linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, jroedel@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, seanjc@google.com,
	vkuznets@redhat.com, jmattson@google.com, luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, slp@redhat.com, pgonda@google.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com,
	rientjes@google.com, dovmurik@linux.ibm.com, tobin@ibm.com,
	bp@alien8.de, vbabka@suse.cz, kirill@shutemov.name,
	ak@linux.intel.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, alpergun@google.com,
	jarkko@kernel.org, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nikunj.dadhania@amd.com,
	pankaj.gupta@amd.com, liam.merwick@oracle.com,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Yamahata, Isaku" <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 09/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT
Date: Mon, 27 May 2024 20:25:59 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7da9c4a3-8597-44aa-a7ad-cc2bd2a85024@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <rczrxq3lhqguarwh4cwxwa35j5riiagbilcw32oaxd7aqpyaq7@6bqrqn6ontba>



On 5/22/2024 5:49 AM, Michael Roth wrote:
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 08:49:59AM +0800, Binbin Wu wrote:
>>
>> On 5/17/2024 1:23 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> On Thu, May 16, 2024 at 10:29 AM Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 5/1/2024 4:51 PM, Michael Roth wrote:
>>>>> SEV-SNP VMs can ask the hypervisor to change the page state in the RMP
>>>>> table to be private or shared using the Page State Change MSR protocol
>>>>> as defined in the GHCB specification.
>>>>>
>>>>> When using gmem, private/shared memory is allocated through separate
>>>>> pools, and KVM relies on userspace issuing a KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
>>>>> KVM ioctl to tell the KVM MMU whether or not a particular GFN should be
>>>>> backed by private memory or not.
>>>>>
>>>>> Forward these page state change requests to userspace so that it can
>>>>> issue the expected KVM ioctls. The KVM MMU will handle updating the RMP
>>>>> entries when it is ready to map a private page into a guest.
>>>>>
>>>>> Use the existing KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall format to deliver these
>>>>> requests to userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
>>>>> Co-developed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>     arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h |  6 ++++
>>>>>     arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c            | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>     2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
>>>>> index 1006bfffe07a..6d68db812de1 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
>>>>> @@ -101,11 +101,17 @@ enum psc_op {
>>>>>         /* GHCBData[11:0] */                            \
>>>>>         GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ)
>>>>>
>>>>> +#define GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_TO_GFN(msr) (((msr) & GENMASK_ULL(51, 12)) >> 12)
>>>>> +#define GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_TO_OP(msr) (((msr) & GENMASK_ULL(55, 52)) >> 52)
>>>>> +
>>>>>     #define GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP           0x015
>>>>>     #define GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val)                  \
>>>>>         /* GHCBData[63:32] */                           \
>>>>>         (((u64)(val) & GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)) >> 32)
>>>>>
>>>>> +/* Set highest bit as a generic error response */
>>>>> +#define GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_ERROR (BIT_ULL(63) | GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP)
>>>>> +
>>>>>     /* GHCB Hypervisor Feature Request/Response */
>>>>>     #define GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_REQ          0x080
>>>>>     #define GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP         0x081
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> index e1ac5af4cb74..720775c9d0b8 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>>>>> @@ -3461,6 +3461,48 @@ static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
>>>>>         svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
>>>>>     }
>>>>>
>>>>> +static int snp_complete_psc_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +     struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
>>>>> +
>>>>> +     if (vcpu->run->hypercall.ret)
>>>> Do we have definition of ret? I didn't find clear documentation about it.
>>>> According to the code, 0 means succssful. Is there any other error codes
>>>> need to or can be interpreted?
>>> They are defined in include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
>>>
>>> #define KVM_ENOSYS        1000
>>> #define KVM_EFAULT        EFAULT /* 14 */
>>> #define KVM_EINVAL        EINVAL /* 22 */
>>> #define KVM_E2BIG        E2BIG /* 7 */
>>> #define KVM_EPERM        EPERM /* 1*/
>>> #define KVM_EOPNOTSUPP        95
>>>
>>> Linux however does not expect the hypercall to fail for SEV/SEV-ES; and
>>> it will terminate the guest if the PSC operation fails for SEV-SNP.  So
>>> it's best for userspace if the hypercall always succeeds. :)
>> Thanks for the info.
>>
>> For TDX, it wants to restrict the size of memory range for conversion in one
>> hypercall to avoid a too long latency.
>> Previously, in TDX QEMU patchset v5, the limitation is in userspace and  if
>> the size is too big, the status_code will set to TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY and the
>> failed GPA for guest to retry is updated.
>> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240229063726.610065-51-xiaoyao.li@intel.com/
>>
>> When TDX converts TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA to KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE, do you think
>> which is more reasonable to set the restriction? In KVM (TDX specific code)
>> or userspace?
>> If userspace is preferred, then the interface needs to  be extended to
>> support it.
> With SNP we might get a batch of requests in a single GHCB request, and
> potentially each of those requests need to get set out to userspace as
> a single KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE. The subsequent patch here handles that in
> a loop by issuing a new KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE via the completion handler.
> So we also sort of need to split large requests into multiple userspace
> requests in some cases.
>
> It seems like TDX should be able to do something similar by limiting the
> size of each KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE to TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN, and then
> returning TDG_VP_VMCALL_RETRY to guest if the original size was greater
> than TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN. But at that point you're effectively done with
> the entire request and can return to guest, so it actually seems a little
> more straightforward than the SNP case above. E.g. TDX has a 1:1 mapping
> between TDG_VP_VMCALL_MAP_GPA and KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE events. (And even
> similar names :))
>
> So doesn't seem like there's a good reason to expose any of these
> throttling details to userspace,

