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From: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
To: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
	 Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	 Linux Memory Management List <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Dave P Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	 Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>,
	Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>,
	 Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>, nd <nd@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 11/26] arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect()
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 11:35:50 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFKCwri+X=de0gFrMZfA84dYmftSkcDc0DEvQ2JAmeOw2sLR=A@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200528163412.GC2961@gaia>

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On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 9:34 AM Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
wrote:

> On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 12:05:09PM +0100, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
> > The 05/28/2020 10:14, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > > On Wed, May 27, 2020 at 11:57:39AM -0700, Peter Collingbourne wrote:
> > > > On Fri, May 15, 2020 at 10:16 AM Catalin Marinas
> > > > <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> > > > > To enable tagging on a memory range, the user must explicitly opt
> in via
> > > > > a new PROT_MTE flag passed to mmap() or mprotect(). Since this is
> a new
> > > > > memory type in the AttrIndx field of a pte, simplify the or'ing of
> these
> > > > > bits over the protection_map[] attributes by making MT_NORMAL
> index 0.
> > > >
> > > > Should the userspace stack always be mapped as if with PROT_MTE if
> the
> > > > hardware supports it? Such a change would be invisible to non-MTE
> > > > aware userspace since it would already need to opt in to tag checking
> > > > via prctl. This would let userspace avoid a complex stack
> > > > initialization sequence when running with stack tagging enabled on
> the
> > > > main thread.
> > >
> > > I don't think the stack initialisation is that difficult. On program
> > > startup (can be the dynamic loader). Something like (untested):
> > >
> > >     register unsigned long stack asm ("sp");
> > >     unsigned long page_sz = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
> > >
> > >     mprotect((void *)(stack & ~(page_sz - 1)), page_sz,
> > >              PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_MTE | PROT_GROWSDOWN);
> > >
> > > (the essential part it PROT_GROWSDOWN so that you don't have to specify
> > > a stack lower limit)
> >
> > does this work even if the currently mapped stack is more than page_sz?
> > determining the mapped main stack area is i think non-trivial to do in
> > userspace (requires parsing /proc/self/maps or similar).
>
> Because of PROT_GROWSDOWN, the kernel adjusts the start of the range
> down automatically. It is potentially problematic if the top of the
> stack is more than a page away and you want the whole stack coloured. I
> haven't run a test but my reading of the kernel code is that the stack
> vma would be split in this scenario, so the range beyond sp+page_sz
> won't have PROT_MTE set.
>
> My assumption is that if you do this during program start, the stack is
> smaller than a page. Alternatively, could we use argv or envp to
> determine the top of the user stack (the bottom is taken care of by the
> kernel)?
>

PROT_GROWSDOWN seems to work fine in our case, and the extra tag
maintenance overhead sounds like a valid argument against setting PROT_MTE
unconditionally.

On the other hand, we may end up doing this in the userspace in every
process. The reason is, PROT_MTE can not be set on a page that contains a
live frame with stack tagging because of mismatching tags (IRG is not
affected by PROT_MTE but STG is). So ideally, this should be done at (or
near) the program entry point, while the stack is mostly empty.


>
> > > I'm fine, however, with enabling PROT_MTE on the main stack based on
> > > some ELF note.
> >
> > note that would likely mean an elf note on the dynamic linker
> > (because a dynamic linked executable may not be loaded by the
> > kernel and ctors in loaded libs run before the executable entry
> > code anyway, so the executable alone cannot be in charge of this
> > decision) i.e. one global switch for all dynamic linked binaries.
>
> I guess parsing such note in the kernel is only useful for static
> binaries.
>
> > i think a dynamic linker can map a new stack and switch to it
> > if it needs to control the properties of the stack at runtime
> > (it's wasteful though).
>
> There is already user code to check for HWCAP2_MTE and the prctl(), so
> adding an mprotect() doesn't look like a significant overhead.
>
> > and i think there should be a runtime mechanism for the brk area:
> > it should be possible to request that future brk expansions are
> > mapped as PROT_MTE so an mte aware malloc implementation can use
> > brk. i think this is not important in the initial design, but if
> > a prctl flag can do it that may be useful to add (may be at a
> > later time).
>
> Looking at the kernel code briefly, I think this would work. We do end
> up with two vmas for the brk, only the expansion having PROT_MTE, and
> I'd to find a way to store the extra flag.
>
> From a coding perspective, it's easier to just set PROT_MTE by default
> on both brk and initial stack ;) (VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS).
>
> > (and eventually there should be a way to use PROT_MTE on
> > writable global data and appropriate code generation that
> > takes colors into account when globals are accessed, but
> > that requires significant ELF, ld.so and compiler changes,
> > that need not be part of the initial mte design).
>
> The .data section needs to be driven by the ELF information. It's also a
> file mapping and we don't support PROT_MTE on them even if MAP_PRIVATE.
> There are complications like DAX where the file you mmap for CoW may be
> hosted on memory that does not support MTE (copied to RAM on write).
>
> Is there a use-case for global data to be tagged?
>

