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Oct 2024 09:52:43 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] mseal: update mseal.rst To: Randy Dunlap Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, keescook@chromium.org, corbet@lwn.net, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, jannh@google.com, sroettger@google.com, pedro.falcato@gmail.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, willy@infradead.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, deraadt@openbsd.org, usama.anjum@collabora.com, surenb@google.com, merimus@google.com, lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com, enh@google.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Rspam-User: X-Stat-Signature: jeh5yddwe843wmouseqaz55uz5u6oxo5 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 7B80D12000F X-Rspamd-Server: rspam02 X-HE-Tag: 1728060787-513441 X-HE-Meta: U2FsdGVkX19raqlmm5NVc/PeincRQ0+m5qbZTMSnJgyVMaHRuNFeSYZ2/CDAtnfhTT98GcIwYUoh7reE3TjhT7Z9TdDo/FE8WJoeFy7z24O3xHWKsOgorHXIfAh0wQYSzLrhhPOT31jQ745bPj3cNBinP8Pmuq0Lheon+EFESfQu1HGrcyxLyVHJxBhaZSWVRqqkWfCZ4pXaTiW+sIqauVzQ+s7daE6fNA0wp3L0rRRY0EnPY7GVfwUCUSkuO7gjPir2V1WTXRbIS+Pr+t+C2XzQgGQgThuWftXhHBnwCIBff0nfrpPk+w5yDllo1AZ3uHdMPvn1NGNXoLC06z0lcmyFuocU1J8laBtMupapcZeoz2Afw54nnPpGqXZjj1A9VTKMm6PTNlB8fhk+3zfRXQl5uPkelS+HT19As/rJYTrEE4HYjZTWEj3fNJoB2LKtHkcXgiLpuf8lTqO2tgdye+kD3YmgtHSQodk/uNNNAabtJGEsGHsaZ2OWgvH1dDUGXA6ew4QBPMS18PlBf4bXDK/paBw2P3DRehpJhHLOU0/RhfMkdoHpiiVK5h+OPfTpoT+QERP1KVMIlhR0ZcCDUVN4GzDuFRXYvIhxHsoYsqCFQ1twl9KtjvkzbmhQsQZyAxQwsWi8RDrBQhc+89WHI3iVKxquL+c4ByU0qFdPYiy71UrZG4NpC6JAZVcub8oCgrSteIMDGsIjHpoXe7EHi8cxt33Mp5rsbVd3bU1PRDJMYHT83pLp5WNDmNedEhmaUr3lUX2LuKMa/URQvRqPejO9x9pNJYamxo6Aivhp1Jw8yUbe2VzsdgD3dJDma0zzCOte4F14L/vwVsF4YW3GfV3JJDBwBAJnglgr7LCe8UINR4Q+cweNYAKnHKVGNFlPsEjou8oX67wRGhzgiCgA84C+cNpc/7cPTW34H4N3JshEulGXdC+DJYWgDBK0Px9vHB+v59EzXcrs4E2xwcu JzHwj+z1 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 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Hi Randy On Thu, Oct 3, 2024 at 3:54=E2=80=AFPM Randy Dunlap = wrote: > > Hi Jeff, > > Sorry for the delay. > Thanks for your v2 updates. > I appreciate you spending time proofreading the mseal.rst. > > On 9/30/24 5:26 PM, jeffxu@chromium.org wrote: > > From: Jeff Xu > > > > Update doc after in-loop change: mprotect/madvise can have > > partially updated and munmap is atomic. > > > > Fix indentation and clarify some sections to improve readability. > > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu > > Fixes: df2a7df9a9aa ("mm/munmap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_= vma") > > Fixes: 4a2dd02b0916 ("mm/mprotect: replace can_modify_mm with can_modif= y_vma") > > Fixes: 38075679b5f1 ("mm/mremap: replace can_modify_mm with can_modify_= vma") > > Fixes: 23c57d1fa2b9 ("mseal: replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma vari= ant") > > --- > > Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst | 304 ++++++++++++-------------- > > 1 file changed, 144 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/user= space-api/mseal.rst > > index 4132eec995a3..04d34b5adb8f 100644 > > --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst > > +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst > > @@ -23,177 +23,161 @@ applications can additionally seal security criti= cal data at runtime. > > A similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the > > VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT flag [1] and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall= [2]. > > > > -User API > > -=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > -mseal() > > ------------ > > -The mseal() syscall has the following signature: > > - > > -``int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)`` > > - > > -**addr/len**: virtual memory address range. > > - > > -The address range set by ``addr``/``len`` must meet: > > - - The start address must be in an allocated VMA. > > - - The start address must be page aligned. > > - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) must be in an allocated VMA. > > - - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > > - > > -The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel. > > - > > -**flags**: reserved for future use. > > - > > -**return values**: > > - > > -- ``0``: Success. > > - > > -- ``-EINVAL``: > > - - Invalid input ``flags``. > > - - The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned. > > - - Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow. > > - > > -- ``-ENOMEM``: > > - - The start address (``addr``) is not