From: jeffxu@chromium.org
To: dave.hansen@intel.com, luto@kernel.org, jorgelo@chromium.org,
keescook@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org, jannh@google.com,
sroettger@google.com
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, jeffxu@google.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] PKEY: Apply PKEY_ENFORCE_API to mprotect
Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 13:05:49 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230515130553.2311248-4-jeffxu@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230515130553.2311248-1-jeffxu@chromium.org>
From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
This patch enables PKEY_ENFORCE_API for the mprotect and
mprotect_pkey syscalls.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu<jeffxu@google.com>
---
mm/mprotect.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 8a68fdca8487..1378be50567d 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -727,9 +727,13 @@ mprotect_fixup(struct vma_iterator *vmi, struct mmu_gather *tlb,
/*
* pkey==-1 when doing a legacy mprotect()
+ * syscall==true if this is called by syscall from userspace.
+ * Note: this is always true for now, added as a reminder in case that
+ * do_mprotect_pkey is called directly by kernel in the future.
+ * Also it is consistent with __do_munmap().
*/
static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
- unsigned long prot, int pkey)
+ unsigned long prot, int pkey, bool syscall)
{
unsigned long nstart, end, tmp, reqprot;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
@@ -794,6 +798,21 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
}
}
+ /*
+ * When called by syscall from userspace, check if the calling
+ * thread has the PKEY permission to modify the memory mapping.
+ */
+ if (syscall &&
+ arch_check_pkey_enforce_api(current->mm, start, end) < 0) {
+ char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+
+ pr_warn_ratelimited(
+ "munmap was denied on PKEY_ENFORCE_API memory, pid=%d '%s'\n",
+ task_pid_nr(current), get_task_comm(comm, current));
+ error = -EACCES;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
prev = vma_prev(&vmi);
if (start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
@@ -878,7 +897,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
unsigned long, prot)
{
- return do_mprotect_pkey(start, len, prot, -1);
+ return do_mprotect_pkey(start, len, prot, -1, true);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -886,7 +905,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
SYSCALL_DEFINE4(pkey_mprotect, unsigned long, start, size_t, len,
unsigned long, prot, int, pkey)
{
- return do_mprotect_pkey(start, len, prot, pkey);
+ return do_mprotect_pkey(start, len, prot, pkey, true);
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pkey_alloc, unsigned long, flags, unsigned long, init_val)
--
2.40.1.606.ga4b1b128d6-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-15 13:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-15 13:05 [PATCH 0/6] Memory Mapping (VMA) protection using PKU - set 1 jeffxu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 1/6] PKEY: Introduce PKEY_ENFORCE_API flag jeffxu
2023-05-16 23:14 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-16 23:55 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 11:07 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 2/6] PKEY: Add arch_check_pkey_enforce_api() jeffxu
2023-05-18 21:43 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-18 22:51 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-19 0:00 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-19 11:22 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-15 13:05 ` jeffxu [this message]
2023-05-16 20:07 ` [PATCH 3/6] PKEY: Apply PKEY_ENFORCE_API to mprotect Kees Cook
2023-05-16 22:23 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 23:18 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-16 23:36 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 4:50 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 4/6] PKEY:selftest pkey_enforce_api for mprotect jeffxu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 5/6] KEY: Apply PKEY_ENFORCE_API to munmap jeffxu
2023-05-16 20:06 ` Kees Cook
2023-05-16 22:24 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 23:23 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-17 0:08 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-15 13:05 ` [PATCH 6/6] PKEY:selftest pkey_enforce_api for munmap jeffxu
2023-05-15 14:28 ` [PATCH 0/6] Memory Mapping (VMA) protection using PKU - set 1 Dave Hansen
2023-05-15 15:03 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-16 7:06 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-16 22:41 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-17 10:51 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-17 15:07 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-17 15:21 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 15:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-17 23:48 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-18 15:37 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-18 20:20 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-18 21:04 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-19 11:13 ` Stephen Röttger
2023-05-24 20:15 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 20:08 ` Kees Cook
2023-05-16 22:17 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-16 22:30 ` Dave Hansen
2023-05-16 23:39 ` Jeff Xu
2023-05-17 10:49 ` Stephen Röttger
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