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b=T28tb/dnYShrqpGI2ZILYjzh72RVEHrrezyrm54oR6Obd86v3PTs376d9kZmGiJB+ MUaqau3YQxX+z/GWr+9RG0JDb6bK1vqUMm9l/H8m/RqGDXDxO5ShNJ6WPrcOKQFN72 Lp2v8MzuVi6Nq52IkFkGidmWcugTYAZverSueVjAgR2lsfg4eHz5f+C9qJscWQmP91 UvSv7pZiNTWpbNmSdj6YKT2dG8l982i7je4+oLgBuBdSEu85qs20Ob4lOnj9/OCG2z aSfS6cai0B+r+urHqmyerKvW0s6us7upbOBQhpzjuP6094eRFGxT0XybG4NqwQpfnw 74hvHOnQ9kYMw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , bpf@vger.kernel.org, containers@lists.linux.dev, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai , Alexander Mikhalitsyn , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , David Howells , Eric Biggers , Giuseppe Scrivano , Hugh Dickins , Jan Kara , Jeff Layton , Jonathan Corbet , Josef Bacik , Kees Cook , KP Singh , Lennart Poettering , Neal Gompa , Oleg Nesterov , Paul Moore , Pavel Tikhomirov , Serge Hallyn , Shuah Khan , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 05/26] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2026 21:35:18 +0200 Message-ID: <20261122193539.3334213-6-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20261122193539.3334213-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20261122193539.3334213-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Archived-By: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 018C912000A X-Stat-Signature: 8t8m16oramnjbom8tuyh8cxgegdzodjw X-Rspamd-Server: rspam08 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_PASS, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-HE-Tag: 1795376178-121550 X-HE-Meta: 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 BOoF3xx0 mG1jPPGMe6zzTlc5wsJOn2KSQlIyiXNE/dL1R6wuSioUVQb9LZAWQJts+oQfBZrc9PHnW3OrX0eU2K3q2VYEP22Vg4+jdFRH44V+APJVRopX4YREwPUVCWV9gBbokDDhWy7HbiW27GSumzPcjsrGf/GK0GmG54t2aDBA3r0Un8ywxHckrGIlqqbecNKelCw7gk5fFZcHLlbjOSIYT4Ykgq+G79cwGMGn3zlvdzY/M+zmCf+9viBzW1Ig+iIp5ertNO/CaWKsX8oTyCrhBophgLJXyhNL9aANoRsXB2ZKNoj7Iwobq78uZ8QRyqZyn9GD8I7MOow2CvsLQ5VL8IjpgDKymQ0DtR65bj67BBr4S8Vkr9TyUoeImuIwCgAduR6sEugryts2KL/QLGh//29bw0+JKapauJAOzb4VIt0bfAgEJ6+52WMCOFe6RAk/oPjZURps1Ru2EULRy7oZs6aaaM005MpJone9eZhc0zNZWAWgbYlg= Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 mount_too_revealing() skips visibility checks whenever current->nsproxy->mnt_ns belongs to init_user_ns, assuming the caller holds CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its current mount namespace. That assumption does not hold when an unprivileged caller creates mounts for a child user namespace while running in init_mnt_ns or another foreign mount namespace. Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns before bypassing mount_too_revealing() for init_mnt_ns, reject chrooted callers lacking CAP_SYS_ADMIN in their current mount namespace, and treat existing mounts and child overmounts in a foreign mount namespace as locked during mnt_already_visible() checks. Co-developed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- fs/namespace.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 781380945d78..1bb9f90a6523 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -6580,7 +6580,7 @@ bool current_chrooted(void) static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, const struct super_block *sb, - int *new_mnt_flags) + int *new_mnt_flags, bool foreign_ns) { int new_flags = *new_mnt_flags; struct mount *mnt; @@ -6606,11 +6606,16 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, continue; /* A local view of the mount flags */ - mnt_flags = mnt->mnt.mnt_flags; + mnt_flags = READ_ONCE(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags); /* Don't miss readonly hidden in the superblock flags */ if (sb_rdonly(mnt->mnt.mnt_sb)) mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY; + if (foreign_ns) { + if (mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY) + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_READONLY; + mnt_flags |= MNT_LOCK_ATIME; + } /* Verify the mount flags are equal to or more permissive * than the proposed new mount. @@ -6629,7 +6634,7 @@ static bool mnt_already_visible(struct mnt_namespace *ns, list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode; /* Only worry about locked mounts */ - if (!(child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)) + if (!foreign_ns && !(READ_ONCE(child->mnt.mnt_flags) & MNT_LOCKED)) continue; /* Is the directory permanently empty? */ if (!is_empty_dir_inode(inode)) @@ -6649,14 +6654,19 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags const unsigned long required_iflags = SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV; struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns; unsigned long s_iflags; - - if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns) - return false; + bool foreign_ns; /* Can this filesystem be too revealing? */ if (!(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT_RESTRICTED)) return false; + foreign_ns = !ns_capable_noaudit(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); + if (ns->user_ns == &init_user_ns && !foreign_ns) + return false; + + if (foreign_ns && current_chrooted()) + return true; + s_iflags = sb->s_iflags; if ((s_iflags & required_iflags) != required_iflags) { WARN_ONCE(1, "Expected s_iflags to contain 0x%lx\n", @@ -6671,7 +6681,7 @@ static bool mount_too_revealing(const struct super_block *sb, int *new_mnt_flags if (s_iflags & SB_I_RESTRICTED_VARIANT) return false; - return !mnt_already_visible(ns, sb, new_mnt_flags); + return !mnt_already_visible(ns, sb, new_mnt_flags, foreign_ns); } bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt) -- 2.47.3