From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: LKMM Maintainers -- Akira Yokosawa <akiyks@gmail.com>,
Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@gmail.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>,
Daniel Lustig <dlustig@nvidia.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Jade Alglave <j.alglave@ucl.ac.uk>,
Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Luc Maranget <luc.maranget@inria.fr>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
"open list:KERNEL BUILD + fi..." <linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/8] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 14:32:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+bfVpu4017p64rc-BBAevs2Ok2otxUYpbwJGYkCbUNYVA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191017141305.146193-2-elver@google.com>
On Thu, Oct 17, 2019 at 4:13 PM Marco Elver <elver@google.com> wrote:
>
> Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) is a dynamic data-race detector for
> kernel space. KCSAN is a sampling watchpoint-based data-race detector.
> See the included Documentation/dev-tools/kcsan.rst for more details.
I think there is some significant potential for improving performance.
Currently we have __tsan_read8 do 2 function calls, push/pop, the
second call is on unpredicted slow path.
Then __kcsan_check_watchpoint and __kcsan_setup_watchpoint do full
load of spills and lots of loads and checks that are not strictly
necessary or can be avoided. Additionally __kcsan_setup_watchpoint
calls non-inlined kcsan_is_atomic.
I think we need to try to structure it around the fast path as follows:
__tsan_read8 does no function calls and no spills on fast path for
both checking existing watchpoints and checking if a new watchpoint
need to be setup. If it discovers a race with existing watchpoint or
needs to setup a new one, that should be non-inlined tail calls to the
corresponding slow paths.
In particular, global enable/disable can be replaced with
occupying/freeing all watchpoints.
Per cpu disabled check should be removed from fast path somehow, it's
only used around debugging checks or during reporting. There should be
a way to check it on a slower path.
user_access_save should be removed from fast path, we needed it only
if we setup a watchpoint. But I am not sure why we need it at all, we
should not be reading any user addresses.
should_watch should be restructured to decrement kcsan_skip first, if
it hits zero (with unlikely hint), we go to slow path. The slow path
resets kcsan_skip to something random. The comment mentions
prandom_u32 is too expensive, do I understand it correctly that you
tried to call it on the fast path? I would expect it is fine for slow
path and will give us better randomness.
At this point we should return from __tsan_read8.
To measure performance we could either do some synthetic in-kernel
benchmarks (e.g. writing something to the debugfs file, which will do
a number of memory accesses in a loop). Or you may try these
user-space benchmarks:
https://github.com/google/sanitizers/blob/master/address-sanitizer/kernel_buildbot/slave/bench_readv.c
https://github.com/google/sanitizers/blob/master/address-sanitizer/kernel_buildbot/slave/bench_pipes.c
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-23 12:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-17 14:12 [PATCH v2 0/8] Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) Marco Elver
2019-10-17 14:12 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] kcsan: Add Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer infrastructure Marco Elver
2019-10-21 13:37 ` Alexander Potapenko
2019-10-21 15:54 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-22 14:11 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-22 16:52 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-22 15:48 ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-10-22 17:42 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-23 16:24 ` Oleg Nesterov
2019-10-24 11:02 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-23 9:41 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 9:56 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 10:03 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 10:09 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 10:28 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 11:08 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 11:20 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 12:05 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-23 12:32 ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2019-10-17 14:12 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] objtool, kcsan: Add KCSAN runtime functions to whitelist Marco Elver
2019-10-21 15:15 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2019-10-21 15:43 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-17 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] build, kcsan: Add KCSAN build exceptions Marco Elver
2019-10-17 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] seqlock, kcsan: Add annotations for KCSAN Marco Elver
2019-10-24 12:28 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-24 14:17 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-24 16:35 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-24 17:09 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-17 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] seqlock: Require WRITE_ONCE surrounding raw_seqcount_barrier Marco Elver
2019-10-17 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] asm-generic, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation for bitops Marco Elver
2019-10-17 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] locking/atomics, kcsan: Add KCSAN instrumentation Marco Elver
2019-10-22 12:33 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-22 18:17 ` Marco Elver
2019-10-17 14:13 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] x86, kcsan: Enable KCSAN for x86 Marco Elver
2019-10-22 12:59 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-22 13:02 ` Marco Elver
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=CACT4Y+bfVpu4017p64rc-BBAevs2Ok2otxUYpbwJGYkCbUNYVA@mail.gmail.com \
--to=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=akiyks@gmail.com \
--cc=andreyknvl@google.com \
--cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \
--cc=arnd@arndb.de \
--cc=boqun.feng@gmail.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=dhowells@redhat.com \
--cc=dja@axtens.net \
--cc=dlustig@nvidia.com \
--cc=elver@google.com \
--cc=glider@google.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=j.alglave@ucl.ac.uk \
--cc=joel@joelfernandes.org \
--cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=luc.maranget@inria.fr \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=npiggin@gmail.com \
--cc=parri.andrea@gmail.com \
--cc=paulmck@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=stern@rowland.harvard.edu \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).