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Miller" , Dietmar Eggemann , Frederic Weisbecker , Geert Uytterhoeven , "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" , Heiko Carstens , Helge Deller , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , "James E.J. Bottomley" , Jan Kara , John Johansen , John Paul Adrian Glaubitz , Jonathan Corbet , Josef Bacik , Juri Lelli , Kees Cook , K Prateek Nayak , "Liam R. Howlett" , Lorenzo Stoakes , Madhavan Srinivasan , Magnus Lindholm , Manfred Spraul , Mark Rutland , Matt Turner , Max Filippov , Mel Gorman , Michael Ellerman , Michal Hocko , Michal Simek , Mike Rapoport , Neal Gompa , Nicholas Piggin , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Moore , Paul Walmsley , Pavel Tikhomirov , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Richard Henderson , Rich Felker , "Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" , Russell King , Serge Hallyn , Shrikanth Hegde , Shuah Khan , Steven Rostedt , Suren Baghdasaryan , Sven Schnelle , Thomas Bogendoerfer , Thomas Gleixner , Valentin Schneider , Vasily Gorbik , Vincent Guittot , Vincenzo Frascino , Vlastimil Babka , Will Deacon , Yoshinori Sato , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 10/14] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 00:43:08 +0200 Message-ID: <20261119224312.1037966-11-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20261119224312.1037966-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20261119224312.1037966-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Archived-By: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam05 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 455B814000A X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_PASS, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Stat-Signature: ms7tnijtp7ebqqx4z7ma1tbnt7ra3rxe X-HE-Tag: 1795128252-730383 X-HE-Meta: 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 utEnAOIv 90XmYecZYFUHuZpnJsispGxJz9iqwiPuugIuxvPJEfK4XTmL4+g1+ste2PougBa22q/LHM7LI8wJuhqOBxBv03MaBDzOdpHMTPM9t1pP7rMU93fcL6yY6GcH+ZMlrY5ISgMI3kthxo46R+QKpYEVWANuobKhRITSsPFQJOZApPhDfqE529KSkNep/CTserFtVBCLXjHhvJfYaAyMIqFIvwGs/pNOu4hM0Pb/PhZ28uCNq72H5zFjWkOxIjVz/hoME8UAsdyRZaW1GbcqSn3eUn/PHsRtkKPYjoCYJYiE2cobZt15vE5jxDRFlvB7QFb74iIak3dG79qh1UFZEChyNuLz1quQtCc8tfEACqrPjLuUn/1+GR93wQr/RxodLx/RBQUOJ4mvOwu99oWTwVkmh3tLH70pFD5IRpz6iLXIr8eBcOFVjteomC5HPBLM6/xoJyt4S Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 Security modules need visibility into root namespace creation, teardown, process entry, and container-wide signal delivery so policies and BPF LSM programs can attach per-rootns security state and mediate operations on rootns file descriptors. Add lbs_rootns and rootns->security blob management alongside security_rootns_alloc(), security_rootns_free(), security_rootns_clone(), and security_rootns_kill(), and register the new hooks in bpf_lsm.c's sleepable and untrusted hook sets. Co-developed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 7 +++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 ++ include/linux/rootns.h | 3 ++ include/linux/security.h | 30 ++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 10 ++++ kernel/rootns.c | 44 +++++++++++++----- security/lsm_init.c | 6 +++ security/security.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 87d9d06710cb..2cb90ddedc14 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -480,3 +480,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_alloc_security, struct block_device *bdev) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bdev_free_security, struct block_device *bdev) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_setintegrity, struct block_device *bdev, enum lsm_integrity_type type, const void *value, size_t size) + +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_alloc, struct rootns *rootns, unsigned int flags) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, rootns_free, struct rootns *rootns) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_clone, struct rootns *rootns) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_kill, struct rootns *rootns, int sig) +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 13621e9e233e..217a59d428b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes { unsigned int lbs_bpf_map; unsigned int lbs_bpf_prog; unsigned int lbs_bpf_token; +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS + unsigned int lbs_rootns; +#endif }; /* diff --git a/include/linux/rootns.h b/include/linux/rootns.h index 802fc76bb66e..795a79584231 100644 --- a/include/linux/rootns.h +++ b/include/linux/rootns.h @@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ enum rootns_state { struct rootns { refcount_t usage; int exit_code; /* The exit code of 'init' */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + void *security; /* LSM security blob */ +#endif struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* Owning user namespace */ struct nsproxy *ns; /* This rootns's namespaces */ struct pid *init_pid; /* The 'init' task's TGID (pid ref) */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 40831fab5470..995292f1c92e 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_krule; struct ns_common; struct user_namespace; struct timezone; +struct rootns; enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, @@ -2469,4 +2470,33 @@ static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +int security_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns, unsigned int flags); +void security_rootns_free(struct rootns *rootns); +int security_rootns_clone(struct rootns *rootns); +int security_rootns_kill(struct rootns *rootns, int sig); +#else +static inline int security_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns, + unsigned int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_rootns_free(struct rootns *rootns) +{ +} + +static inline int security_rootns_clone(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_rootns_kill(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ + #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index 468e63dbd922..bbcf1433fdc2 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* For every LSM hook that allows attachment of BPF programs, declare a nop * function where a BPF program can be attached. Notably, we qualify each with @@ -404,6 +405,11 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_setscheduler) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_userns_create) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bdev_alloc_security) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bdev_setintegrity) +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_rootns_alloc) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_rootns_clone) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_rootns_kill) +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ BTF_SET_END(sleepable_lsm_hooks) BTF_SET_START(untrusted_lsm_hooks) @@ -420,6 +426,10 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_free_security) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_task_free) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bdev_alloc_security) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bdev_free_security) +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_rootns_alloc) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_rootns_free) +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ BTF_SET_END(untrusted_lsm_hooks) bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id) diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c index 865689eed69c..3733a249feca 100644 --- a/kernel/rootns.c +++ b/kernel/rootns.c @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* @@ -63,14 +64,8 @@ struct rootns *get_rootns(struct rootns *c) return c; } -/* - * Drop a reference on a rootns and clear it if it is no longer in use. - */ -void put_rootns(struct rootns *c) +static void free_rootns(struct rootns *c) { - if (!c || !refcount_dec_and_test(&c->usage)) - return; - if (c->ns) put_nsproxy(c->ns); if (c->init_pid) @@ -82,6 +77,18 @@ void put_rootns(struct rootns *c) kfree(c); } +/* + * Drop a reference on a rootns and clear it if it is no longer in use. + */ +void put_rootns(struct rootns *c) +{ + if (!c || !refcount_dec_and_test(&c->usage)) + return; + + security_rootns_free(c); + free_rootns(c); +} + /* * Allow the user to poll for the rootns dying. */ @@ -163,6 +170,7 @@ static int rootns_kill_members(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) bool any_perm = false; int other_err = 0; struct pid *pid; + int ret; int nr; if (!pidns_is_ancestor(pid_ns, task_active_pid_ns(current))) @@ -170,6 +178,10 @@ static int rootns_kill_members(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) if (READ_ONCE(rootns->state) != ROOTNS_RUNNING) return -ESRCH; + ret = security_rootns_kill(rootns, sig); + if (ret) + return ret; + scoped_guard(rcu) { read_lock(&tasklist_lock); idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, pid, nr) { @@ -365,31 +377,35 @@ static struct rootns *create_rootns(unsigned int flags) user_ns = create_rootns_user_ns(); if (IS_ERR(user_ns)) { ret = PTR_ERR(user_ns); - goto err_put; + goto err_free; } c->user_ns = user_ns; ns_ref_active_get(user_ns); if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { ret = -EPERM; - goto err_put; + goto err_free; } ns = create_new_namespaces(clone_flags, current->nsproxy, user_ns, NULL); if (IS_ERR(ns)) { ret = PTR_ERR(ns); - goto err_put; + goto err_free; } timens_activate_nsproxy(ns); c->ns = ns; nsproxy_ns_active_get(ns); + ret = security_rootns_alloc(c, flags); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_free; + return c; -err_put: - put_rootns(c); +err_free: + free_rootns(c); return ERR_PTR(ret); } @@ -485,6 +501,10 @@ int rootns_prepare_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *args) if (!pidns_is_ancestor(pid_ns, task_active_pid_ns(current))) return -EXDEV; + ret = security_rootns_clone(rootns); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = mnt_ns_get_root(rootns->ns->mnt_ns, &root); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/security/lsm_init.c b/security/lsm_init.c index 8d5ecea99c46..56b515b20812 100644 --- a/security/lsm_init.c +++ b/security/lsm_init.c @@ -316,6 +316,9 @@ static void __init lsm_prepare(struct lsm_info *lsm) lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_map, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_prog, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_token, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_rootns, &blob_sizes.lbs_rootns); +#endif } /** @@ -460,6 +463,9 @@ int __init security_init(void) lsm_pr("blob(bpf_map) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); lsm_pr("blob(bpf_prog) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); lsm_pr("blob(bpf_token) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS + lsm_pr("blob(rootns) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_rootns); +#endif } if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4727b8347fc4..919d4bb63701 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -395,6 +396,22 @@ static int lsm_ns_alloc(struct ns_common *ns) return lsm_blob_alloc(&ns->ns_security, blob_sizes.lbs_ns, GFP_KERNEL); } +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +/** + * lsm_rootns_alloc - allocate a composite rootns blob + * @rootns: the rootns that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the rootns blob for all the modules + * + * Return: Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + return lsm_blob_alloc(&rootns->security, blob_sizes.lbs_rootns, + GFP_KERNEL); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ + /** * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled @@ -5795,3 +5812,72 @@ void security_initramfs_populated(void) { call_void_hook(initramfs_populated); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +/** + * security_rootns_alloc() - Check creation of a new rootns and init LSM blob + * @rootns: the new rootns + * @flags: creation flags passed to rootns() + * + * Check whether a new rootns may be created and initialize its LSM security + * blob. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns, unsigned int flags) +{ + int rc; + + rc = lsm_rootns_alloc(rootns); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(rootns_alloc, rootns, flags); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_rootns_free(rootns); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * security_rootns_free() - Release LSM security data from a rootns + * @rootns: the rootns being freed + * + * Release security data attached to @rootns before the structure is freed. + */ +void security_rootns_free(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + call_void_hook(rootns_free, rootns); + kfree(rootns->security); + rootns->security = NULL; +} + +/** + * security_rootns_clone() - Check permission to spawn a task into a rootns + * @rootns: the target rootns + * + * Check permission before spawning a child process into @rootns via + * clone3(CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted, negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_rootns_clone(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + return call_int_hook(rootns_clone, rootns); +} + +/** + * security_rootns_kill() - Check permission to signal a rootns + * @rootns: the target rootns + * @sig: signal number to deliver (or 0 for permission check) + * + * Check permission before broadcasting @sig to member thread groups in @rootns + * via ioctl(ROOTNS_KILL). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted, negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_rootns_kill(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) +{ + return call_int_hook(rootns_kill, rootns, sig); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ -- 2.47.3