From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCHv11 05/16] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 03:17:11 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221025001722.17466-6-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221025001722.17466-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
untagged_addr() is a helper used by the core-mm to strip tag bits and
get the address to the canonical shape. In only handles userspace
addresses. The untagging mask is stored in mmu_context and will be set
on enabling LAM for the process.
The tags must not be included into check whether it's okay to access the
userspace address.
Strip tags in access_ok().
get_user() and put_user() don't use access_ok(), but check access
against TASK_SIZE directly in assembly. Strip tags, before calling into
the assembly helper.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 11 ++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
index 002889ca8978..2fdb390040b5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ typedef struct {
/* Active LAM mode: X86_CR3_LAM_U48 or X86_CR3_LAM_U57 or 0 (disabled) */
unsigned long lam_cr3_mask;
+
+ /* Significant bits of the virtual address. Excludes tag bits. */
+ u64 untag_mask;
#endif
struct mutex lock;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 69c943b2ae90..5bd3d46685dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -100,6 +100,12 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = oldmm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
+ mm->context.untag_mask = oldmm->context.untag_mask;
+}
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm->context.untag_mask = -1UL;
}
#else
@@ -112,6 +118,10 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
}
+
+static inline void mm_reset_untag_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+}
#endif
#define enter_lazy_tlb enter_lazy_tlb
@@ -138,6 +148,7 @@ static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
mm->context.execute_only_pkey = -1;
}
#endif
+ mm_reset_untag_mask(mm);
init_new_context_ldt(mm);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 8bc614cfe21b..c6062c07ccd2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/instrumented.h>
#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
@@ -21,6 +22,30 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
# define WARN_ON_IN_IRQ()
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/*
+ * Mask out tag bits from the address.
+ *
+ * Magic with the 'sign' allows to untag userspace pointer without any branches
+ * while leaving kernel addresses intact.
+ */
+#define untagged_addr(mm, addr) ({ \
+ u64 __addr = (__force u64)(addr); \
+ s64 sign = (s64)__addr >> 63; \
+ __addr &= (mm)->context.untag_mask | sign; \
+ (__force __typeof__(addr))__addr; \
+})
+
+#define untagged_ptr(mm, ptr) ({ \
+ u64 __ptrval = (__force u64)(ptr); \
+ __ptrval = untagged_addr(mm, __ptrval); \
+ (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)) *)__ptrval; \
+})
+#else
+#define untagged_addr(mm, addr) (addr)
+#define untagged_ptr(mm, ptr) (ptr)
+#endif
+
/**
* access_ok - Checks if a user space pointer is valid
* @addr: User space pointer to start of block to check
@@ -41,7 +66,7 @@ static inline bool pagefault_disabled(void);
#define access_ok(addr, size) \
({ \
WARN_ON_IN_IRQ(); \
- likely(__access_ok(addr, size)); \
+ likely(__access_ok(untagged_addr(current->mm, addr), size)); \
})
#include <asm-generic/access_ok.h>
@@ -127,7 +152,13 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
* On error, the variable @x is set to zero.
*/
-#define get_user(x,ptr) ({ might_fault(); do_get_user_call(get_user,x,ptr); })
+#define get_user(x,ptr) \
+({ \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__ptr_clean; \
+ __ptr_clean = untagged_ptr(current->mm, ptr); \
+ might_fault(); \
+ do_get_user_call(get_user,x,__ptr_clean); \
+})
/**
* __get_user - Get a simple variable from user space, with less checking.
@@ -227,7 +258,12 @@ extern void __put_user_nocheck_8(void);
*
* Return: zero on success, or -EFAULT on error.
*/
-#define put_user(x, ptr) ({ might_fault(); do_put_user_call(put_user,x,ptr); })
+#define put_user(x, ptr) ({ \
+ __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__ptr_clean; \
+ __ptr_clean = untagged_ptr(current->mm, ptr); \
+ might_fault(); \
+ do_put_user_call(put_user,x,__ptr_clean); \
+})
/**
* __put_user - Write a simple value into user space, with less checking.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index c21b7347a26d..d1e83ba21130 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <asm/unwind.h>
#include <asm/tdx.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include "process.h"
@@ -367,6 +368,8 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(current);
speculation_ctrl_update(read_thread_flags());
}
+
+ mm_reset_untag_mask(current->mm);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
--
2.38.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-25 0:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-25 0:17 [PATCHv11 00/16] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 01/16] x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 02/16] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 03/16] mm: Pass down mm_struct to untagged_addr() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 04/16] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:58 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-11-07 17:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 18:02 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 21:35 ` [PATCHv11.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-09 3:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-11-09 9:17 ` kirill
2022-10-25 0:17 ` Kirill A. Shutemov [this message]
2022-11-07 14:50 ` [PATCHv11 05/16] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Andy Lutomirski
2022-11-07 17:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 06/16] KVM: Serialize tagged address check against tagging enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 07/16] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 21:37 ` [PATCHv11.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 08/16] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 09/16] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 14:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 10/16] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 11/16] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 12/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 13/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 14/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 15/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 16/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 11:25 ` [PATCHv11 00/16] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
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