From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
To: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Marco Elver <elver@google.com>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>,
Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 12/33] kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 23:01:06 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231121220155.1217090-13-iii@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231121220155.1217090-1-iii@linux.ibm.com>
Like for KASAN, it's useful to temporarily disable KMSAN checks around,
e.g., redzone accesses. Introduce kmsan_disable_current() and
kmsan_enable_current(), which are similar to their KASAN counterparts.
Even though it's not strictly necessary, make them reentrant, in order
to match the KASAN behavior. Repurpose the allow_reporting field for
this.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
---
Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst | 4 ++--
include/linux/kmsan-checks.h | 12 ++++++++++++
include/linux/kmsan_types.h | 2 +-
mm/kmsan/core.c | 2 +-
mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
mm/kmsan/report.c | 6 +++---
6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst
index 323eedad53cd..022a823f5f1b 100644
--- a/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst
+++ b/Documentation/dev-tools/kmsan.rst
@@ -338,11 +338,11 @@ Per-task KMSAN state
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Every task_struct has an associated KMSAN task state that holds the KMSAN
-context (see above) and a per-task flag disallowing KMSAN reports::
+context (see above) and a per-task counter disallowing KMSAN reports::
struct kmsan_context {
...
- bool allow_reporting;
+ unsigned int depth;
struct kmsan_context_state cstate;
...
}
diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h
index 5218973f0ad0..bab2603685f7 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmsan-checks.h
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy,
*/
void kmsan_memmove_metadata(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n);
+void kmsan_enable_current(void);
+
+void kmsan_disable_current(void);
+
#else
static inline void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size,
@@ -92,6 +96,14 @@ static inline void kmsan_memmove_metadata(void *dst, const void *src, size_t n)
{
}
+static inline void kmsan_enable_current(void)
+{
+}
+
+static inline void kmsan_disable_current(void)
+{
+}
+
#endif
#endif /* _LINUX_KMSAN_CHECKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/kmsan_types.h b/include/linux/kmsan_types.h
index 8bfa6c98176d..27bb146ece95 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmsan_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmsan_types.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct kmsan_context_state {
struct kmsan_ctx {
struct kmsan_context_state cstate;
int kmsan_in_runtime;
- bool allow_reporting;
+ unsigned int depth;
};
#endif /* _LINUX_KMSAN_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/core.c b/mm/kmsan/core.c
index c19f47af0424..b8767378cf8a 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/core.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/core.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ void kmsan_internal_task_create(struct task_struct *task)
struct thread_info *info = current_thread_info();
__memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- ctx->allow_reporting = true;
+ ctx->depth = 0;
kmsan_internal_unpoison_memory(info, sizeof(*info), false);
}
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
index 4d477a0a356c..7b5814412e9f 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/hooks.c
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ void kmsan_task_exit(struct task_struct *task)
if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime())
return;
- ctx->allow_reporting = false;
+ ctx->depth++;
}
void kmsan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, gfp_t flags)
@@ -434,3 +434,15 @@ void kmsan_check_memory(const void *addr, size_t size)
REASON_ANY);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_check_memory);
+
+void kmsan_enable_current(void)
+{
+ current->kmsan_ctx.depth--;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_enable_current);
+
+void kmsan_disable_current(void)
+{
+ current->kmsan_ctx.depth++;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_disable_current);
diff --git a/mm/kmsan/report.c b/mm/kmsan/report.c
index c79d3b0d2d0d..edcf53ca428e 100644
--- a/mm/kmsan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kmsan/report.c
@@ -158,12 +158,12 @@ void kmsan_report(depot_stack_handle_t origin, void *address, int size,
if (!kmsan_enabled)
return;
- if (!current->kmsan_ctx.allow_reporting)
+ if (current->kmsan_ctx.depth)
return;
if (!origin)
return;
- current->kmsan_ctx.allow_reporting = false;
+ current->kmsan_ctx.depth++;
ua_flags = user_access_save();
raw_spin_lock(&kmsan_report_lock);
pr_err("=====================================================\n");
@@ -216,5 +216,5 @@ void kmsan_report(depot_stack_handle_t origin, void *address, int size,
if (panic_on_kmsan)
panic("kmsan.panic set ...\n");
user_access_restore(ua_flags);
- current->kmsan_ctx.allow_reporting = true;
+ current->kmsan_ctx.depth--;
}
--