allocated. > > - - The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated. > > - - A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > > - > > -- ``-EPERM``: > > - - sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not supporte= d. > > - > > -- For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range is > > - unmodified, i.e. no partial update. > > - > > -- There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.g. > > - error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching the max > > - number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to the giv= en > > - memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare. > > - > > -**Blocked operations after sealing**: > > - Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size, > > - via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore > > - can be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes. > > - > > - Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location, > > - via mremap(). > > - > > - Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED). > > - > > - Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any > > - specific risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because > > - the use case is unclear. In any case, users can rely on > > - merging to expand a sealed VMA. > > - > > - mprotect() and pkey_mprotect(). > > - > > - Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) > > - for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to th= e > > - memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pa= ges, > > - effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. > > - > > - Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked operations. > > - > > - For blocked operations, one can expect the given address is unmodi= fied, > > - i.e. no partial update. Note, this is different from existing mm > > - system call behaviors, where partial updates are made till an erro= r is > > - found and returned to userspace. To give an example: > > - > > - Assume following code sequence: > > - > > - - ptr =3D mmap(null, 8192, PROT_NONE); > > - - munmap(ptr + 4096, 4096); > > - - ret1 =3D mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_READ); > > - - mseal(ptr, 4096); > > - - ret2 =3D mprotect(ptr, 8192, PROT_NONE); > > - > > - ret1 will be -ENOMEM, the page from ptr is updated to PROT_READ. > > - > > - ret2 will be -EPERM, the page remains to be PROT_READ. > > - > > -**Note**: > > - > > -- mseal() only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPU. > > - > > -- users can call mseal() multiple times, mseal() on an already sealed = memory > > - is a no-action (not error). > > - > > -- munseal() is not supported. > > - > > -Use cases: > > -=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > +SYSCALL > > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > +mseal syscall signature > > +----------------------- > > + ``int mseal(void \* addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)`` > > + > > + **addr**/**len**: virtual memory address range. > > + The address range set by **addr**/**len** must meet: > > + - The start address must be in an allocated VMA. > > + - The start address must be page aligned. > > + - The end address (**addr** + **len**) must be in an allocate= d VMA. > > + - no gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > > + > > + The ``len`` will be paged aligned implicitly by the kernel. > > + > > + **flags**: reserved for future use. > > + > > + **Return values**: > > + - **0**: Success. > > + - **-EINVAL**: > > + * Invalid input ``flags``. > > + * The start address (``addr``) is not page aligned. > > + * Address range (``addr`` + ``len``) overflow. > > + - **-ENOMEM**: > > + * The start address (``addr``) is not allocated. > > + * The end address (``addr`` + ``len``) is not allocated. > > + * A gap (unallocated memory) between start and end address. > > + - **-EPERM**: > > + * sealing is supported only on 64-bit CPUs, 32-bit is not sup= ported. > > + > > + **Note about error return**: > > + - For above error cases, users can expect the given memory range= is > > + unmodified, i.e. no partial update. > > + - There might be other internal errors/cases not listed here, e.