From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>,
Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
"H. J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
"Shanbhogue, Vedvyas" <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack
Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 09:38:49 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <35b33f293bc392df71710102f38fa6a40d0bb996.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrWLtpfkecfUAXJ64Z5xDeHPJxTQSci+T4RCem7vCqorTw@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 2018-11-22 at 08:53 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> [cc some more libc folks]
>
> I have a general question about this patch set:
>
> If I'm writing a user program, and I write a signal handler, there are
> two things I want to make sure I can still do:
>
> 1. I want to be able to unwind directly from the signal handler
> without involving sigreturn() -- that is, I want to make sure that
> siglongjmp() works. How does this work? Is INCSSP involved? How
Yes, siglongjmp() works by doing INCSSP.
> exactly does the user program know how much to increment SSP by? (And
> why on Earth does INCSSP only consider the low 8 bits of its argument?
> That sounds like a mistake. Can Intel still fix that? On the other
GLIBC calculates how many frames to be unwound and breaks into 255 batches when
necessary.
> hand, what happens if you INCSSP off the end of the shadow stack
> entirely? I assume the next access will fault as long as there's an
> appropriate guard page.)
Yes, that is the case.
>
> 2. I want to be able to modify the signal context from a signal
> handler such that, when the signal handler returns, it will return to
> a frame higher up on the call stack than where the signal started and
> to a different RIP value. How can I do this? I guess I can modify
> the shadow stack with WRSS if WR_SHSTK_EN=1, but how do I tell the
> kernel to kindly skip the frames I want to skip when I do sigreturn()?
>
> The reason I'm asking #2 is that I think it's time to resurrect my old
> vDSO syscall cancellation helper series here:
>
> https://lwn.net/Articles/679434/
If tools/testing/selftests/x86/unwind_vdso.c passes, can we say the kernel does
the right thing? Or do you have other tests that I can run?
>
> and it's not at all clear to me that __vdso_abort_pending_syscall()
> can work without kernel assistance when CET is enabled. I want to
> make sure that it can be done, or I want to come up with some other
> way to allow a signal handler to abort a syscall while CET is on. I
> could probably change __vdso_abort_pending_syscall() to instead point
> RIP to __kernel_vsyscall's epilogue so that we con't change the depth
> of the call stack. But I could imagine that other user programs might
> engage in similar shenanigans and want to have some way to unwind a
> signal's return context without actually jumping there a la
> siglongjmp().
>
> Also, what is the intended setting of WR_SHSTK_EN with this patch set applied?
This bit enables WRSS instruction, which writes to kernel SHSTK. This patch set
uses only WRUSS and WR_SHSTK_EN is not be set.
>
> (I suppose we could just say that 32-bit processes should not use CET,
> but that seems a bit sad.)
They work in compat mode. Should anything break, we can fix it.
Yu-cheng
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-26 17:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-19 21:47 [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-20 9:52 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-20 20:36 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-21 7:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Change names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-12-04 17:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-12-04 18:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 06/26] x86/cet: Add control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 07/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 08/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 09/26] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 10/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 11/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 12/26] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 13/26] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 14/26] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 15/26] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:47 ` [RFC PATCH v6 16/26] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 17/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 18/26] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 19/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 22/26] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 11:02 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 15:14 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2019-04-25 15:35 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:11 ` Dave Martin
2019-04-25 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 23/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 24/26] mm/mmap: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-19 21:48 ` [RFC PATCH v6 26/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-11-22 16:53 ` [RFC PATCH v6 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-26 17:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-11-26 18:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
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