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LAM			(12*32+26) /* Linear Address Masking */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index a7f3d9100adb..d8cccadc83a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
  * On systems with SME, one bit (in a variable position!) is stolen to indicate
  * that the top-level paging structure is encrypted.
  *
+ * On systemms with LAM, bits 61 and 62 are used to indicate LAM mode.
+ *
  * All of the remaining bits indicate the physical address of the top-level
  * paging structure.
  *
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
index c47cc7f2feeb..d898432947ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_BITS	12
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_MASK	(_AC((1UL << X86_CR3_PCID_BITS) - 1, UL))
 
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT	61 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:57 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U57		_BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT)
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT	62 /* Activate LAM for userspace, 62:48 bits masked */
+#define X86_CR3_LAM_U48		_BITULL(X86_CR3_LAM_U48_BIT)
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT 63 /* Preserve old PCID */
 #define X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH    _BITULL(X86_CR3_PCID_NOFLUSH_BIT)
 
@@ -132,6 +136,8 @@
 #define X86_CR4_PKE		_BITUL(X86_CR4_PKE_BIT)
 #define X86_CR4_CET_BIT		23 /* enable Control-flow Enforcement Technology */
 #define X86_CR4_CET		_BITUL(X86_CR4_CET_BIT)
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT	28 /* LAM for supervisor pointers */
+#define X86_CR4_LAM_SUP		_BITUL(X86_CR4_LAM_SUP_BIT)
 
 /*
  * x86-64 Task Priority Register, CR8
-- 
2.35.1



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-09-30 14:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-30 14:47 [PATCHv9 00/14] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 01/14] x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 03/14] mm: Pass down mm_struct to untagged_addr() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 04/14] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 05/14] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 06/14] KVM: Serialize tagged address check against tagging enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 07/14] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 08/14] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 09/14] x86: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/arch_status Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 10/14] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVM mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-10 21:24   ` Jacob Pan
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 11/14] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 12/14] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 13/14] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-09-30 14:47 ` [PATCHv9 14/14] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-06 13:58 ` [PATCHv9 00/14] Linear Address Masking enabling Alexander Potapenko
2022-10-06 16:41   ` Kirill A. Shutemov

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