Yes, catching global buffer overflow bugs. They are not nearly as common as
heap-based issues though.


>
> --
> Catalin
>

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-28 18:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-15 17:15 [PATCH v4 00/26] arm64: Memory Tagging Extension user-space support Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 01/26] arm64: mte: system register definitions Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 02/26] arm64: mte: CPU feature detection and initial sysreg configuration Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 03/26] arm64: mte: Use Normal Tagged attributes for the linear map Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 04/26] arm64: mte: Add specific SIGSEGV codes Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 05/26] arm64: mte: Handle synchronous and asynchronous tag check faults Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 06/26] mm: Add PG_ARCH_2 page flag Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 07/26] arm64: mte: Clear the tags when a page is mapped in user-space with PROT_MTE Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 08/26] arm64: mte: Tags-aware copy_page() implementation Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 09/26] arm64: mte: Tags-aware aware memcmp_pages() implementation Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 10/26] mm: Introduce arch_calc_vm_flag_bits() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 11/26] arm64: mte: Add PROT_MTE support to mmap() and mprotect() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27 18:57   ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-05-28  9:14     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-28 11:05       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-05-28 16:34         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-28 18:35           ` Evgenii Stepanov [this message]
2020-05-29 11:19             ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01  8:55           ` Dave Martin
2020-06-01 14:45             ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01 15:04               ` Dave Martin
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 12/26] mm: Introduce arch_validate_flags() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:15 ` [PATCH v4 13/26] arm64: mte: Validate the PROT_MTE request via arch_validate_flags() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 14/26] mm: Allow arm64 mmap(PROT_MTE) on RAM-based files Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 15/26] arm64: mte: Allow user control of the tag check mode via prctl() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27  7:46   ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27  8:32     ` Dave Martin
2020-05-27  8:48       ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27 11:16       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 16/26] arm64: mte: Allow user control of the generated random tags " Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 17/26] arm64: mte: Restore the GCR_EL1 register after a suspend Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 18/26] arm64: mte: Add PTRACE_{PEEK,POKE}MTETAGS support Catalin Marinas
2020-05-29 21:25   ` Luis Machado
2020-06-01 12:07     ` Catalin Marinas
2020-06-01 15:17       ` Luis Machado
2020-06-01 16:33         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 19/26] fs: Handle intra-page faults in copy_mount_options() Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 20/26] mm: Add arch hooks for saving/restoring tags Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 21/26] arm64: mte: Enable swap of tagged pages Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 22/26] arm64: mte: Save tags when hibernating Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 23/26] arm64: mte: Check the DT memory nodes for MTE support Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 24/26] arm64: mte: Introduce early param to disable " Catalin Marinas
2020-05-18 11:26   ` Vladimir Murzin
2020-05-18 11:31     ` Will Deacon
2020-05-18 17:20       ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-22  5:57         ` Patrick Daly
2020-05-22 10:37           ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-27  2:11             ` Patrick Daly
2020-05-27  9:55               ` Will Deacon
2020-05-27 10:37                 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2020-05-27 11:12                 ` Catalin Marinas
2020-05-19 16:14     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-01-21 19:37   ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22  2:03     ` Andrey Konovalov
2021-01-22 14:41     ` Catalin Marinas
2021-01-22 17:28       ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 25/26] arm64: mte: Kconfig entry Catalin Marinas
2020-05-15 17:16 ` [PATCH v4 26/26] arm64: mte: Add Memory Tagging Extension documentation Catalin Marinas

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