Re: [PATCH v8 1/7] mseal sysmap: kernel config and header change

Jeff Xu
2025-03-03T19:29:37Z

On Mon, Mar 3, 2025 at 8:37 AM Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Mar 03, 2025 at 05:09:15AM +0000, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote:
> > From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> >
> > Provide infrastructure to mseal system mappings. Establish
> > two kernel configs (CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS,
> > ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS) and VM_SEALED_SYSMAP
> > macro for future patches.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > include/linux/mm.h | 10 ++++++++++
> > init/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > security/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> > 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index 7b1068ddcbb7..8b800941678d 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -4155,4 +4155,14 @@ int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *st
> > int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> > int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status);
> >
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * mseal of userspace process's system mappings.
> > + */
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > +#define VM_SEALED_SYSMAP VM_SEALED
> > +#else
> > +#define VM_SEALED_SYSMAP VM_NONE
> > +#endif
> > +
> > #endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */
> > diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
> > index d0d021b3fa3b..c90dd8778993 100644
> > --- a/init/Kconfig
> > +++ b/init/Kconfig
> > @@ -1882,6 +1882,28 @@ config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_CALLBACKS
> > config ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
> > bool
> >
> > +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + bool
> > + help
> > + Control MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS access based on architecture.
> > +
> > + A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > + No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > + To enable this feature, the architecture needs to update their
> > + special mappings calls to include the sealing flag and confirm
> > + that it doesn't unmap/remap system mappings during the life
> > + time of the process. The existence of this flag for an architecture
> > + implies that it does not require the remapping of thest system
>
> typo nit: "the" instead of "thest"
>
> > + mappings during process lifetime, so sealing these mappings is safe
> > + from a kernel perspective.
> > +
> > + After the architecture enables this, a distribution can set
> > + CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPING to manage access to the feature.
> > +
> > + For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > + Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> > config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
> > bool
> > help
> > diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> > index f10dbf15c294..5311f4a6786c 100644
> > --- a/security/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/Kconfig
> > @@ -51,6 +51,27 @@ config PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE
> >
> > endchoice
> >
> > +config MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + bool "mseal system mappings"
> > + depends on 64BIT
> > + depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS
> > + depends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > + help
> > + Apply mseal on system mappings.
> > + The system mappings includes vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock,
> > + vectors (arm compact-mode), sigpage (arm compact-mode), uprobes.
>
> typo nits: "compat" instead of "compact".
>
Got it, I will change everywhere for this (mseal.rst, coverletter)

> > +
> > + A 64-bit kernel is required for the memory sealing feature.
> > + No specific hardware features from the CPU are needed.
> > +
> > + WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating
> > + or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time
> > + of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore
> > + this config can't be enabled universally.
> > +
> > + For complete descriptions of memory sealing, please see
> > + Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
> > +
> > config SECURITY
> > bool "Enable different security models"
> > depends on SYSFS
> > --
> > 2.48.1.711.g2feabab25a-goog
> >
>
> Perhaps akpm can fix these up directly instead of a v9 spin?
>
V9 is relatively easy for me. I probably need a good version for
backporting to chromeOS/Android.

If all goes well, I'll follow up with a V10 based on Thomas
Weißschuh's vdso refactor branch [1] [2].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkXwaJ=s3XqHKu1aFVfcacgxpQ5Ji1_BqaN+ch2i_RnA9Q@mail.gmail.com/
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/log/?h=timers/vdso

> But otherwise, yes, reads well to me:
>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
>
> --
> Kees Cook