From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: "Christian Brauner (Amutable)" <brauner@kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v3 3/4] ptrace: add ptracer_access_allowed()
Date: Sat, 23 May 2026 00:32:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <610c0702-4e55-429f-befd-445134483563@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260520-work-task_exec_state-v3-3-69f895bc1385@kernel.org>
On 5/20/26 23:48, Christian Brauner (Amutable) wrote:
> Add a helper that encapsulates all of the logic for checking ptrace
> access and remove open-coded versions in follow-up patches.
>
> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
> ---
> include/linux/ptrace.h | 1 +
> kernel/ptrace.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
> index 90507d4afcd6..ef314f7a9ecc 100644
> --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ struct syscall_info {
> struct seccomp_data data;
> };
>
> +bool ptracer_access_allowed(struct task_struct *tsk);
> extern int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
> void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 07398c9c8fe3..0e1f80f73a7f 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
> #include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
> +#include <linux/sched/exec_state.h>
> #include <linux/sched/task.h>
> #include <linux/errno.h>
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> @@ -36,6 +37,32 @@
>
> #include <asm/syscall.h> /* for syscall_get_* */
>
> +/**
> + * ptracer_access_allowed - may current peek/poke @tsk's address space?
> + * @tsk: tracee
> + *
> + * Per-access check used by ptrace_access_vm() and architecture-specific
> + * tag/register accessors. Returns true iff current is the registered
> + * ptracer of @tsk and either @tsk is owner-dumpable or current holds
> + * CAP_SYS_PTRACE in @tsk's exec namespace. Lighter than
> + * __ptrace_may_access(): it re-validates only dumpability and
> + * capability on every access, without re-running LSM hooks or
> + * cred_cap_issubset() checks performed at attach time.
> + */
> +bool ptracer_access_allowed(struct task_struct *tsk)
> +{
> + const struct task_exec_state *es;
> +
> + if (!tsk->ptrace)
> + return false;
> + if (current != tsk->parent)
> + return false;
> + guard(rcu)();
> + es = task_exec_state_rcu(tsk);
> + return READ_ONCE(es->dumpable) == TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER ||
> + ptracer_capable(tsk, es->user_ns);
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Access another process' address space via ptrace.
> * Source/target buffer must be kernel space,
>
Besides the new RCU + old MM handling, this matches what we do in
ptrace_access_vm().
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (arm) <david@kernel.org>
--
Cheers,
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-22 22:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-20 21:48 [PATCH RFC v3 0/4] exec: introduce task_exec_state for exec-time metadata Christian Brauner (Amutable)
2026-05-20 21:48 ` [PATCH RFC v3 1/4] sched/coredump: introduce enum task_dumpable Christian Brauner (Amutable)
2026-05-22 22:14 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-05-20 21:48 ` [PATCH RFC v3 2/4] exec: introduce struct task_exec_state Christian Brauner (Amutable)
2026-05-22 15:00 ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-05-22 22:21 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-05-20 21:48 ` [PATCH RFC v3 3/4] ptrace: add ptracer_access_allowed() Christian Brauner (Amutable)
2026-05-22 15:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
2026-05-22 22:32 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-05-20 21:48 ` [PATCH RFC v3 4/4] exec_state: relocate dumpable information Christian Brauner (Amutable)
2026-05-21 10:05 ` Christian Brauner
2026-05-21 11:16 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-21 13:08 ` Christian Brauner
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=610c0702-4e55-429f-befd-445134483563@kernel.org \
--to=david@kernel.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=liam@infradead.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=mhocko@suse.com \
--cc=minchan@kernel.org \
--cc=oleg@redhat.com \
--cc=qsa@qualys.com \
--cc=rppt@kernel.org \
--cc=surenb@google.com \
--cc=torvalds@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox