From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
To: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Harry Yoo <harry@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
Hao Li <hao.li@linux.dev>, Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] mm/kasan: Detect double-free involving kfree_rcu_sheaf().
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2026 21:46:25 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261009214639.2878857-2-kuniyu@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261009214639.2878857-1-kuniyu@google.com>
syzbot reported a weird use-after-free splat. [0]
In the report, an object in the kmalloc-64 cache was freed via
rcu_free_sheaf() while it was still in use, even though the
object should always be freed with kfree() (in xfrm_hash_free()),
implying that the object was a victim of a double-free involving
kfree_rcu() somewhere else.
When kvfree_call_rcu() frees an object via kfree_rcu_sheaf() and
queues it into pcs->rcu_free, debug facilities are skipped, e.g.,
kasan_slab_pre_free(), kasan_record_aux_stack(),
debug_rcu_head_queue(), etc.
As a result, KASAN cannot detect the double-free at the call site.
If the object is still in the KASAN quarantine when the sheaf is
flushed, KASAN can detect the double-free in rcu_free_sheaf(), but
with no trace of the suspect.
Worse yet, once the object is evicted from the quarantine and
reallocated before the sheaf is flushed, rcu_free_sheaf() silently
poisons the live object, resulting in a false-positive use-after-free
report on the new user.
If __kfree_rcu_sheaf() simply calls kasan_slab_pre_free(), we
can detect the second kfree_rcu(), but only while the object is
poisoned in the KASAN quarantine after the first free:
kfree() --(poisoned)--------------------> kfree_rcu()
kfree_rcu() -> rcu_free_sheaf() -(poisoned)-> kfree_rcu()
An object queued in pcs->rcu_free remains unpoisoned until the
sheaf becomes full and rcu_free_sheaf() runs after the RCU
grace period, so a subsequent kfree_rcu() or kfree() before
rcu_free_sheaf() cannot be detected by shadow bytes alone:
kfree_rcu() -(unpoisoned)-> kfree_rcu() -> rcu_free_sheaf() (too late!)
kfree_rcu() -(unpoisoned)-> kfree() -> rcu_free_sheaf() (too late!)
These cases can be detected if we call debug_rcu_head_queue()
before kfree_rcu_sheaf(), but ODEBUG splat only shows the second
free.
To detect these cases with KASAN, we just need a 1-bit flag
to indicate the state, which can reuse an unused bit in struct
kasan_track.pid. (PID_MAX_LIMIT is 1<<22)
The bit is marked along with recording the stack trace when
deferring slab frees in kfree_rcu_sheaf() and checked in
check_slab_allocation() so that any double-free pattern above
can be detected immediately.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6ac959ee.70ed5d86.2ac85.007d.GAE@google.com/ #[0]
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 13 +++++++++----
mm/kasan/common.c | 13 ++++++++-----
mm/kasan/generic.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
mm/slub.c | 13 ++++++++++---
5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index bf233bde68c7..3a43e3d2658e 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static __always_inline void * __must_check kasan_init_slab_obj(
}
bool __kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
- unsigned long ip);
+ unsigned long ip, bool after_rcu_delay);
/**
* kasan_slab_pre_free - Check whether freeing a slab object is safe.
* @object: Object to be freed.
@@ -193,10 +193,12 @@ bool __kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
* @Return true if freeing the object is unsafe; false otherwise.
*/
static __always_inline bool kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *s,
- void *object)
+ void *object,
+ bool after_rcu_delay)
{
if (kasan_enabled())
- return __kasan_slab_pre_free(s, object, _RET_IP_);
+ return __kasan_slab_pre_free(s, object, _RET_IP_,
+ after_rcu_delay);
return false;
}
@@ -424,7 +426,8 @@ static inline void *kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
return (void *)object;
}
-static inline bool kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
+static inline bool kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
+ bool after_rcu_delay)
{
return false;
}
@@ -495,6 +498,7 @@ void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache);
void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache);
void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr);
+void kasan_record_aux_stack_rcu(void *ptr);
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
@@ -512,6 +516,7 @@ static inline void kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache,
static inline void kasan_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *cache) {}
static inline void kasan_cache_shutdown(struct kmem_cache *cache) {}
static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *ptr) {}
+static inline void kasan_record_aux_stack_rcu(void *ptr) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 7d21c4db68d2..4187606a88cf 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ void kasan_set_track(struct kasan_track *track, depot_stack_handle_t stack)
track->timestamp = ts_nsec >> 9;
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA_INFO */
track->pid = current->pid;
+ track->rcu_free = 0;
track->stack = stack;
}
@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
/* Returns true when freeing the object is not safe. */
static bool check_slab_allocation(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
- unsigned long ip)
+ unsigned long ip, bool after_rcu_delay)
{
void *tagged_object = object;
@@ -242,7 +243,8 @@ static bool check_slab_allocation(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
return true;
}
- if (!kasan_byte_accessible(tagged_object)) {
+ if (!kasan_byte_accessible(tagged_object) ||
+ kasan_check_rcu_free(cache, object, after_rcu_delay)) {
kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip, KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE);
return true;
}
@@ -259,17 +261,18 @@ static inline void poison_slab_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
KASAN_SLAB_FREE, init);
+ kasan_clear_rcu_free(cache, object);
if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
kasan_save_free_info(cache, tagged_object);
}
bool __kasan_slab_pre_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
- unsigned long ip)
+ unsigned long ip, bool after_rcu_delay)
{
if (is_kfence_address(object))
return false;
- return check_slab_allocation(cache, object, ip);
+ return check_slab_allocation(cache, object, ip, after_rcu_delay);
}
bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, bool init,
@@ -544,7 +547,7 @@ bool __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
slab = page_slab(page);
- if (check_slab_allocation(slab->slab_cache, ptr, ip))
+ if (check_slab_allocation(slab->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false))
return false;
poison_slab_object(slab->slab_cache, ptr, false);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 2b8e73f5f6a7..07636ffe1626 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ size_t kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache, bool in_object)
* This function avoids dynamic memory allocations and thus can be called from
* contexts that do not allow allocating memory.
