From: Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX
Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 19:17:21 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <568C8741.4040709@labbott.name> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJQKaA1qgLEV9vXEVH4QBC__Vg141BX22ZsZzW6p9yk4Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 1/5/16 4:09 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 22, 2015 at 12:04 PM, Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> wrote:
>> On 12/22/15 8:08 AM, Christoph Lameter wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, 21 Dec 2015, Laura Abbott wrote:
>>>
>>>> The biggest change from PAX_MEMORY_SANTIIZE is that this feature
>>>> sanitizes
>>>> the SL[AOU]B allocators only. My plan is to work on the buddy allocator
>>>> santization after this series gets picked up. A side effect of this is
>>>> that allocations which go directly to the buddy allocator (i.e. large
>>>> allocations) aren't sanitized. I'd like feedback about whether it's worth
>>>> it to add sanitization on that path directly or just use the page
>>>> allocator sanitization when that comes in.
>
> This looks great! I love the added lkdtm tests, too. Very cool.
>
>>> I am not sure what the point of this patchset is. We have a similar effect
>>> to sanitization already in the allocators through two mechanisms:
>>>
>>> 1. Slab poisoning
>>> 2. Allocation with GFP_ZERO
>>>
>>> I do not think we need a third one. You could accomplish your goals much
>>> easier without this code churn by either
>>>
>>> 1. Improve the existing poisoning mechanism. Ensure that there are no
>>> gaps. Security sensitive kernel slab caches can then be created with
>>> the POISONING flag set. Maybe add a Kconfig flag that enables
>>> POISONING for each cache? What was the issue when you tried using
>>> posining for sanitization?
>>
>> The existing poisoning does work for sanitization but it's still a debug
>> feature. It seemed more appropriate to keep debug features and non-debug
>> features separate hence the separate option and configuration.
>
> What stuff is intertwined in the existing poisoning that makes it
> incompatible/orthogonal?
>
It's not the poisoning per se that's incompatible, it's how the poisoning is
set up. At least for slub, the current poisoning is part of SLUB_DEBUG which
enables other consistency checks on the allocator. Trying to pull out just
the poisoning for use when SLUB_DEBUG isn't on would result in roughly what
would be here anyway. I looked at trying to reuse some of the existing poisoning
and came to the conclusion it was less intrusive to the allocator to keep it
separate.
Thanks,
Laura
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-06 3:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-12-22 3:40 [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 1/7] mm/slab_common.c: Add common support for slab saniziation Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:48 ` Vlastimil Babka
2016-01-06 0:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:06 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:19 ` Kees Cook
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 2/7] slub: Add support for sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 3/7] slab: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 4/7] slob: " Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 5/7] mm: Mark several cases as SLAB_NO_SANITIZE Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:21 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:11 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 6/7] mm: Add Kconfig option for slab sanitization Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 9:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 17:51 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 18:37 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 19:18 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 20:01 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 20:06 ` Mathias Krause
2015-12-22 14:57 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:25 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:22 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 17:24 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 17:28 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 18:08 ` Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 18:19 ` Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 19:13 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 19:32 ` Dave Hansen
2016-01-06 0:29 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:46 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 3:40 ` [RFC][PATCH 7/7] lkdtm: Add READ_AFTER_FREE test Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 2:49 ` Laura Abbott
2015-12-22 16:08 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/7] Sanitization of slabs based on grsecurity/PaX Christoph Lameter
2015-12-22 16:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2015-12-22 16:38 ` Daniel Micay
2015-12-22 20:04 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-06 0:09 ` Kees Cook
2016-01-06 3:17 ` Laura Abbott [this message]
2016-01-07 16:26 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-08 1:23 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-08 14:07 ` Christoph Lameter
2016-01-14 3:49 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 3:35 ` Laura Abbott
2016-01-21 15:39 ` Christoph Lameter
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