From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>,
David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>,
Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>,
Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>,
Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>,
Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
"Ritesh Harjani (IBM)" <ritesh.list@gmail.com>,
Shrikanth Hegde <sshegde@linux.ibm.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, "Felix Kuehling" <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>,
"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
"Chris Mason" <mason@kernel.org>,
"Felix Kuehling" <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 4/4] mm: check permissions and bounds for vm_ops->access
Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 18:55:21 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261122-access_shite-v2-4-808d8d2aa700@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261122-access_shite-v2-0-808d8d2aa700@kernel.org>
GUP rejects VM_IO and VM_PFNMAP mappings early. __access_remote_vm() then
falls back to vm_ops->access without checking VMA permissions and without
limiting the request to the VMA size.
Consequently, /proc/<pid>/mem can bypass protections even without
FOLL_FORCE, or cross into another mapping without checking its
permissions.
Check VMA permissions before calling ->access and limit each request to
the current VMA. Implement access permission checks similar to GUP,
however:
(1) Reject writes to CoW mappings because the callbacks access backing
memory directly and cannot handle CoW.
(2) Allow forced writes to non-CoW mappings with VM_MAYWRITE.
(3) Allow reads of write-only mappings, as we historically did. Most
architectures cannot express write-only mappings in page tables
anyway, and i915 selftests rely on it.
This intentionally breaks forced writes through legacy amdgpu PROT_NONE,
MAP_PRIVATE debugger mappings. The workaround in commit fa5239f2af98
("drm/amdgpu: workaround failed COW checks for Thunk VMAs") cleared
VM_MAYWRITE to avoid CoW, but debugger writes still succeeded by
exploiting the missing access-permission checks fixed here. Reads remain
supported. Userspace must use MAP_SHARED instead; ROCm 5.5.0, released
in May 2023, already does so.
Similarly, forced writes to MAP_SHARED mappings of files opened read-only
(e.g., read-only DMA-bufs) no longer succeed, as VM_MAYWRITE is not set.
Writing to read-only files through ptrace was never intended to work,
and would usually be a security bug.
If this turns out to break real users that cannot easily satisfy their
debugging needs differently, we can figure out how to handle that.
Link: https://github.com/ROCm/ROCT-Thunk-Interface/commit/fea44fab6e84eda52fcf6b419b35600c18f4c022
Fixes: 272ddc8b3735 ("proc: don't use FOLL_FORCE for reading cmdline and environment")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Felix Kuehling <Felix.Kuehling@amd.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>
Reported-by: Chris Mason <mason@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Felix Kuehling <felix.kuehling@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
---
mm/memory.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 5d0d58aeff3cb..d43837623a063 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -7412,6 +7412,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(generic_access_phys);
static int __access_remote_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags)
{
+ const bool force = gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE;
void *old_buf = buf;
int write = gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE;
@@ -7451,15 +7452,36 @@ static int __access_remote_vm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON)
break;
+ /*
+ * In contrast to GUP, we historically allowed
+ * FOLL_FORCE write access to non-CoW mappings and
+ * read access to write-only mappings. However, we
+ * must always reject writes to CoW mappings as we
+ * cannot CoW here.
+ */
+ if (write) {
+ if (!vma_test(vma, VMA_MAYWRITE_BIT))
+ break;
+ if (!vma_test(vma, VMA_WRITE_BIT) && !force)
+ break;
+ if (vma_is_cow_mapping(vma))
+ break;
+ } else if (!vma_test_any(vma, VMA_READ_BIT, VMA_WRITE_BIT)) {
+ if (!force || !vma_test(vma, VMA_MAYREAD_BIT))
+ break;
+ }
+
/*
* Check if this is a VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP VMA, which
* we can access using slightly different code.
*/
bytes = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT
- if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->access)
+ if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->access) {
+ bytes = min_t(unsigned long, len, vma->vm_end - addr);
bytes = vma->vm_ops->access(vma, addr, buf,
- len, write);
+ bytes, write);
+ }
#endif
if (bytes <= 0)
break;
--
2.56.1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-22 17:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-22 17:55 [PATCH v2 0/4] mm,drm/i915,powerpc/spufs: vm_ops->access related fixes David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-22 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] mm: do not call vm_ops->access with FOLL_ANON David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-22 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] drm/i915: consider vm_pgoff in vm_access() David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-22 17:55 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] powerpc/spufs: consider vm_pgoff in spufs_mem_mmap_access() David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-11-22 17:55 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261122-access_shite-v2-4-808d8d2aa700@kernel.org \
--to=david@kernel.org \
--cc=Felix.Kuehling@amd.com \
--cc=airlied@gmail.com \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \
--cc=chleroy@kernel.org \
--cc=chris@chris-wilson.co.uk \
--cc=christian.koenig@amd.com \
--cc=dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org \
--cc=intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org \
--cc=jani.nikula@linux.intel.com \
--cc=joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=liam@infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=maddy@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=mason@kernel.org \
--cc=matthew.auld@intel.com \
--cc=mhocko@suse.com \
--cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \
--cc=npiggin@gmail.com \
--cc=riel@redhat.com \
--cc=ritesh.list@gmail.com \
--cc=rodrigo.vivi@intel.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=simona@ffwll.ch \
--cc=sshegde@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=surenb@google.com \
--cc=tursulin@ursulin.net \
--cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
--cc=w@1wt.eu \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox