From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 11/20] mmu: maybe_mkwrite updated to manufacture shadow stack PTEs
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 13:05:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2d6eefb8-c7c5-7d32-9a75-ae716f828cd9@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230213045351.3945824-12-debug@rivosinc.com>
On 13.02.23 05:53, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> maybe_mkwrite creates PTEs with WRITE encodings for underlying arch if
> VM_WRITE is turned on in vma->vm_flags. Shadow stack memory is a write-
> able memory except it can only be written by certain specific
> instructions. This patch allows maybe_mkwrite to create shadow stack PTEs
> if vma is shadow stack VMA. Each arch can define which combination of VMA
> flags means a shadow stack.
>
> Additionally pte_mkshdwstk must be provided by arch specific PTE
> construction headers to create shadow stack PTEs. (in arch specific
> pgtable.h).
>
> This patch provides dummy/stub pte_mkshdwstk if CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> is not selected.
>
> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
> include/linux/pgtable.h | 4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 8f857163ac89..a7705bc49bfe 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -1093,6 +1093,21 @@ static inline unsigned long thp_size(struct page *page)
> void free_compound_page(struct page *page);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> +bool arch_is_shadow_stack_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma);
> +#endif
> +
> +static inline bool
> +is_shadow_stack_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK
> + return arch_is_shadow_stack_vma(vma);
> +#else
> + return false;
> +#endif
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Do pte_mkwrite, but only if the vma says VM_WRITE. We do this when
> * servicing faults for write access. In the normal case, do always want
> @@ -1101,8 +1116,12 @@ void free_compound_page(struct page *page);
> */
> static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> {
> - if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
> - pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
> + if (likely(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
> + if (unlikely(is_shadow_stack_vma(vma)))
> + pte = pte_mkshdwstk(pte);
> + else
> + pte = pte_mkwrite(pte);
> + }
> return pte;
Exactly what we are trying to avoid in the x86 approach right now.
Please see the x86 series on details, we shouldn't try reinventing the
wheel but finding a core-mm approach that fits multiple architectures.
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230119212317.8324-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-13 12:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com>
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 05/20] mmap : Introducing new protection "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" for mmap Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 07/20] elf: ELF header parsing in GNU property for cfi state Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 08/20] riscv: ELF header parsing in GNU property for riscv zisslpcfi Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 11/20] mmu: maybe_mkwrite updated to manufacture shadow stack PTEs Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 12:05 ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2023-02-13 14:37 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 14:56 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-13 20:01 ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 12:10 ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-14 18:27 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
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