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b=kgP/2/6s7spLqnf+9wMSyz4rEEZTRyT+B+YkDBhkt50gtPY+vgrIGcVhtKCrkLRFD 0f2TJ3D7eb/66eUajBQSuTi/fbl8VRvUv25a5lt8QxW+oq/QqpzAMtr3BhPptZ0j5i 3kW5sabhvAZySVfrnN6bJyajveSB6ITeCvGTqK5veb2w1g2xbX4xKOGMMc4+GYvvr8 EMRR/HfWrBOhDIla3WYo95eeveTxI0eMLnSe03JMHIIvWFMZ8OIizWNrWwv+7r/z/D KlSGsb410AtNh5e/TSaDB78vVeHXyRexH3UeeV5hcfhavPGsM91d/HPvOkbt6OMZDE HiqUj0/wbi5cg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , bpf@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Mikhalitsyn , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , David Howells , Giuseppe Scrivano , Hugh Dickins , Jan Kara , Jeff Layton , Jonathan Corbet , Josef Bacik , Kees Cook , KP Singh , Lennart Poettering , Neal Gompa , Oleg Nesterov , Paul Moore , Pavel Tikhomirov , Serge Hallyn , Shuah Khan , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 03:17:48 +0200 Message-ID: <20261122011809.2667684-6-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20261122011809.2667684-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20261122011809.2667684-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Archived-By: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam03 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 41806100002 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_PASS, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-Stat-Signature: 9ax45rcb6yyrj7ir33n4qzwgtj7a3csn X-HE-Tag: 1795310320-171873 X-HE-Meta: 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 cIcODvyq tOWzdOiVXWqKUeoURKh6GfZvN8vf7Rzsk9GNL7GA/E1y5K9W4CWVoP4AIeKkSBQnWHzjYvkePf75ROtUvqmqQWc/2M6Jmdn5O1D6+kVmsi9qO3KZZFI9EEkTF83TkUw+oaGThljumqJuHz2zI3khQ83HNGOze2+PhMeLzA78yzm2tovNCGnWewMWODahDovbB4AOnqlUsfkmAM4Nia06wvf5ul09TCUhSVnzX4jEgDNzqAVTTgoGA5rvctGMayEM7monlgXaGb64BDNDmTTehhyfk//PpLIObVLtnAJiUwBSGzS9b6quJVBYoy6sKtIA5YuVEWPG5dnYBFwemTWzwX/XX7kzTjFxamH0HXZSYfAmcH9nWUOEO6zYkyfEQw+F0aIGEDZjju0nbr0kw9i+mWpxkyTt0dsoKn6EOYMPCRa18bIAV+SKMAnNrat6bY1hC5u9DdBF9AsT2l95KJ4ygRrjHvE3qSZyziCvB0GgnzXHzrCM= Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 mount_too_revealing() skips visibility checks whenever current->nsproxy->mnt_ns belongs to init_user_ns, assuming the caller holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its current mount namespace. That assumption does not hold when an unprivileged caller creates mounts for a child user namespace while running in init_mnt_ns or another foreign mount namespace. Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns before bypassing mount_too_revealing() for init_mnt_ns, reject chrooted callers lacking CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their current mount namespace, and treat existing mounts and child overmounts in a foreign mount namespace as locked during mnt_already_visible() checks. Co-developed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- fs/namespace.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 781380945d78..b2dc84c0d0d6 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -6582,6 +6582,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags) { + bool foreign_ns = !ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); int new_flags = *new_mnt_flags; struct mount *mnt; @@ -6606,11 +6607,16 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, continue; /* A local view of the mount flags */ - mnt_flags = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags; + mnt_flags = READ_ONCE(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags); /* Don't miss readonly hidden in the superblock flags */ if (sb_rdonly(mnt->mnt.mnt_sb)) mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY; + if (foreign_ns) { + if (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY; + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME; + } /* Verify the mount flags are equal to or more permissive * than the proposed new mount. @@ -6629,7 +6635,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode; /* Only worry about locked mounts */ - if (!(child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)) + if (!foreign_ns && !(READ_ONCE(child->mnt.mnt_flags) & MNT_LOCKED)) continue; /* Is the directory permanently empty? */ if (!is_empty_dir_inode(inode)) @@ -6650,13 +6656,18 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns; unsigned long s_iflags; - if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns) - return false; - /* Can this filesystem be too revealing? */ if (!(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT_RESTRICTED)) return false; + if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns && + ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return false; + + if (!ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && + current_chrooted()) + return true; + s_iflags = sb->s_iflags; if ((s_iflags & required_iflags) != required_iflags) { WARN_ONCE(1, "Expected s_iflags to contain 0x%lx\n", -- 2.47.3