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From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, rkrcmar@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, luto@kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: konrad.wilk@oracle.com, jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com,
	liran.alon@oracle.com, jwadams@google.com, graf@amazon.de,
	rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/27] Kernel Address Space Isolation
Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2019 16:40:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <426fe24d-2ae2-782e-fcc1-ad2ede9ee68b@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1562855138-19507-1-git-send-email-alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>


And I've just noticed that I've messed up the subject of the cover letter.
There are 26 patches, not 27. So it should have been 00/26 not 00/27.

Sorry about that.

alex.

On 7/11/19 4:25 PM, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> This is version 2 of the "KVM Address Space Isolation" RFC. The code
> has been completely changed compared to v1 and it now provides a generic
> kernel framework which provides Address Space Isolation; and KVM is now
> a simple consumer of that framework. That's why the RFC title has been
> changed from "KVM Address Space Isolation" to "Kernel Address Space
> Isolation".
> 
> Kernel Address Space Isolation aims to use address spaces to isolate some
> parts of the kernel (for example KVM) to prevent leaking sensitive data
> between hyper-threads under speculative execution attacks. You can refer
> to the first version of this RFC for more context:
> 
>     https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/5/13/515
> 
> The new code is still a proof of concept. It is much more stable than v1:
> I am able to run a VM with a full OS (and also a nested VM) with multiple
> vcpus. But it looks like there are still some corner cases which cause the
> system to crash/hang.
> 
> I am looking for feedback about this new approach where address space
> isolation is provided by the kernel, and KVM is a just a consumer of this
> new framework.
> 
> 
> Changes
> =======
> 
> - Address Space Isolation (ASI) is now provided as a kernel framework:
>    interfaces for creating and managing an ASI are provided by the kernel,
>    there are not implemented in KVM.
> 
> - An ASI is associated with a page-table, we don't use mm anymore. Entering
>    isolation is done by just updating CR3 to use the ASI page-table. Exiting
>    isolation restores CR3 with the CR3 value present before entering isolation.
> 
> - Isolation is exited at the beginning of any interrupt/exception handler,
>    and on context switch.
> 
> - Isolation doesn't disable interrupt, but if an interrupt occurs the
>    interrupt handler will exit isolation.
> 
> - The current stack is mapped when entering isolation and unmapped when
>    exiting isolation.
> 
> - The current task is not mapped by default, but there's an option to map it.
>    In such a case, the current task is mapped when entering isolation and
>    unmap when exiting isolation.
> 
> - Kernel code mapped to the ASI page-table has been reduced to:
>    . the entire kernel (I still need to test with only the kernel text)
>    . the cpu entry area (because we need the GDT to be mapped)
>    . the cpu ASI session (for managing ASI)
>    . the current stack
> 
> - Optionally, an ASI can request the following kernel mapping to be added:
>    . the stack canary
>    . the cpu offsets (this_cpu_off)
>    . the current task
>    . RCU data (rcu_data)
>    . CPU HW events (cpu_hw_events).
> 
>    All these optional mappings are used for KVM isolation.
>    
> 
> Patches:
> ========
> 
> The proposed patches provides a framework for creating an Address Space
> Isolation (ASI) (represented by a struct asi). The ASI has a page-table which
> can be populated by copying mappings from the kernel page-table. The ASI can
> then be entered/exited by switching between the kernel page-table and the
> ASI page-table. In addition, any interrupt, exception or context switch
> will automatically abort and exit the isolation. Finally patches use the
> ASI framework to implement KVM isolation.
> 
> - 01-03: Core of the ASI framework: create/destroy ASI, enter/exit/abort
>    isolation, ASI page-fault handler.
> 
> - 04-14: Functions to manage, populate and clear an ASI page-table.
> 
> - 15-20: ASI core mappings and optional mappings.
> 
> - 21: Make functions to read cr3/cr4 ASI aware
> 
> - 22-26: Use ASI in KVM to provide isolation for VMExit handlers.
> 
> 
> API Overview:
> =============
> Here is a short description of the main ASI functions provided by the framwork.
> 
> struct asi *asi_create(int map_flags)
> 
>    Create an Address Space Isolation (ASI). map_flags can be used to specify
>    optional kernel mapping to be added to the ASI page-table (for example,
>    ASI_MAP_STACK_CANARY to map the stack canary).
> 
> 
> void asi_destroy(struct asi *asi)
> 
>    Destroy an ASI.
> 
> 
> int asi_enter(struct asi *asi)
> 
>    Enter isolation for the specified ASI. This switches from the kernel page-table
>    to the page-table associated with the ASI.
> 
> 
> void asi_exit(struct asi *asi)
> 
>    Exit isolation for the specified ASI. This switches back to the kernel
>    page-table
> 
> 
> int asi_map(struct asi *asi, void *ptr, unsigned long size);
> 
>    Copy kernel mapping to the specified ASI page-table.
> 
> 
> void asi_unmap(struct asi *asi, void *ptr);
> 
>    Clear kernel mapping from the specified ASI page-table.
> 
> 
> ----
> Alexandre Chartre (23):
>    mm/x86: Introduce kernel address space isolation
>    mm/asi: Abort isolation on interrupt, exception and context switch
>    mm/asi: Handle page fault due to address space isolation
>    mm/asi: Functions to track buffers allocated for an ASI page-table
>    mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry offset functions
>    mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry allocation functions
>    mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry set functions
>    mm/asi: Functions to populate an ASI page-table from a VA range
>    mm/asi: Helper functions to map module into ASI
>    mm/asi: Keep track of VA ranges mapped in ASI page-table
>    mm/asi: Functions to clear ASI page-table entries for a VA range
>    mm/asi: Function to copy page-table entries for percpu buffer
>    mm/asi: Add asi_remap() function
>    mm/asi: Handle ASI mapped range leaks and overlaps
>    mm/asi: Initialize the ASI page-table with core mappings
>    mm/asi: Option to map current task into ASI
>    rcu: Move tree.h static forward declarations to tree.c
>    rcu: Make percpu rcu_data non-static
>    mm/asi: Add option to map RCU data
>    mm/asi: Add option to map cpu_hw_events
>    mm/asi: Make functions to read cr3/cr4 ASI aware
>    KVM: x86/asi: Populate the KVM ASI page-table
>    KVM: x86/asi: Map KVM memslots and IO buses into KVM ASI
> 
> Liran Alon (3):
>    KVM: x86/asi: Introduce address_space_isolation module parameter
>    KVM: x86/asi: Introduce KVM address space isolation
>    KVM: x86/asi: Switch to KVM address space on entry to guest
> 
>   arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S          |   42 ++-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h         |  237 ++++++++
>   arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   20 +-
>   arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h    |   10 +
>   arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c      |    4 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/Makefile              |    3 +-
>   arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c                 |    2 +-
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/isolation.c       |  231 ++++++++
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c             |   14 +-
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h             |   24 +
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                 |   68 +++-
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.h                 |    1 +
>   arch/x86/mm/Makefile               |    2 +
>   arch/x86/mm/asi.c                  |  459 +++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/mm/asi_pagetable.c        | 1077 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   arch/x86/mm/fault.c                |    7 +
>   include/linux/kvm_host.h           |    7 +
>   kernel/rcu/tree.c                  |   56 ++-
>   kernel/rcu/tree.h                  |   56 +--
>   kernel/sched/core.c                |    4 +
>   security/Kconfig                   |   10 +
>   21 files changed, 2269 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
>   create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/asi.h
>   create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/isolation.c
>   create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/asi.c
>   create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/asi_pagetable.c
> 


