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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:29:41 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4a357b9b-7d53-5bd6-81db-9d8cc63a6c72@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160912165944.rpqbwxz2biathnt3@pd.tnic>

On 09/12/2016 11:59 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:38:59PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> Since the setup data is in memory in the clear, it must be accessed as
>> un-encrypted.  Always use ioremap (similar to sysfs setup data support)
>> to map the data.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c |   30 +++++++++++-------------------
>>  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
>> index bdb83e4..a58a82e 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kdebugfs.c
>> @@ -48,17 +48,13 @@ static ssize_t setup_data_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
>>  
>>  	pa = node->paddr + sizeof(struct setup_data) + pos;
>>  	pg = pfn_to_page((pa + count - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
>> -	if (PageHighMem(pg)) {
> 
> Why is it ok to get rid of the PageHighMem() check?

Since the change is to perform the ioremap call no matter what the check
for PageHighMem() wasn't needed anymore.

> 
> Btw, we did talk earlier in the thread about making __va() clear the SME
> mask and then you won't really need to change stuff here. Or?

This is still required because just using the __va() would still cause
the mapping created to have the encryption bit set. The ioremap call
will result in the mapping not having the encryption bit set.

Thanks,
Tom

> 

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-14 14:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223539.29880.96739.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-02  8:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <3fbb0763-5f9f-6ff7-2266-7478fb12642e-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-07 15:23           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223550.29880.39409.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-08-25  3:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223559.29880.1502.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-02 11:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223622.29880.17779.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-02 14:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223646.29880.28794.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-05 15:22     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30       ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]         ` <f4125cae-63af-f8c7-086f-e297ce480a07-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-07 15:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26             ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]               ` <bc8f22db-b6f9-951f-145c-fed919098cbe-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-08 13:55                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223710.29880.23936.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-06 16:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]       ` <6431e761-a4c8-c9bb-1352-6d66672200fd-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 16:35         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223749.29880.10183.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-09 17:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223757.29880.24107.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-09 17:34     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223807.29880.69294.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223820.29880.17752.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 11:45     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57           ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]             ` <421c767b-2410-2537-4f4e-b70670898fee-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-16  7:08               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223829.29880.10341.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 12:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223859.29880.60652.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 16:59     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-09-14 14:51         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08           ` Tom Lendacky
     [not found]             ` <b734c2da-fee4-efae-fda2-bbcd74abbb33-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-16  7:11               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
     [not found]   ` <20160822223908.29880.50365.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-12 17:08     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31       ` Tom Lendacky

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