Re: [PATCH v6 01/30] mm: Introduce kpkeys

Kevin Brodsky
2026-04-17T13:11:09Z

On 17/04/2026 14:00, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 4/15/26 17:50, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
>> On 15/04/2026 15:00, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
>>> On 2/27/26 18:54, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
>>>> kpkeys is a simple framework to enable the use of protection keys
>>>> (pkeys) to harden the kernel itself. This patch introduces the basic
>>>> API in <linux/kpkeys.h>: a couple of functions to set and restore
>>>> the pkey register and macros to define guard objects.
>>>>
>>>> kpkeys introduces a new concept on top of pkeys: the kpkeys level.
>>>> Each level is associated to a set of permissions for the pkeys
>>>> managed by the kpkeys framework. kpkeys_set_level(lvl) sets those
>>>> permissions according to lvl, and returns the original pkey
>>>> register, to be later restored by kpkeys_restore_pkey_reg(). To
>>>> start with, only KPKEYS_LVL_DEFAULT is available, which is meant
>>>> to grant RW access to KPKEYS_PKEY_DEFAULT (i.e. all memory since
>>>> this is the only available pkey for now).
>>>>
>>>> Because each architecture implementing pkeys uses a different
>>>> representation for the pkey register, and may reserve certain pkeys
>>>> for specific uses, support for kpkeys must be explicitly indicated
>>>> by selecting ARCH_HAS_KPKEYS and defining the following functions in
>>>> <asm/kpkeys.h>, in addition to the macros provided in
>>>> <asm-generic/kpkeys.h>:
>>> I don't quite understand the reason for using levels. Levels sounds like
>>> it would all be in some ordered fashion, where higher levels have access
>>> to lower levels.
>> That was originally the idea indeed, but in practice I don't expect
>> levels to have a strict ordering, as it's not practical for composing
>> features.
>>
>>> Think of that as a key that can unlock all "lower" locks, not just a
>>> single lock.
>>>
>>> Then, the question is about the ordering once we introduce new
>>> keys/locks. With two, it obviously doesn't matter :)
>>>
>>> So naturally I wonder whether levels is really the right abstraction
>>> here, and why we are not simply using "distinct" keys, like
>>>
>>> KPKEY_DEFAULT
>>> KPKEY_PGTABLE
>>> KPKEY_SUPER_SECRET1
>>> KPKEY_SUPER_SECRET2
>>>
>>> Is it because you want KPKEY_PGTABLE also be able to write to KPKEY_DEFAULT?
>> Right, and in general a given level may be able to write to any number
>> of pkeys. That's why I don't want to conflate pkeys and levels. Agreed
>> that "level" might not be the clearest term though, since there's no
>> strict ordering.
> As discussed offline, maybe the right terminology to use here would be
> something like a "context".
>
> You'd be activating/setting a context.
>
> KPKEY_CTX_DEFAULT
> KPKEY_CTX_PGTABLE
> KPKEY_CTX_SUPER_SECRET1

Sounds good to me, that's more accurate than "level" if it is possible
to give access to arbitrary pkeys to each context, which is the current
assumption.

> What is accessible (and how) is defined for each context. For example, I
> would assume that all context allow for read/write access to everything
> that KPKEY_CTX_DEFAULT has access to.

Most contexts would, although as I mentioned in the previous email,
unprivileged contexts such as eBPF programs may be further restricted.

- Kevin