*/
-void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
+static void __kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr, bool rcu_free)
{
struct slab *slab = kasan_addr_to_slab(addr);
struct kmem_cache *cache;
@@ -552,10 +552,22 @@ void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
if (!alloc_meta)
return;
+ if (rcu_free)
+ alloc_meta->alloc_track.rcu_free = 1;
alloc_meta->aux_stack[1] = alloc_meta->aux_stack[0];
alloc_meta->aux_stack[0] = kasan_save_stack(0, 0);
}
+void kasan_record_aux_stack(void *addr)
+{
+ __kasan_record_aux_stack(addr, false);
+}
+
+void kasan_record_aux_stack_rcu(void *addr)
+{
+ __kasan_record_aux_stack(addr, true);
+}
+
void kasan_save_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
{
struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index fc9169a54766..43d608899544 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -191,7 +191,10 @@ static inline bool kasan_requires_meta(void)
#define KASAN_STACK_DEPTH 64
struct kasan_track {
- u32 pid;
+#define KASAN_PID_BITS const_ilog2(PID_MAX_LIMIT)
+ u32 pid:KASAN_PID_BITS;
+ u32 rcu_free:1;
+ u32 unused:32 - (KASAN_PID_BITS + 1);
depot_stack_handle_t stack;
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_EXTRA_INFO
u64 cpu:20;
@@ -390,8 +393,37 @@ struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
const void *object);
void kasan_init_object_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object);
+
+static inline bool kasan_check_rcu_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+ const void *object,
+ bool after_rcu_delay)
+{
+ struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+
+ alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+ if (!alloc_meta)
+ return false;
+
+ return alloc_meta->alloc_track.rcu_free != after_rcu_delay;
+}
+
+static inline void kasan_clear_rcu_free(struct kmem_cache *cache,
+ const void *object)
+{
+ struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
+
+ alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
+ if (alloc_meta)
+ alloc_meta->alloc_track.rcu_free = 0;
+}
#else
static inline void kasan_init_object_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object) { }
+static inline bool kasan_check_rcu_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
+ bool after_rcu_delay)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+static inline void kasan_clear_rcu_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object) { }
#endif
depot_stack_handle_t kasan_save_stack(gfp_t flags, depot_flags_t depot_flags);
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 544cff39762c..8a08ca73d76b 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -2690,7 +2690,7 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
* Give KASAN a chance to notice an invalid free operation before we
* modify the object.
*/
- if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
+ if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x, after_rcu_delay))
return false;
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG
@@ -2706,7 +2706,7 @@ bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x, bool init,
* We have to do this manually because the rcu_head is
* not located inside the object.
*/
- kasan_record_aux_stack(x);
+ kasan_record_aux_stack_rcu(x);
delayed_free->object = x;
call_rcu(&delayed_free->head, slab_free_after_rcu_debug);
@@ -6177,6 +6177,12 @@ bool __kfree_rcu_sheaf(struct kmem_cache *s, void *obj, unsigned int free_flags)
}
do_free:
+ if (unlikely(kasan_slab_pre_free(s, obj, false))) {
+ local_unlock(&s->cpu_sheaves->lock);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ kasan_record_aux_stack_rcu(obj);
rcu_sheaf = pcs->rcu_free;
@@ -6217,6 +6223,7 @@ bool __kfree_rcu_sheaf(struct kmem_cache *s, void *obj, unsigned int free_flags)
local_unlock(&s->cpu_sheaves->lock);
stat(s, FREE_RCU_SHEAF);
+out:
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT))
lock_map_release(&kfree_rcu_sheaf_map);
return true;
@@ -6850,7 +6857,7 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object)
* -> kfree_nolock() -> kasan_report_invalid_free() on the same CPU
* is double buggy and deserves to deadlock.
*/
- if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x))
+ if (kasan_slab_pre_free(s, x, false))
return;
/*
* memcg, kasan_slab_pre_free are done for 'x'.
--
2.56.0.385.gd3acb90ef8-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-09 21:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-09 21:46 [PATCH 0/2] mm/kasan: Detect double-free involving kfree_rcu_sheaf() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-09 21:46 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima [this message]
2026-10-20 12:29 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Vlastimil Babka (SUSE)
2026-10-27 12:48 ` Alexander Potapenko
2026-10-27 21:51 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-09 21:46 ` [PATCH 2/2] mm/kasan/kunit: Add double-free tests " Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-27 12:48 ` Alexander Potapenko
2026-10-27 22:16 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-10-27 6:15 ` [PATCH 0/2] mm/kasan: Detect double-free " Kuniyuki Iwashima
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