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From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: "Baek Kyu, Kim" <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes (Arm)" <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/secretmem: Keep locked memory accounting until inode eviction
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 23:59:57 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <45ce0b42-d45a-44e3-b300-607989e618c5@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261030152407.113568-1-pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>

On 10/30/26 16:24, Baek Kyu, Kim wrote:
> A secretmem inode can outlive its original file. An O_PATH descriptor
> opened through /proc/self/fd keeps the inode and its unevictable folios
> alive after the mapping and original descriptor are closed. The file
> release path nevertheless drops the locked-memory charge, allowing the
> same user to reuse RLIMIT_MEMLOCK while those folios remain allocated.
> 
> Move private-state and locked-memory accounting cleanup to inode eviction,
> after truncating the page cache. Keep secretmem_users active over the same
> lifetime so that the hibernation guard covers retained secret pages. Let
> iput() handle file-creation failures and tolerate an inode with no private
> state.
> 
> Fixes: 97d34aa65c29 ("mm/secretmem: properly account locked pages")
> Signed-off-by: Baek Kyu, Kim <pocj8ur4in@gmail.com>

Lorenzo, Mike, this problem seems real to me. Can you take a look?

> ---
> On an arm64 QEMU guest with an 8 KiB RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, an O_PATH reference
> retained two secretmem pages. The baseline dropped the charge to zero and
> allowed a further one-page fault; the patch kept both pages charged and
> rejected that fault until the last path reference closed. The Image
> was built with KASAN and lockdep. Hibernation, other architectures,
> and long-running concurrency were not tested.
> 
>  mm/secretmem.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++-------------
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index 384f5cfc457f..fa8be360bd2a 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -185,18 +185,14 @@ static void secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
>  {
>  	struct secretmem_inode_state *state = inode->i_private;
>  
> +	if (!state)
> +		return;
> +
>  	secretmem_unaccount_all_folios(state);
>  	free_uid(state->user);
>  	kfree(state);
>  	inode->i_private = NULL;
> -}
> -
> -static int secretmem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> -{
>  	atomic_dec(&secretmem_users);
> -	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> -
> -	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static int secretmem_mmap_prepare(struct vm_area_desc *desc)
> @@ -216,7 +212,6 @@ bool vma_is_secretmem(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>  }
>  
>  static const struct file_operations secretmem_fops = {
> -	.release	= secretmem_release,
>  	.mmap_prepare	= secretmem_mmap_prepare,
>  };
>  
> @@ -274,6 +269,7 @@ static int secretmem_init_inode_priv(struct inode *inode)
>  
>  	state->user = get_uid(current_user());
>  	inode->i_private = state;
> +	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> @@ -296,7 +292,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
>  				 O_RDWR | O_LARGEFILE, &secretmem_fops);
>  	if (IS_ERR(file)) {
>  		err = PTR_ERR(file);
> -		goto err_free_priv;
> +		goto err_free_inode;
>  	}
>  
>  	mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_USER);
> @@ -309,11 +305,7 @@ static struct file *secretmem_file_create(unsigned long flags)
>  	inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
>  	inode->i_size = 0;
>  
> -	atomic_inc(&secretmem_users);
> -
>  	return file;
> -err_free_priv:
> -	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
>  err_free_inode:
>  	iput(inode);
>  	return ERR_PTR(err);
> @@ -335,6 +327,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
>  	return FD_ADD(flags & O_CLOEXEC, secretmem_file_create(flags));
>  }
>  
> +static void secretmem_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
> +{
> +	truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
> +	clear_inode(inode);
> +	secretmem_destroy_inode_priv(inode);
> +}
> +
> +static const struct super_operations secretmem_super_ops = {
> +	.statfs		= simple_statfs,
> +	.evict_inode	= secretmem_evict_inode,
> +};
> +
>  static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  {
>  	struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx;
> @@ -342,6 +346,7 @@ static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  	ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC);
>  	if (!ctx)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> +	ctx->ops = &secretmem_super_ops;
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }


-- 
Cheers,

David


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18 23:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-30 15:24 [PATCH] mm/secretmem: Keep locked memory accounting until inode eviction Baek Kyu, Kim
2026-11-18 22:59 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-11-19  7:36   ` Mike Rapoport

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