= g. > > + error during merging/splitting VMAs, or the process reaching t= he max > > = maximum fixed. > > > + number of supported VMAs. In those cases, partial updates to t= he given > > + memory range could happen. However, those cases should be rare= . > > + > > + **Architecture support**: > > + mseal only works on 64-bit CPUs, not 32-bit CPUs. > > + > > + **Idempotent**: > > + users can call mseal multiple times. mseal on an already sealed = memory > > + is a no-action (not error). > > + > > + **no munseal** > > + Once mapping is sealed, it can't be unsealed. kernel should neve= r > > The kernel Fixed. > > > + have munseal, this is consistent with other sealing feature, e.g= . > > + F_SEAL_SEAL for file. > > + > > +Blocked mm syscall for sealed mapping > > +------------------------------------- > > + It might be important to note: **once the mapping is sealed, it wil= l > > + stay in the process's memory until the process terminates**. > > + > > + Example:: > > + > > + *ptr =3D mmap(0, 4096, PROT_READ, MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE= , 0, 0); > > + rc =3D mseal(ptr, 4096, 0); > > + /* munmap will fail */ > > + rc =3D munmap(ptr, 4096); > > + assert(rc < 0); > > + > > + Blocked mm syscall: > > + - munmap > > + - mmap > > + - mremap > > + - mprotect and pkey_mprotect > > + - some destructive madvise behaviors: MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE, > > + MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFOR= K > > + > > + The first set of syscall to block is munmap, mremap, mmap. They can > > syscalls fixed. > > > + either leave an empty space in the address space, therefore allow > > allowin= g fixed. > > > + replacement with a new mapping with new set of attributes, or can > > + overwrite the existing mapping with another mapping. > > + > > + mprotect and pkey_mprotect are blocked because they changes the > > + protection bits (RWX) of the mapping. > > + > > + Some destructive madvise behaviors (MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE,> + = MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK) > > + for anonymous memory, when users don't have write permission to the > > + memory. Those behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pag= es, > > above is not a sentence but I don't know how to fix it. > Would below work ? Certain destructive madvise behaviors, specifically MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED, MADV_FREE, MADV_DONTFORK, MADV_WIPEONFORK, can pose risks when applied to anonymous memory by threads without write permissions. These behaviors have the potential to modify region contents by discarding pages, effectively performing a memset(0) operation on the anonymous memory. > > + effectively a memset(0) for anonymous memory. > > + > > + Kernel will return -EPERM for blocked syscalls. > > + > > + When blocked syscall return -EPERM due to sealing, the memory regio= ns may or may not be changed, depends on the syscall being blocked: > > a blocked syscall returns = depending on > > and split that line into 2 lines. fixed. > > > + - munmap: munmap is atomic. If one of VMAs in the given range is > > + sealed, none of VMAs are updated. > > + - mprotect, pkey_mprotect, madvise: partial update might happen,= e.g. > > + when mprotect over multiple VMAs, mprotect might update the be= ginning > > + VMAs before reaching the sealed VMA and return -EPERM. > > + - mmap and mremap: undefined behavior. > > + > > +Use cases > > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > - glibc: > > The dynamic linker, during loading ELF executables, can apply sealin= g to > > - non-writable memory segments. > > - > > -- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data-structures. > > + mapping segments. > > > > -Notes on which memory to seal: > > -=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > +- Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures. > > > > -It might be important to note that sealing changes the lifetime of a m= apping, > > -i.e. the sealed mapping won=E2=80=99t be unmapped till the process ter= minates or the > > -exec system call is invoked. Applications can apply sealing to any vir= tual > > -memory region from userspace, but it is crucial to thoroughly analyze = the > > -mapping's lifetime prior to apply the sealing. > > +When not to use mseal > > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > +Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from users= pace, > > +but it is *crucial to thoroughly analyze the mapping's lifetime* prior= to > > +apply the sealing. This is because the sealed mapping *won=E2=80=99t b= e unmapped* > > +until the process terminates or the exec system call is invoked. > > > > For example: > > + - aio/shm > > + aio/shm can call mmap and munmap on behalf of userspace, e.g. > > + ksys_shmdt() in shm.c. The lifetimes of those mapping are not tie= d to > > + the lifetime of the process. If those memories are sealed from us= erspace, > > + then munmap will fail, causing leaks in VMA address space during = the > > + lifetime of the process. > > + > > + - ptr allocated by malloc (heap) > > + Don't use mseal on the memory ptr return from