From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: simon guinot <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
rkrcmar@redhat.com, matt@codeblueprint.co.uk,
linus walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, paul gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>,
hpa@zytor.com, dan j williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
aarcange@redhat.com, sfr@canb.auug.org.au,
andriy shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, bhe@redhat.com, xemul@parallels.com,
joro@8bytes.org, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
msalter@redhat.com, ross zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>,
bp@suse.de, dyoung@redhat.com,
thomas lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
jroedel@suse.de, keescook@chromium.org,
toshi kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
mathieu desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
devel@linuxdriverproject.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
mchehab@kernel.or
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 16:14:56 -0400 (EDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <28535418.4145222.1476735296810.JavaMail.zimbra@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <59369ed7-9d35-baad-e0a9-ce4a62bc30bb@amd.com>
> I am not sure if I fully understand this feedback. Let me summaries what
> we have right now.
>
> At highest level SEV key management commands are divided into two sections:
>
> - platform management : commands used during platform provisioning. PSP
> drv provides ioctl's for these commands. Qemu will not use these
> ioctl's, i believe these ioctl will be used by other tools.
>
> - guest management: command used during guest life cycle. PSP drv
> exports various function and KVM drv calls these function when it
> receives the SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl from qemu.
>
> If I understanding correctly then you are recommending that instead of
> exporting various functions from PSP drv we should expose one function
> for the all the guest command handling (something like this).
My understanding is that a user could exhaust the ASIDs for encrypted
VMs if it was allowed to start an arbitrary number of KVM guests. So
we would need some kind of control. Is this correct?
If so, does /dev/psp provide any functionality that you believe is
dangerous for the KVM userspace (which runs in a very confined
environment)? Is this functionality blocked through capability
checks?
Thanks,
Paolo
> int psp_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep,
> int cmd, unsigned long addr,
> int *psp_ret)
> {
> /* here we check to ensure that file->f_ops is a valid
> * psp instance.
> */
> if (filep->f_ops != &psp_fops)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> /* handle the command */
> return psp_issue_cmd (cmd, addr, timeout, psp_ret);
> }
>
> In KVM driver use something like this to invoke the PSP command handler.
>
> int kvm_sev_psp_cmd (struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd *input,
> unsigned long data)
> {
> int ret;
> struct fd f;
>
> f = fdget(input->psp_fd);
> if (!f.file)
> return -EBADF;
> ....
>
> psp_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, input->cmd,
> data, &input->psp_ret);
> ....
> }
>
> Please let me know if I understood this correctly.
>
> >> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> >> ---
> >> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 +
> >> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 13 ++++
> >> include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 125
> >> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >> 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+)
> >>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-10-17 20:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13 9:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23 9:33 ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23 9:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23 7:14 ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2016-10-18 19:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51 ` Brijesh Singh
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