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From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: "Jan Sebastian Götte" <linux@jaseg.de>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages before kdump
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2026 16:53:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <70c578dc-769f-465f-a146-4a4695f747c1@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260731162739.158320-4-linux@jaseg.de>

On 7/31/26 18:27, Jan Sebastian Götte wrote:
> Register a CRASH_ZEROIZE notifier that wipes secretmem folios. As a
> result, when CONFIG_CRASH_ZEROIZE is set, secretmem areas will be
> cleared before the kdump kernel is kexec'ed.
> 
> Zeroization runs after the other CPUs have been stopped, so the page
> cache cannot be mutated concurrently and the xarray may be walked
> without taking the i_pages lock. This is a best effort, defense in depth
> measure. s_inode_list_lock is taken with trylock only. If a CPU was
> stopped mid-modification the list may be inconsistent, and this late
> into the panic path, there's nothing we can do about it.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jan Sebastian Götte <linux@jaseg.de>

Are you actually using secretmem in your use case? I heard some rumors that
secretmem isn't used all that much in practice :)

-- 
Cheers,

David


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-11 14:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-31 16:27 [PATCH 0/4] CRASH_ZEROIZE: Wipe secrets before kdump Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 1/4] of/kexec: fix typo in comment (usable-memory-range) Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 13:43   ` Rob Herring
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 2/4] kexec: add CRASH_ZEROIZE to wipe secrets before kdump Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages " Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 14:53   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-08-11 15:05     ` Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-08-11 15:14       ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-11 15:18         ` Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 16:27 ` [PATCH 4/4] security/keys: zeroize key payloads " Jan Sebastian Götte
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-07-31 15:46 [PATCH 0/4] CRASH_ZEROIZE: Wipe secrets " Jan Sebastian Götte
2026-07-31 15:46 ` [PATCH 3/4] mm/secretmem: zeroize secret pages " Jan Sebastian Götte

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