malloc(). > > + malloc() is implemented by allocator, e.g. by glibc. Heap manager= might > > + allocate a ptr from brk or mapping created by mmap. > > + If an app calls mseal on a ptr returned from malloc(), this can a= ffect > > + the heap manager's ability to manage the mappings; the outcome is > > + non-deterministic. > > + > > + Example:: > > + > > + ptr =3D malloc(size); > > + /* don't call mseal on ptr return from malloc. */ > > + mseal(ptr, size); > > + /* free will success, allocator can't shrink heap lower than p= tr */ > > + free(ptr); > > + > > +mseal doesn't block > > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > +In a nutshell, mseal blocks certain mm syscall from modifying some of = VMA's > > +attributes, such as protection bits (RWX). Sealed mappings doesn't mea= n the > > +memory is immutable. > > > > -- aio/shm > > - > > - aio/shm can call mmap()/munmap() on behalf of userspace, e.g. ksys_s= hmdt() in > > - shm.c. The lifetime of those mapping are not tied to the lifetime of= the > > - process. If those memories are sealed from userspace, then munmap() = will fail, > > - causing leaks in VMA address space during the lifetime of the proces= s. > > - > > -- Brk (heap) > > - > > - Currently, userspace applications can seal parts of the heap by call= ing > > - malloc() and mseal(). > > - let's assume following calls from user space: > > - > > - - ptr =3D malloc(size); > > - - mprotect(ptr, size, RO); > > - - mseal(ptr, size); > > - - free(ptr); > > - > > - Technically, before mseal() is added, the user can change the protec= tion of > > - the heap by calling mprotect(RO). As long as the user changes the pr= otection > > - back to RW before free(), the memory range can be reused. > > - > > - Adding mseal() into the picture, however, the heap is then sealed pa= rtially, > > - the user can still free it, but the memory remains to be RO. If the = address > > - is re-used by the heap manager for another malloc, the process might= crash > > - soon after. Therefore, it is important not to apply sealing to any m= emory > > - that might get recycled. > > - > > - Furthermore, even if the application never calls the free() for the = ptr, > > - the heap manager may invoke the brk system call to shrink the size o= f the > > - heap. In the kernel, the brk-shrink will call munmap(). Consequently= , > > - depending on the location of the ptr, the outcome of brk-shrink is > > - nondeterministic. > > - > > - > > -Additional notes: > > -=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > As Jann Horn pointed out in [3], there are still a few ways to write > > -to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. Those cases are not cover= ed > > -by mseal(). If applications want to block such cases, sandbox tools (s= uch as > > -seccomp, LSM, etc) might be considered. > > +to RO memory, which is, in a way, by design. And those could be blocke= d > > +by different security measures. > > > > Those cases are: > > - > > -- Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface. > > -- Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT). > > -- userfaultfd. > > + - Write to read-only memory through /proc/self/mem interface (FOLL_= FORCE). > > + - Write to read-only memory through ptrace (such as PTRACE_POKETEXT= ). > > + - userfaultfd. > > > > The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen R=C3=B6ttger=E2= =80=99s work in V8 > > CFI [4]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this API= . > > > > -Reference: > > -=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > -[1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e37a= ff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274 > > - > > -[2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2 > > - > > -[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2hzQ= 426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com > > - > > -[4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfbmw= dvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=3Dh.bvaojj9fu6hc > > +Reference > > +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D > > +- [1] https://github.com/apple-oss-distributions/xnu/blob/1031c584a5e3= 7aff177559b9f69dbd3c8c3fd30a/osfmk/mach/vm_statistics.h#L274 > > +- [2] https://man.openbsd.org/mimmutable.2 > > +- [3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez3ShUYey+ZAFsU2i1RpQn0a5eOs2h= zQ426FkcgnfUGLvA@mail.gmail.com > > +- [4] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1O2jwK4dxI3nRcOJuPYkonhTkNQfb= mwdvxQMyXgeaRHo/edit#heading=3Dh.bvaojj9fu6hc > > With those few changes: > > Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap > Thanks! -Jeff > -- > ~Randy