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Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] riscv signal: Save and restore of shadow stack for signal
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 22:21:48 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240125062739.1339782-24-debug@rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com>

From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>

Save shadow stack pointer in sigcontext structure while delivering signal.
Restore shadow stack pointer from sigcontext on sigreturn.

Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
---
 arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 18 ++++++++++++
 arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c       | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c      | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 110 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h
index 4bd10dcd48aa..28c67866ff6f 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task);
 bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task);
 bool is_indir_lp_enabled(struct task_struct *task);
 bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task);
+unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task);
+int restore_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long shstk_ptr);
+int save_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *saved_shstk_ptr);
 
 #define PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK (PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE)
 
@@ -70,6 +73,16 @@ static inline bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task)
 	return false;
 }
 
+int restore_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long shstk_ptr)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+int save_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *saved_shstk_ptr)
+{
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline bool is_indir_lp_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	return false;
@@ -81,6 +94,11 @@ static inline bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task)
 	return false;
 }
 
+static inline unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */
 
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c
index 88b6220b2608..d1092f0a6363 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <asm/vector.h>
 #include <asm/csr.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/usercfi.h>
 
 unsigned long signal_minsigstksz __ro_after_init;
 
@@ -229,6 +230,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
 	struct task_struct *task;
+	unsigned long ss_ptr = 0;
 	sigset_t set;
 	size_t frame_size = get_rt_frame_size(false);
 
@@ -251,6 +253,26 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (restore_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack))
 		goto badframe;
 
+	/*
+	 * Restore shadow stack as a form of token stored on shadow stack itself as a safe
+	 * way to restore.
+	 * A token on shadow gives following properties
+	 *	- Safe save and restore for shadow stack switching. Any save of shadow stack
+	 *	  must have had saved a token on shadow stack. Similarly any restore of shadow
+	 *	  stack must check the token before restore. Since writing to shadow stack with
+	 *	  address of shadow stack itself is not easily allowed. A restore without a save
+	 *	  is quite difficult for an attacker to perform.
+	 *	- A natural break. A token in shadow stack provides a natural break in shadow stack
+	 *	  So a single linear range can be bucketed into different shadow stack segments.
+	 *	  sspopchk will detect the condition and fault to kernel as sw check exception.
+	 */
+	if (__copy_from_user(&ss_ptr, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext.sc_cfi_state.ss_ptr,
+						 sizeof(unsigned long)))
+		goto badframe;
+
+	if (is_shstk_enabled(current) && restore_user_shstk(current, ss_ptr))
+		goto badframe;
+
 	regs->cause = -1UL;
 
 	return regs->a0;
@@ -320,6 +342,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
 	long err = 0;
 	unsigned long __maybe_unused addr;
+	unsigned long ss_ptr = 0;
 	size_t frame_size = get_rt_frame_size(false);
 
 	frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, frame_size);
@@ -331,6 +354,23 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 	/* Create the ucontext. */
 	err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags);
 	err |= __put_user(NULL, &frame->uc.uc_link);
+	/*
+	 * Save a pointer to shadow stack itself on shadow stack as a form of token.
+	 * A token on shadow gives following properties
+	 *	- Safe save and restore for shadow stack switching. Any save of shadow stack
+	 *	  must have had saved a token on shadow stack. Similarly any restore of shadow
+	 *	  stack must check the token before restore. Since writing to shadow stack with
+	 *	  address of shadow stack itself is not easily allowed. A restore without a save
+	 *	  is quite difficult for an attacker to perform.
+	 *	- A natural break. A token in shadow stack provides a natural break in shadow stack
+	 *	  So a single linear range can be bucketed into different shadow stack segments. Any
+	 *	  sspopchk will detect the condition and fault to kernel as sw check exception.
+	 */
+	if (is_shstk_enabled(current)) {
+		err |= save_user_shstk(current, &ss_ptr);
+		err |= __put_user(ss_ptr, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext.sc_cfi_state.ss_ptr);
+	}
+
 	err |= __save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, regs->sp);
 	err |= setup_sigcontext(frame, regs);
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
@@ -341,6 +381,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 	regs->ra = (unsigned long)VDSO_SYMBOL(
 		current->mm->context.vdso, rt_sigreturn);
+
+	/* if bcfi is enabled x1 (ra) and x5 (t0) must match. not sure if we need this? */
+	if (is_shstk_enabled(current))
+		regs->t0 = regs->ra;
+
 #else
 	/*
 	 * For the nommu case we don't have a VDSO.  Instead we push two
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
index af8cc8f4616c..f5eb0124571b 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr)
 	task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk = shstk_addr;
 }
 
+unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk;
+}
+
 void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable)
 {
 	task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en = enable ? 1 : 0;
@@ -165,6 +170,48 @@ static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Save user shadow stack pointer on shadow stack itself and return pointer to saved location
+ * returns -EFAULT if operation was unsuccessful
+ */
+int save_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *saved_shstk_ptr)
+{
+	unsigned long ss_ptr = 0;
+	unsigned long token_loc = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (saved_shstk_ptr == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ss_ptr = get_active_shstk(tsk);
+	ret = create_rstor_token(ss_ptr, &token_loc);
+
+	*saved_shstk_ptr = token_loc;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores user shadow stack pointer from token on shadow stack for task `tsk`
+ * returns -EFAULT if operation was unsuccessful
+ */
+int restore_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long shstk_ptr)
+{
+	unsigned long token = 0;
+
+	token = amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)shstk_ptr, 0);
+
+	if (token == -1)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* invalid token, return EINVAL */
+	if ((token - shstk_ptr) != SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* all checks passed, set active shstk and return success */
+	set_active_shstk(tsk, token);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
 				unsigned long token_offset,
 				bool set_tok)
-- 
2.43.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-01-25  6:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-01-25  6:21 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] riscv: abstract envcfg CSR debug
2024-02-12 10:23   ` Andrew Jones
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] riscv: envcfg save and restore on trap entry/exit debug
2024-01-25  7:19   ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-01-25 17:09     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 17:54       ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] riscv: define default value for envcfg debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] riscv/Kconfig: enable HAVE_EXIT_THREAD for riscv debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] riscv: zicfiss/zicfilp enumeration debug
2024-01-25 17:59   ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25 18:26     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 18:46       ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] riscv: zicfiss/zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] riscv: kernel handling on trap entry/exit for user cfi debug
2024-01-25  7:29   ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-01-25 17:30     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 19:47       ` Stefan O'Rear
2024-01-26  0:25         ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for RISC-V debug
2024-01-25  8:17   ` David Hildenbrand
2024-01-25 17:05     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] mm: abstract shadow stack vma behind `arch_is_shadow_stack` debug
2024-01-25  8:18   ` David Hildenbrand
2024-01-25 17:07     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-02-13 10:34       ` David Hildenbrand
2024-02-22  1:32         ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] riscv/mm : Introducing new protection flag "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] riscv: Implementing "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" on riscv debug
     [not found]   ` <2914cf78e47010e195d963857b37807e8446e3be.camel@intel.com>
2024-02-22  0:39     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall debug
2024-01-25 21:24   ` Charlie Jenkins
2024-01-26  0:44     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-02-06 16:01   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22  0:47     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-02-22 13:33       ` Mark Brown
     [not found]   ` <ba45e69f69851721419b84f1ff8b66a490f92c86.camel@intel.com>
2024-02-22  0:50     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] prctl: arch-agnostic prtcl for indirect branch tracking debug
2024-02-06 16:13   ` Mark Brown
2024-02-22  0:42     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] riscv: Implements arch argnostic indirect branch tracking prctls debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] riscv sigcontext: adding cfi state field in sigcontext debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` debug [this message]
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] riscv: select config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support debug
2024-01-25 18:04   ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25 18:12     ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25 18:44       ` Conor Dooley
2024-01-25 19:26         ` Deepak Gupta
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv debug
2024-01-25  6:21 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi debug

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