The reasons I want to put the throttling in userspace are:
1. Hardcode the TDX_MAP_GPA_MAX_LEN in kernel may not be preferred.
2. The throttling thing doesn't need to be TDX specific, it can be 
generic in userspace.

I think we can set a reasonable value in userspace, so that for SNP, it 
doesn't trigger the throttling since the large request will be split to 
multiple userspace requests.


> in which case existing
> KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE interface seems like it should be sufficient.
>
> -Mike
>
>>
>>>> For TDX, it may also want to use KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall  to
>>>> userspace via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL.
>>> Yes, definitely.
>>>
>>> Paolo
>>>



  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-27 12:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-01  8:51 [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 01/20] Revert "KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level" Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 02/20] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-02 23:11   ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-07 17:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-01 17:39   ` [PATCH] Fixes: f32fb32820b1 ("KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level") Ackerley Tng
2024-08-01 17:57     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-01 17:59       ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-08-01 18:15     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 03/20] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 04/20] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 05/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 06/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 07/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 08/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 09/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-16  8:28   ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-16 17:23     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-21  0:49       ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-21 21:49         ` Michael Roth
2024-05-27 12:25           ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2024-05-28 10:39             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-29 20:02               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-31  1:22                 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-31 13:10                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 16:47           ` Zhi Wang
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 10/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 11/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 12/20] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 13/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-05-20 10:16   ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 17:35     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 21:57       ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 23:15         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 23:41           ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-21  0:30             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 19:14     ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 14/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 15/20] KVM: x86: Implement hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 16/20] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 17/20] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 18/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 19/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST " Michael Roth
2024-05-13 23:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-14  2:51     ` Michael Roth
2024-05-14 14:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-15  1:25         ` [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Replace KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT with KVM_EXIT_SNP_REQ_CERTS Michael Roth
2024-08-16 21:50           ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-08-16 21:58             ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 20/20] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-05-07 18:04 ` [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:14   ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10  2:34     ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10  1:58 ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Michael Roth
2024-05-10  1:58   ` [PATCH v15 22/23] KVM: SEV: Fix return code interpretation for RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 15:36       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 16:37         ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:59           ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 17:25             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-14  8:10             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-10  1:58   ` [PATCH v15 23/23] KVM: SEV: Fix PSC handling for SMASH/UNSMASH and partial update ops Michael Roth
2024-05-10 17:09     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 19:08       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:47   ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 13:50     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 15:27       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 15:59         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 17:47           ` Isaku Yamahata

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=7da9c4a3-8597-44aa-a7ad-cc2bd2a85024@linux.intel.com \
    --to=binbin.wu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=alpergun@google.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=ashish.kalra@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dovmurik@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=jroedel@suse.de \
    --cc=kirill@shutemov.name \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=liam.merwick@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nikunj.dadhania@amd.com \
    --cc=pankaj.gupta@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=slp@redhat.com \
    --cc=srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=tobin@ibm.com \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).