From: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
To: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Baoquan He <baoquan.he@linux.dev>,
Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>,
Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>,
Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>,
Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, rmikey@meta.com, riel@surriel.com,
kernel-team@meta.com, Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] kexec: keep the next kernel off hardware-poisoned pages
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2026 19:49:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2vxzecgj6od4.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260730-kexec_posioned-v2-1-f92d18551f64@debian.org> (Breno Leitao's message of "Thu, 30 Jul 2026 08:55:50 -0700")
On Thu, Jul 30 2026, Breno Leitao wrote:
> Memory failures (such as unrecoverable ECCs errors) are getting more and
> more common. The kernel knows how to handle it while running, marking it
> as poisoned (and SIGBUS user tasks).
>
> Poisoned memory is removed from the buddy allocator, but, not from
> other places. A current problem is that kexec will load new kernel
> on top of a bad/poisoned memory, which is undesirable.
>
> If the next kernel's image, initrd or purgatory lands on poisoned frame,
> the relocation copy writes to the bad memory and the machine checks
> during the kexec.
>
> Skip hardware-poisoned frames when placing segments: check them in the
> kexec_file hole finder so it lays the next kernel down on good memory,
> and reject a poisoned destination in sanity_check_segment_list() for
> the kexec_load path, which cannot relocate.
>
> Suggested-by: Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
> ---
> Changes in v2:
> - EDITME: describe what is new in this series revision.
> - EDITME: use bulletpoints and terse descriptions.
> - Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728-kexec_posioned-v1-1-160c81d180fe@debian.org
> ---
> include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++
> kernel/kexec_core.c | 10 ++++++++++
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
> mm/memory-failure.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> index 7fabe6c66b4b7..48cad9a519d08 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> @@ -5192,6 +5192,8 @@ extern const struct attribute_group memory_failure_attr_group;
> extern void memory_failure_queue(unsigned long pfn, int flags);
> void num_poisoned_pages_inc(unsigned long pfn);
> void num_poisoned_pages_sub(unsigned long pfn, long i);
> +bool range_contains_hwpoison(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size,
> + phys_addr_t *poison);
> #else
> static inline void memory_failure_queue(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
> {
> @@ -5204,6 +5206,12 @@ static inline void num_poisoned_pages_inc(unsigned long pfn)
> static inline void num_poisoned_pages_sub(unsigned long pfn, long i)
> {
> }
> +
> +static inline bool range_contains_hwpoison(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size,
> + phys_addr_t *poison)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> #endif
>
> #if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE) && defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG)
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_core.c b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> index dc770b9a6d053..9f6ed3c04299b 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_core.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_core.c
> @@ -212,6 +212,16 @@ int sanity_check_segment_list(struct kimage *image)
> }
> #endif
>
> + /*
> + * Reject destinations that land on hardware-poisoned memory: the
> + * relocation copy would machine-check on the bad frame.
> + */
> + for (i = 0; i < nr_segments; i++) {
> + if (range_contains_hwpoison(image->segment[i].mem,
> + image->segment[i].memsz, NULL))
> + return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
> + }
> +
> /*
> * The destination addresses are searched from system RAM rather than
> * being allocated from the buddy allocator, so they are not guaranteed
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index 59fb9d71e9d86..95cc981a557be 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> {
> struct kimage *image = kbuf->image;
> unsigned long temp_start, temp_end;
> + phys_addr_t poisoned_addr;
>
> temp_end = min(end, kbuf->buf_max);
> temp_start = temp_end - kbuf->memsz + 1;
> @@ -504,6 +505,14 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> continue;
> }
>
> + if (range_contains_hwpoison(temp_start, temp_end - temp_start + 1,
> + &poisoned_addr)) {
> + if (poisoned_addr < kbuf->memsz)
> + return 0;
> + temp_start = poisoned_addr - kbuf->memsz;
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> /* We found a suitable memory range */
> break;
> } while (1);
> @@ -520,6 +529,7 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> {
> struct kimage *image = kbuf->image;
> unsigned long temp_start, temp_end;
> + phys_addr_t poisoned_addr;
>
> temp_start = max(start, kbuf->buf_min);
>
> @@ -546,6 +556,15 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_bottom_up(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> continue;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * Avoid placing the next kernel on hardware-poisoned memory.
> + */
> + if (range_contains_hwpoison(temp_start, temp_end - temp_start + 1,
> + &poisoned_addr)) {
> + temp_start = poisoned_addr + PAGE_SIZE;
> + continue;
> + }
> +
> /* We found a suitable memory range */
> break;
> } while (1);
> diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c
> index a8b03e2920ba8..04a1883d51fda 100644
> --- a/mm/memory-failure.c
> +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c
> @@ -96,6 +96,34 @@ void num_poisoned_pages_sub(unsigned long pfn, long i)
> memblk_nr_poison_sub(pfn, i);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Return true if any online page in [start, start + size) is hardware
> + * poisoned. On a hit, when @poison is not NULL, @poison is set to the
> + * address of the first poisoned page, which is ugly, but I cannot only
Won't the last page be better? If two poisoned pages land in the range,
you'd like to search past the last one.
> + * return phys_addr_t, thus this "extra" parameter, instead of returning
> + * the hit.
> + */
> +bool range_contains_hwpoison(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size,
> + phys_addr_t *poison)
Perhaps
phys_addr_t range_last_hwpoison(phys_addr_t start, unsigned long size) ?
And if no poisoned page lands here then a default of 0 or ~0UL?
> +{
> + unsigned long pfn, end_pfn;
> +
> + if (!size || !atomic_long_read(&num_poisoned_pages))
> + return false;
> +
> + end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(start + size - 1);
> + for (pfn = PHYS_PFN(start); pfn <= end_pfn; pfn++) {
> + struct page *page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
> +
> + if (page && PageHWPoison(page)) {
> + if (poison)
> + *poison = PFN_PHYS(pfn);
> + return true;
> + }
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * MF_ATTR_RO - Create sysfs entry for each memory failure statistics.
> * @_name: name of the file in the per NUMA sysfs directory.
>
> ---
> base-commit: c5e32e86ca02b003f86e095d379b38148999293d
> change-id: 20260727-kexec_posioned-72bb0a4143a0
>
> Best regards,
> --
>
> Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
>
--
Regards,
Pratyush Yadav
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-31 17:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-30 15:55 [PATCH v2] kexec: keep the next kernel off hardware-poisoned pages Breno Leitao
2026-07-30 16:18 ` Breno Leitao
2026-07-31 17:49 ` Pratyush Yadav [this message]
2026-07-31 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
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