From: debug@rivosinc.com
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Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] riscv: Implementing "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" on riscv
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:21:36 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240125062739.1339782-12-debug@rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com>
From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
This patch implements new risc-v specific protection flag
`PROT_SHADOWSTACK` (only for kernel) on riscv.
`PROT_SHADOWSTACK` protection flag is only limited to kernel and not exposed
to userspace. Shadow stack is a security construct to prevent against ROP attacks.
`map_shadow_stack` is a new syscall to manufacture shadow stack. In order to avoid
multiple methods to create shadow stack, `PROT_SHADOWSTACK` is not allowed for user
space `mmap` call. `mprotect` wouldn't allow because `arch_validate_prot` already
takes care of this for risc-v.
`arch_calc_vm_prot_bits` is implemented on risc-v to return VM_SHADOW_STACK (alias
for VM_WRITE) if PROT_SHADOWSTACK is supplied (such as call to `do_mmap` will) and
underlying CPU supports shadow stack. `PROT_WRITE` will be converted to `VM_READ |
`VM_WRITE` so that existing case where `PROT_WRITE` is specified keep working but
don't collide with `VM_WRITE` only encoding which now denotes a shadow stack.
risc-v `mmap` wrapper enforces if PROT_WRITE is specified and PROT_READ is left out
then PROT_READ is enforced.
Earlier `protection_map[VM_WRITE]` used to pick read-write (and copy on write) PTE
encodings. Now all non-shadow stack writeable mappings will pick `protection_map[VM_WRITE
| VM_READ] PTE encodings. `protection[VM_WRITE]` are programmed to pick PAGE_SHADOWSTACK
PTE encordings.
Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
---
arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 1 +
arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h
index 4902d837e93c..bc09a9c0e81f 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -22,4 +22,21 @@
*/
#define PROT_SHADOWSTACK 0x40
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long pkey __always_unused)
+{
+ unsigned long ret = 0;
+
+ if (cpu_supports_shadow_stack())
+ ret = (prot & PROT_SHADOWSTACK) ? VM_SHADOW_STACK : 0;
+ /*
+ * If PROT_WRITE was specified, force it to VM_READ | VM_WRITE.
+ * Only VM_WRITE means shadow stack.
+ */
+ if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+ ret = (VM_READ | VM_WRITE);
+ return ret;
+}
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
#endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 294044429e8e..54a8dde29504 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ extern struct pt_alloc_ops pt_ops __initdata;
#define PAGE_READ_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC)
#define PAGE_WRITE_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ | \
_PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_WRITE)
+#define PAGE_SHADOWSTACK __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_WRITE)
#define PAGE_COPY PAGE_READ
#define PAGE_COPY_EXEC PAGE_READ_EXEC
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
index a2ca5b7756a5..2a7cf28a6fe0 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#include <asm-generic/mman-common.h>
#include <vdso/vsyscall.h>
+#include <asm/mman.h>
static long riscv_sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
@@ -25,6 +26,24 @@ static long riscv_sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
if (unlikely(offset & (~PAGE_MASK >> page_shift_offset)))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * If only PROT_WRITE is specified then extend that to PROT_READ
+ * protection_map[VM_WRITE] is now going to select shadow stack encodings.
+ * So specifying PROT_WRITE actually should select protection_map [VM_WRITE | VM_READ]
+ * If user wants to create shadow stack then they should use `map_shadow_stack` syscall.
+ */
+ if (unlikely((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(prot & PROT_READ)))
+ prot |= PROT_READ;
+
+ /*
+ * PROT_SHADOWSTACK is a kernel only protection flag on risc-v.
+ * mmap doesn't expect PROT_SHADOWSTACK to be set by user space.
+ * User space can rely on `map_shadow_stack` syscall to create
+ * shadow stack pages.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(prot & PROT_SHADOWSTACK))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
return ksys_mmap_pgoff(addr, len, prot, flags, fd,
offset >> (PAGE_SHIFT - page_shift_offset));
}
diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
index 2e011cbddf3a..f71c2d2c6cbf 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ pgd_t early_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD] __initdata __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
static const pgprot_t protection_map[16] = {
[VM_NONE] = PAGE_NONE,
[VM_READ] = PAGE_READ,
- [VM_WRITE] = PAGE_COPY,
+ [VM_WRITE] = PAGE_SHADOWSTACK,
[VM_WRITE | VM_READ] = PAGE_COPY,
[VM_EXEC] = PAGE_EXEC,
[VM_EXEC | VM_READ] = PAGE_READ_EXEC,
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-25 6:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-25 6:21 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] riscv: abstract envcfg CSR debug
2024-02-12 10:23 ` Andrew Jones
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] riscv: envcfg save and restore on trap entry/exit debug
2024-01-25 7:19 ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-01-25 17:09 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 17:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] riscv: define default value for envcfg debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] riscv: zicfiss/zicfilp enumeration debug
2024-01-25 17:59 ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25 18:26 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 18:46 ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] riscv: zicfiss/zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] riscv: kernel handling on trap entry/exit for user cfi debug
2024-01-25 7:29 ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-01-25 17:30 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 19:47 ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-01-26 0:25 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for RISC-V debug
2024-01-25 8:17 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-01-25 17:05 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] mm: abstract shadow stack vma behind `arch_is_shadow_stack` debug
2024-01-25 8:18 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-01-25 17:07 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-02-13 10:34 ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-22 1:32 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] riscv/mm : Introducing new protection flag "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` debug [this message]
[not found] ` <2914cf78e47010e195d963857b37807e8446e3be.camel@intel.com>
2024-02-22 0:39 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] riscv: Implementing "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" on riscv Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall debug
2024-01-25 21:24 ` Charlie Jenkins
2024-01-26 0:44 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-02-06 16:01 ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22 0:47 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-02-22 13:33 ` Mark Brown
[not found] ` <ba45e69f69851721419b84f1ff8b66a490f92c86.camel@intel.com>
2024-02-22 0:50 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] prctl: arch-agnostic prtcl for indirect branch tracking debug
2024-02-06 16:13 ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22 0:42 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] riscv: Implements arch argnostic indirect branch tracking prctls debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] riscv sigcontext: adding cfi state field in sigcontext debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] riscv signal: Save and restore of shadow stack for signal debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] riscv: select config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support debug
2024-01-25 18:04 ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25 18:12 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 18:44 ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25 19:26 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv debug
2024-01-25 6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi debug
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