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-07-11 14:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-11 14:25 [RFC v2 00/27] Kernel Address Space Isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 01/26] mm/x86: Introduce kernel address space isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 21:33   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12  7:43     ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 02/26] mm/asi: Abort isolation on interrupt, exception and context switch Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 20:11   ` Andi Kleen
2019-07-11 20:17     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-07-11 20:41       ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12  0:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-12  7:50     ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 03/26] mm/asi: Handle page fault due to address space isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 04/26] mm/asi: Functions to track buffers allocated for an ASI page-table Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 05/26] mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry offset functions Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 06/26] mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry allocation functions Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 07/26] mm/asi: Add ASI page-table entry set functions Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 08/26] mm/asi: Functions to populate an ASI page-table from a VA range Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 09/26] mm/asi: Helper functions to map module into ASI Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 10/26] mm/asi: Keep track of VA ranges mapped in ASI page-table Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 11/26] mm/asi: Functions to clear ASI page-table entries for a VA range Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 12/26] mm/asi: Function to copy page-table entries for percpu buffer Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 13/26] mm/asi: Add asi_remap() function Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 14/26] mm/asi: Handle ASI mapped range leaks and overlaps Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 15/26] mm/asi: Initialize the ASI page-table with core mappings Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 16/26] mm/asi: Option to map current task into ASI Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 17/26] rcu: Move tree.h static forward declarations to tree.c Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 18/26] rcu: Make percpu rcu_data non-static Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 19/26] mm/asi: Add option to map RCU data Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 20/26] mm/asi: Add option to map cpu_hw_events Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 21/26] mm/asi: Make functions to read cr3/cr4 ASI aware Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 22/26] KVM: x86/asi: Introduce address_space_isolation module parameter Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 23/26] KVM: x86/asi: Introduce KVM address space isolation Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 24/26] KVM: x86/asi: Populate the KVM ASI page-table Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 25/26] KVM: x86/asi: Switch to KVM address space on entry to guest Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:25 ` [RFC v2 26/26] KVM: x86/asi: Map KVM memslots and IO buses into KVM ASI Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-11 14:40 ` Alexandre Chartre [this message]
2019-07-11 22:38 ` [RFC v2 00/27] Kernel Address Space Isolation Dave Hansen
2019-07-12  8:09   ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 13:51     ` Dave Hansen
2019-07-12 14:06       ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 15:23         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 10:44   ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 11:56     ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 12:50       ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 13:43         ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 13:58           ` Dave Hansen
2019-07-12 14:36           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-14 18:17             ` Alexander Graf
2019-07-12 13:54         ` Dave Hansen
2019-07-12 15:20           ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 15:16         ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 16:37           ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 16:45             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-14 17:11               ` Mike Rapoport
2019-07-12 19:06             ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-14 15:06               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-15 10:33                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 19:48             ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-15  8:23               ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-15  8:28                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 16:00       ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-07-12 11:44 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 12:17   ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 12:36     ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 12:47       ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-12 13:07         ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-07-12 13:46           ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-07-31 16:31             ` Dario Faggioli
2019-08-22 12:31               ` Alexandre Chartre
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-07-01 13:55 hackapple
2020-07-01 14:00 黄金海
2020-07-01 14:02 黄金海

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