From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
<linux-mm@kvack.org>, <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>, <jmattson@google.com>,
<luto@kernel.org>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
<slp@redhat.com>, <pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
<tobin@ibm.com>, <bp@alien8.de>, <vbabka@suse.cz>,
<kirill@shutemov.name>, <ak@linux.intel.com>,
<tony.luck@intel.com>,
<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
<alpergun@google.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 04/25] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 22:11:04 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240126041126.1927228-5-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240126041126.1927228-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The memory integrity guarantees of SEV-SNP are enforced through a new
structure called the Reverse Map Table (RMP). The RMP is a single data
structure shared across the system that contains one entry for every 4K
page of DRAM that may be used by SEV-SNP VMs. The APM Volume 2 section
on Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) details a number of steps needed to
detect/enable SEV-SNP and RMP table support on the host:
- Detect SEV-SNP support based on CPUID bit
- Initialize the RMP table memory reported by the RMP base/end MSR
registers and configure IOMMU to be compatible with RMP access
restrictions
- Set the MtrrFixDramModEn bit in SYSCFG MSR
- Set the SecureNestedPagingEn and VMPLEn bits in the SYSCFG MSR
- Configure IOMMU
RMP table entry format is non-architectural and it can vary by
processor. It is defined by the PPR document for each respective CPU
family. Restrict SNP support to CPU models/families which are compatible
with the current RMP table entry format to guard against any undefined
behavior when running on other system types. Future models/support will
handle this through an architectural mechanism to allow for broader
compatibility.
SNP host code depends on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV config flag which may be
enabled even when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't set, so update the
SNP-specific IOMMU helpers used here to rely on CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
instead of CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Co-developed-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/Kbuild | 2 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 11 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 6 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 16 +++
arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile | 3 +
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 216 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 253 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile
create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kbuild b/arch/x86/Kbuild
index 5a83da703e87..6a1f36df6a18 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kbuild
+++ b/arch/x86/Kbuild
@@ -28,5 +28,7 @@ obj-y += net/
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += purgatory/
+obj-y += virt/svm/
+
# for cleaning
subdir- += boot tools
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index f1bd7b91b3c6..f482bc6a5ae7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -599,6 +599,8 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE 0xc0010132
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_END 0xc0010133
/* SNP feature bits enabled by the hypervisor */
#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM BIT_ULL(3)
@@ -708,8 +710,15 @@
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2 0xc001001d
#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG 0xc0010010
-#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT 24
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT 25
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN_BIT)
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT 19
+#define MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM_BIT)
+
#define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055
/* C1E active bits in int pending message */
#define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 5b4a1ce3d368..1f59d8ba9776 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -243,4 +243,10 @@ static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; }
static inline u64 sev_get_status(void) { return 0; }
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
+bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void);
+#else
+static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 79153e9b92b5..f48c51640c65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <asm/delay.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
#include <asm/resctrl.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
# include <asm/mmconfig.h>
@@ -584,6 +585,21 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
break;
}
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP)) {
+ /*
+ * RMP table entry format is not architectural and it can vary by processor
+ * and is defined by the per-processor PPR. Restrict SNP support on the
+ * known CPU model and family for which the RMP table entry format is
+ * currently defined for.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN3) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN4) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
+ else if (!snp_probe_rmptable_info())
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
+ }
+
return;
warn:
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ef2a31bdcc70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV) += sev.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..575a9ff046cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD SVM-SEV Host Support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/printk.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/iommu.h>
+#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
+
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/cpuid.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/iommu.h>
+
+/*
+ * The RMP entry format is not architectural. The format is defined in PPR
+ * Family 19h Model 01h, Rev B1 processor.
+ */
+struct rmpentry {
+ u64 assigned : 1,
+ pagesize : 1,
+ immutable : 1,
+ rsvd1 : 9,
+ gpa : 39,
+ asid : 10,
+ vmsa : 1,
+ validated : 1,
+ rsvd2 : 1;
+ u64 rsvd3;
+} __packed;
+
+/*
+ * The first 16KB from the RMP_BASE is used by the processor for the
+ * bookkeeping, the range needs to be added during the RMP entry lookup.
