From: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Federico Di Pierro <nierro92@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] bpf: Add user memory kfuncs
Date: Thu, 29 Oct 2026 22:25:45 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261029212551.56964-3-jolsa@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261029212551.56964-1-jolsa@kernel.org>
Add sleepable kfuncs to copy data into a task's address space and to map
or unmap private anonymous memory in the current process.
Require a usable user mm for mmap and munmap. Register the kfuncs for
KPROBE programs and gate them on CAP_SYS_ADMIN BPF token capability and
the BPF_WRITE_USER lockdown check.
Use FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE for task memory copies and return -EFAULT
when a copy is incomplete.
Rename the syscall info-copy helper to bpf_copy_to_user_buf to avoid
the name collision.
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-6
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 10 ++---
2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 648abe1ba63a..0540e415c7dd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
#include <linux/task_work.h>
#include <linux/irq_work.h>
#include <linux/buildid.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
#include "../../lib/kstrtox.h"
@@ -3738,6 +3741,83 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_from_user_mm(void *dst, u32 dst__sz,
return ret;
}
+/**
+ * bpf_copy_to_user() - Copy data to the current task's address space
+ * @unsafe_ptr__ign: Destination address in the current task's address space
+ * @src__srcptr: Source address, in kernel space
+ * @src__sz: Number of bytes to copy
+ * @flags: Reserved for future use; must be zero
+ *
+ * Faults in the destination and writes the way ptrace(PTRACE_POKETEXT) does:
+ * a private mapping doesn't have to be writable. A partial copy is not undone,
+ * the bytes before the fault stay written.
+ *
+ * The caller must coordinate with other threads so they do not execute the
+ * destination range while it is being modified, and ensure execution begins
+ * only after the copy completes.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EINVAL if @flags is non-zero, or -EFAULT if the copy
+ * fails or is partial.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_copy_to_user(void __user *unsafe_ptr__ign, const void *src__srcptr,
+ u32 src__sz, u64 flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (unlikely(flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(src__sz > S32_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (unlikely(!src__sz))
+ return 0;
+ ret = access_process_vm(current, (unsigned long)unsafe_ptr__ign, (void *)src__srcptr,
+ src__sz, FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE);
+ return ret == src__sz ? 0 : -EFAULT;
+}
+
+/* bpf_wq and bpf_task_work callbacks can run without a usable mm. */
+static bool bpf_user_mm_ok(void)
+{
+ return current->mm && !(current->flags & (PF_KTHREAD | PF_EXITING));
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_user_mmap() - Map private anonymous memory into the current process
+ * @len: Length of the mapping
+ * @prot: PROT_* flags of mmap(2), including PROT_EXEC
+ *
+ * This maps memory by calling vm_mmap() directly. It does not invoke the
+ * mmap(2) syscall, so seccomp filters do not mediate this mapping.
+ *
+ * Return: The address of the mapping on success, -EPERM if the caller has no
+ * user mm, or an unsigned-long encoded negative error code, as returned by
+ * vm_mmap().
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc unsigned long bpf_user_mmap(unsigned long len, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ if (!bpf_user_mm_ok())
+ return -EPERM;
+ return vm_mmap(NULL, 0, len, prot, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_user_munmap() - Unmap a range of addresses of the current process
+ * @addr: Start of the range
+ * @len: Length of the range
+ *
+ * This unmaps memory by calling vm_munmap() directly. It does not invoke the
+ * munmap(2) syscall, so seccomp filters do not mediate this unmapping.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EPERM if the caller has no user mm, or a negative
+ * error code.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_user_munmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
+{
+ if (!bpf_user_mm_ok())
+ return -EPERM;
+ return vm_munmap(addr, len);
+}
+
/**
* bpf_copy_from_user_mm_str() - Copy a string from an address space
* @dst: Destination address, in kernel space. This buffer must be
@@ -5139,6 +5219,27 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set generic_kfunc_set = {
.set = &generic_btf_ids,
};
+BTF_KFUNCS_START(user_mem_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_to_user, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_user_mmap, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_user_munmap, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_KFUNCS_END(user_mem_btf_ids)
+
+static int user_mem_kfunc_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
+{
+ if (!btf_id_set8_contains(&user_mem_btf_ids, kfunc_id))
+ return 0;
+ if (!bpf_token_capable(prog->aux->token, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER);
+}
+
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set user_mem_kfunc_set = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .set = &user_mem_btf_ids,
+ .filter = user_mem_kfunc_filter,
+};
+
BTF_ID_LIST(generic_dtor_ids)
BTF_ID(struct, task_struct)
BTF_ID(func, bpf_task_release_dtor)
@@ -5266,6 +5367,7 @@ static int __init kfunc_init(void)
};
ret = register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, &generic_kfunc_set);
+ ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE, &user_mem_kfunc_set);
ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, &generic_kfunc_set);
ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_XDP, &generic_kfunc_set);
ret = ret ?: register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS, &generic_kfunc_set);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 90bc7230afa8..0da2a26bcb82 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -3936,8 +3936,8 @@ static void bpf_raw_tp_link_show_fdinfo(const struct bpf_link *link,
raw_tp_link->cookie);
}
-static int bpf_copy_to_user(char __user *ubuf, const char *buf, u32 ulen,
- u32 len)
+static int bpf_copy_to_user_buf(char __user *ubuf, const char *buf, u32 ulen,
+ u32 len)
{
if (ulen >= len + 1) {
if (copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, len + 1))
@@ -3974,7 +3974,7 @@ static int bpf_raw_tp_link_fill_link_info(const struct bpf_link *link,
if (!ubuf)
return 0;
- return bpf_copy_to_user(ubuf, tp_name, ulen, tp_len);
+ return bpf_copy_to_user_buf(ubuf, tp_name, ulen, tp_len);
}
static const struct bpf_link_ops bpf_raw_tp_link_lops = {
@@ -4035,7 +4035,7 @@ static int bpf_perf_link_fill_common(const struct perf_event *event,
goto out;
if (buf) {
- err = bpf_copy_to_user(uname, buf, ulen, len);
+ err = bpf_copy_to_user_buf(uname, buf, ulen, len);
} else {
char zero = '\0';
@@ -5714,7 +5714,7 @@ static int bpf_task_fd_query_copy(const union bpf_attr *attr,
if (put_user(zero, ubuf))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
- err = bpf_copy_to_user(ubuf, buf, input_len, len);
+ err = bpf_copy_to_user_buf(ubuf, buf, input_len, len);
if (err == -EFAULT)
return err;
}
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-29 21:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-29 21:25 [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] bpf: Add user memory kfuncs Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] bpf: Add __srcptr kfunc argument suffix Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:49 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2026-10-29 21:25 ` Jiri Olsa [this message]
2026-10-29 22:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] bpf: Add user memory kfuncs Andrii Nakryiko
2026-10-29 22:12 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-29 21:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] selftests/bpf: Add get_procmap_info helper Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] selftests/bpf: Test __srcptr kfunc arguments Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] selftests/bpf: Test user memory mmap kfuncs Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:59 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-10-29 21:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next 6/8] selftests/bpf: Test user memory page exec Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next 7/8] selftests/bpf: Test bpf_copy_to_user kfunc Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:25 ` [PATCH bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: Test user memory kfunc errors Jiri Olsa
2026-10-29 21:59 ` bot+bpf-ci
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