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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization
Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2015 09:22:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <567986E7.50107@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1512221023550.2748@east.gentwo.org>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1078 bytes --]

On 12/22/2015 08:25 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote:
> On Tue, 22 Dec 2015, Dave Hansen wrote:
>> On 12/21/2015 07:40 PM, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>> +	  The tradeoff is performance impact. The noticible impact can vary
>>> +	  and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload
>>> +	  before deploying it
>>
>> What if instead of writing SLAB_MEMORY_SANITIZE_VALUE, we wrote 0's?
>> That still destroys the information, but it has the positive effect of
>> allowing a kzalloc() call to avoid zeroing the slab object.  It might
>> mitigate some of the performance impact.
> 
> We already write zeros in many cases or the object is initialized in a
> different. No one really wants an uninitialized object. The problem may be
> that a freed object is having its old content until reused. Which is
> something that poisoning deals with.

Or are you just saying that we should use the poisoning *code* that we
already have in slub?  Using the _code_ looks like a really good idea,
whether we're using it to write POISON_FREE, or 0's.  Something like the
attached patch?



[-- Attachment #2: slub-poison-zeros.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1546 bytes --]



---

 b/mm/slub.c |   12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff -puN mm/slub.c~slub-poison-zeros mm/slub.c
--- a/mm/slub.c~slub-poison-zeros	2015-12-22 09:18:30.585371985 -0800
+++ b/mm/slub.c	2015-12-22 09:21:23.754174731 -0800
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ static inline bool kmem_cache_has_cpu_pa
 /* Internal SLUB flags */
 #define __OBJECT_POISON		0x80000000UL /* Poison object */
 #define __CMPXCHG_DOUBLE	0x40000000UL /* Use cmpxchg_double */
+#define __OBJECT_POISON_ZERO	0x20000000UL /* Poison with zeroes */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 static struct notifier_block slab_notifier;
@@ -678,7 +679,10 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cach
 	u8 *p = object;
 
 	if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) {
-		memset(p, POISON_FREE, s->object_size - 1);
+		if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON_ZERO) {
+			memset(p, POISON_FREE, s->object_size - 1);
+		else
+			memset(p, 0, s->object_size - 1);
 		p[s->object_size - 1] = POISON_END;
 	}
 
@@ -2495,7 +2499,8 @@ redo:
 		stat(s, ALLOC_FASTPATH);
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object)
+	if (unlikely(gfpflags & __GFP_ZERO) && object &&
+	    !(s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON_ZERO)) {
 		memset(object, 0, s->object_size);
 
 	slab_post_alloc_hook(s, gfpflags, object);
@@ -2839,7 +2844,8 @@ bool kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_c
 	local_irq_enable();
 
 	/* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
-	if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO)) {
+	if (unlikely(flags & __GFP_ZERO) &&
+	    !(s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON_ZERO)) {
 		int j;
 
 		for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
_

  reply	other threads:[~2015-12-22 17:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-12-22  3:40 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48   ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06  0:17     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:06       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:19   ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:21   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:11     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  9:33   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37       ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18         ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06           ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57   ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25     ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22       ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2015-12-22 17:24         ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28           ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08             ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19               ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13                 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32                   ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06  0:29                   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:46                     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22  3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:15   ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  2:49     ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38   ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04   ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06  0:09     ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06  3:17       ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-07 16:26         ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08  1:23           ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07             ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14  3:49               ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21  3:35                 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39                   ` Christoph Lameter

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