+ */
+#define RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ 0x4000
+
+static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
+static struct rmpentry *rmptable __ro_after_init;
+static u64 rmptable_max_pfn __ro_after_init;
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SEV-SNP: " fmt
+
+static int __mfd_enable(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+ return 0;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+ val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MFDM;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void mfd_enable(void *arg)
+{
+ __mfd_enable(smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+static int __snp_enable(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+ return 0;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+ val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN;
+ val |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_VMPL_EN;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void snp_enable(void *arg)
+{
+ __snp_enable(smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+#define RMP_ADDR_MASK GENMASK_ULL(51, 13)
+
+bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
+{
+ u64 max_rmp_pfn, calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz, rmp_base, rmp_end;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_BASE, rmp_base);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_RMP_END, rmp_end);
+
+ if (!(rmp_base & RMP_ADDR_MASK) || !(rmp_end & RMP_ADDR_MASK)) {
+ pr_err("Memory for the RMP table has not been reserved by BIOS\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (rmp_base > rmp_end) {
+ pr_err("RMP configuration not valid: base=%#llx, end=%#llx\n", rmp_base, rmp_end);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ rmp_sz = rmp_end - rmp_base + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the amount the memory that must be reserved by the BIOS to
+ * address the whole RAM, including the bookkeeping area. The RMP itself
+ * must also be covered.
+ */
+ max_rmp_pfn = max_pfn;
+ if (PHYS_PFN(rmp_end) > max_pfn)
+ max_rmp_pfn = PHYS_PFN(rmp_end);
+
+ calc_rmp_sz = (max_rmp_pfn << 4) + RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
+
+ if (calc_rmp_sz > rmp_sz) {
+ pr_err("Memory reserved for the RMP table does not cover full system RAM (expected 0x%llx got 0x%llx)\n",
+ calc_rmp_sz, rmp_sz);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ probed_rmp_base = rmp_base;
+ probed_rmp_size = rmp_sz;
+
+ pr_info("RMP table physical range [0x%016llx - 0x%016llx]\n",
+ probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size - 1);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
+ * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
+ * firmware ABI spec.
+ */
+static int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
+{
+ void *rmptable_start;
+ u64 rmptable_size;
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!amd_iommu_snp_en)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!probed_rmp_size)
+ goto nosnp;
+
+ rmptable_start = memremap(probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!rmptable_start) {
+ pr_err("Failed to map RMP table\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check if SEV-SNP is already enabled, this can happen in case of
+ * kexec boot.
+ */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+ if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+ goto skip_enable;
+
+ memset(rmptable_start, 0, probed_rmp_size);
+
+ /* Flush the caches to ensure that data is written before SNP is enabled. */
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ /* MtrrFixDramModEn must be enabled on all the CPUs prior to enabling SNP. */
+ on_each_cpu(mfd_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+ on_each_cpu(snp_enable, NULL, 1);
+
+skip_enable:
+ rmptable_start += RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
+ rmptable_size = probed_rmp_size - RMPTABLE_CPU_BOOKKEEPING_SZ;
+
+ rmptable = (struct rmpentry *)rmptable_start;
+ rmptable_max_pfn = rmptable_size / sizeof(struct rmpentry) - 1;
+
+ cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/rmptable_init:online", __snp_enable, NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+
+nosnp:
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP);
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This must be called after the IOMMU has been initialized.
+ */
+device_initcall(snp_rmptable_init);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-26 4:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-26 4:11 [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] iommu/amd: Don't rely on external callers to enable IOMMU SNP support Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] x86/mtrr: Don't print errors if MtrrFixDramModEn is set when SNP enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] x86/fault: Dump RMP table information when RMP page faults occur Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2024-01-29 18:00 ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 19:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 19:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] x86/sev: Adjust directmap to avoid inadvertant RMP faults Michael Roth
2024-01-26 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 17:04 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-26 18:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 23:54 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 11:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-27 15:45 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-27 16:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 11:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-29 15:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-01-29 17:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2024-01-29 14:26 ` Vlastimil Babka
2024-01-29 14:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: ccp: Handle non-volatile INIT_EX data " Michael Roth
2024-01-29 15:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: ccp: Handle legacy SEV commands " Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] iommu/amd: Clean up RMP entries for IOMMU pages during SNP shutdown Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2024-01-26 11:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] x86/cpufeatures: Enable/unmask SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_COMMIT command Michael Roth
2024-01-26 4:11 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_SET_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2024-01-29 19:18 ` Liam Merwick
2024-01-29 20:10 ` Michael Roth
2024-01-30 16:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Initialization Support Borislav Petkov
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