From: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
To: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
Andre Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2025 09:32:58 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250624093258.4906c0e0@pumpkin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ff2662ca-3b86-425b-97f8-3883f1018e83@csgroup.eu>
On Tue, 24 Jun 2025 07:27:47 +0200
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> wrote:
> Le 22/06/2025 à 18:20, David Laight a écrit :
> > On Sun, 22 Jun 2025 11:52:38 +0200
> > Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> wrote:
> >
> >> Masked user access avoids the address/size verification by access_ok().
> >> Allthough its main purpose is to skip the speculation in the
> >> verification of user address and size hence avoid the need of spec
> >> mitigation, it also has the advantage to reduce the amount of
> >> instructions needed so it also benefits to platforms that don't
> >> need speculation mitigation, especially when the size of the copy is
> >> not know at build time.
> >
> > It also removes a conditional branch that is quite likely to be
> > statically predicted 'the wrong way'.
>
> But include/asm-generic/access_ok.h defines access_ok() as:
>
> #define access_ok(addr, size) likely(__access_ok(addr, size))
>
> So GCC uses the 'unlikely' variant of the branch instruction to force
> the correct prediction, doesn't it ?
Nope...
Most architectures don't have likely/unlikely variants of branches.
So all gcc can do is decide which path is the fall-through and
whether the branch is forwards or backwards.
Additionally unless there is code in both the 'if' and 'else' clauses
the [un]likely seems to have no effect.
So on simple cpu that predict 'backwards branches taken' you can get
the desired effect - but it may need an 'asm comment' to force the
compiler to generate the required branches (eg forwards branch directly
to a backwards unconditional jump).
On x86 it is all more complicated.
I think the pre-fetch code is likely to assume 'not taken' (but might
use stale info on the cache line).
The predictor itself never does 'static prediction' - it is always
based on the referenced branch prediction data structure.
So, unless you are in a loop (eg running a benchmark!) there is pretty
much a 50% chance of a branch mispredict.
I've been trying to benchmark different versions of the u64 * u64 / u64
function - and I think mispredicted branches make a big difference.
I need to sit down and sequence the test cases so that I can see
the effect of each branch!
>
> >
> >> Unlike x86_64 which masks the address to 'all bits set' when the
> >> user address is invalid, here the address is set to an address in
> >> the gap. It avoids relying on the zero page to catch offseted
> >> accesses. On book3s/32 it makes sure the opening remains on user
> >> segment. The overcost is a single instruction in the masking.
> >
> > That isn't true (any more).
> > Linus changed the check to (approx):
> > if (uaddr > TASK_SIZE)
> > uaddr = TASK_SIZE;
> > (Implemented with a conditional move)
>
> Ah ok, I overlooked that, I didn't know the cmove instruction, seem
> similar to the isel instruction on powerpc e500.
It got added for the 386 - I learnt 8086 :-)
I suspect x86 got there first...
Although called 'conditional move' I very much suspect the write is
actually unconditional.
So the hardware implementation is much the same as 'add carry' except
the ALU operation is a simple multiplex.
Which means it is unlikely to be speculative.
David
>
> Christophe
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-24 8:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-22 9:52 [PATCH 0/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 1/5] uaccess: Add masked_user_{read/write}_access_begin Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 16:35 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 5:34 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 2/5] uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user_iter() Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 16:52 ` David Laight
2025-06-22 16:57 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 20:18 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 5:49 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-24 8:07 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 15:15 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 3/5] powerpc: Remove unused size parametre to KUAP enabling/disabling functions Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 4/5] powerpc: Move barrier_nospec() out of allow_read_{from/write}_user() Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 9:52 ` [PATCH 5/5] powerpc: Implement masked user access Christophe Leroy
2025-06-22 17:13 ` David Laight
2025-06-22 17:40 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-06-22 19:51 ` David Laight
2025-06-22 18:57 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-22 16:20 ` [PATCH 0/5] " David Laight
2025-06-24 5:27 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-24 8:32 ` David Laight [this message]
2025-06-24 21:37 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-25 8:30 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 13:17 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-24 16:50 ` David Laight
2025-06-24 18:25 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-24 21:08 ` David Laight
2025-06-26 5:56 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-06-26 22:01 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 10:55 ` Christophe Leroy
2025-07-05 11:42 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 18:33 ` David Laight
2025-07-05 20:15 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-07-05 21:05 ` David Laight
2025-07-05 21:37 ` Segher Boessenkool
2025-06-26 21:39 ` Segher Boessenkool
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