2.41.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-21 22:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-21 22:00 [PATCH v2 00/33] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:00 ` [PATCH v2 01/33] ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in ftrace_ops_list_func() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-22 23:32 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-12-08 14:16 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-12-08 14:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2023-11-21 22:00 ` [PATCH v2 02/33] kmsan: Make the tests compatible with kmsan.panic=1 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:00 ` [PATCH v2 03/33] kmsan: Disable KMSAN when DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is enabled Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:00 ` [PATCH v2 04/33] kmsan: Increase the maximum store size to 4096 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 16:31 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:00 ` [PATCH v2 05/33] kmsan: Fix is_bad_asm_addr() on arches with overlapping address spaces Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-11 9:52 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 08/33] kmsan: Remove an x86-specific #include from kmsan.h Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 09/33] kmsan: Introduce kmsan_memmove_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 16:51 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 11/33] kmsan: Export panic_on_kmsan Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` Ilya Leoshkevich [this message]
2023-12-11 11:50 ` [PATCH v2 12/33] kmsan: Allow disabling KMSAN checks for the current task Alexander Potapenko
2023-12-13 15:01 ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 13/33] kmsan: Introduce memset_no_sanitize_memory() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 13:48 ` Alexander Potapenko
[not found] ` <69e7bc8e8c8a38c429a793e991e0509cb97a53e1.camel@linux.ibm.com>
2023-12-08 15:25 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 14/33] kmsan: Support SLAB_POISON Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 13:51 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 15/33] kmsan: Use ALIGN_DOWN() in kmsan_get_metadata() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 16/33] mm: slub: Let KMSAN access metadata Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-30 15:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 17/33] mm: kfence: Disable KMSAN when checking the canary Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 12:53 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-12-08 13:55 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 18/33] lib/string: Add KMSAN support to strlcpy() and strlcat() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 16:50 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-12-13 0:53 ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 19/33] lib/zlib: Unpoison DFLTCC output buffers Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 13:32 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-12-08 14:14 ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 14:25 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 20/33] kmsan: Accept ranges starting with 0 on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 21/33] s390: Turn off KMSAN for boot, vdso and purgatory Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 22/33] s390: Use a larger stack for KMSAN Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 23/33] s390/boot: Add the KMSAN runtime stub Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 16:56 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 24/33] s390/checksum: Add a KMSAN check Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 13:38 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 25/33] s390/cpacf: Unpoison the results of cpacf_trng() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-11 10:36 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 26/33] s390/ftrace: Unpoison ftrace_regs in kprobe_ftrace_handler() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-08 14:18 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 27/33] s390/mm: Define KMSAN metadata for vmalloc and modules Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-11 10:13 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 28/33] s390/string: Add KMSAN support Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-11 10:49 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 29/33] s390/traps: Unpoison the kernel_stack_overflow()'s pt_regs Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 30/33] s390/uaccess: Add KMSAN support to put_user() and get_user() Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-11 10:46 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 31/33] s390/unwind: Disable KMSAN checks Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 32/33] s390: Implement the architecture-specific kmsan functions Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-11 10:26 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-12-11 10:39 ` Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-12-11 10:45 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-21 22:01 ` [PATCH v2 33/33] kmsan: Enable on s390 Ilya Leoshkevich
2023-11-29 9:19 ` Alexander Potapenko
2023-11-29 9:58 ` Ilya Leoshkevich
[not found] ` <20231121220155.1217090-11-iii@linux.ibm.com>
2023-12-11 10:07 ` [PATCH v2 10/33] kmsan: Expose kmsan_get_metadata() Alexander Potapenko
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