From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
To: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Cc: "lsf-pc@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
<lsf-pc@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
Linux kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [LSF/MM TOPIC] VM containers
Date: Mon, 25 Jan 2016 12:25:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56A65AA2.6040307@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160124170656.6c5460a3@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
On 01/24/2016 12:06 PM, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:
>>> That changes some of the goals the memory management subsystem has,
>>> from "use all the resources effectively" to "use as few resources as
>>> necessary, in case the host needs the memory for something else".
>
> Also "and take guidance/provide telemetry" - because you want to tune the
> VM behaviours based upon policy and to learn from them for when you re-run
> that container.
>
>> Beyond memory consumption, I would be interested whether we can harden the kernel by the paravirt interfaces for memory protection in VMs (if any). For example, the hypervisor could write-protect part of the page tables or kernel data structures in VMs, and does it help?
>
> There are four behaviours I can think of, some of which you see in
> various hypervisors and security hardening systems
>
> - die on write (a write here causes a security trap and termination after
> the guest has marked the page range die on write, and it cannot be
> unmarked). The guest OS at boot can for example mark all it's code as
> die-on-write.
> - irrevocably read only (VM never allows page to be rewritten by guest
> after the guest marks the page range irrevocably r/o)
For these we get the question "how do we make it harder for the
guest to remap the page tables to point at read/write memory,
and modify that instead of the read-only memory?"
On "smaller" guests (less than 1TB in size), it may be enough to
ensure that the kernel PUD pointer points to the (read-only) kernel
PUD at context switch time, placing the main kernel page tables,
kernel text, and some other things in read-only memory.
> - asynchronous faulting (pages the guest thinks are in it's memory but
> are in fact on the hosts swap cause a subscribable fault in the guest
> so that it can (where possible) be context switched
KVM (and s390) already do the asynchronous page fault trick.
> - free if needed - marking pages as freed up and either you get a page
> back as it was or a fault and a zeroed page
People have worked on this for KVM. I do not remember what
happened to the code.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-25 17:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-22 15:56 [LSF/MM TOPIC] VM containers Rik van Riel
2016-01-22 16:05 ` [Lsf-pc] " James Bottomley
2016-01-22 17:11 ` Johannes Weiner
2016-01-27 15:48 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-01-27 18:36 ` Johannes Weiner
2016-01-28 17:12 ` Vladimir Davydov
2016-01-23 23:41 ` Nakajima, Jun
2016-01-24 17:06 ` One Thousand Gnomes
2016-01-25 17:25 ` Rik van Riel [this message]
2016-01-28 15:18 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
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