From: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
To: "Barnabás Pőcze" <pobrn@protonmail.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
cyphar@cyphar.com, david@readahead.eu,
dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com, dverkamp@chromium.org,
hughd@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, keescook@chromium.org,
skhan@linuxfoundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] memfd: `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` should not imply `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 14:31:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALmYWFv-y9N2pK-Rq9GY4duHynWCUrwi2BRnoihoNzLHVNvTUg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240630184912.37335-1-pobrn@protonmail.com>
Hi
On Sun, Jun 30, 2024 at 11:49 AM Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn@protonmail.com> wrote:
>
> `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` should remove the executable bits and set `F_SEAL_EXEC`
> to prevent further modifications to the executable bits as per the comment
> in the uapi header file:
>
> not executable and sealed to prevent changing to executable
>
> However, commit 105ff5339f498a ("mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC")
> that introduced this feature made it so that `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` unsets
> `F_SEAL_SEAL`, essentially acting as a superset of `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`.
>
> Nothing implies that it should be so, and indeed up until the second version
> of the of the patchset[0] that introduced `MFD_EXEC` and `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`,
> `F_SEAL_SEAL` was not removed, however, it was changed in the third revision
> of the patchset[1] without a clear explanation.
>
> This behaviour is surprising for application developers, there is no
> documentation that would reveal that `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` has the additional
> effect of `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`. Additionally, combined with `vm.memfd_noexec=2`
> it has the effect of making all memfds initially sealable.
>
The documentation is in linux main (653c5c75115c), I hope this gives
clarity to the usage of MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL flag to application
developers, furthermore I'm working on man page for memfd_create.
> So do not remove `F_SEAL_SEAL` when `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` is requested,
> thereby returning to the pre-Linux 6.3 behaviour of only allowing
> sealing when `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` is specified.
>
> Now, this is technically a uapi break. However, the damage is expected
> to be minimal. To trigger user visible change, a program has to do the
> following steps:
>
> - create memfd:
> - with `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL`,
> - without `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`;
> - try to add seals / check the seals.
>
> But that seems unlikely to happen intentionally since this change
> essentially reverts the kernel's behaviour to that of Linux <6.3,
> so if a program worked correctly on those older kernels, it will
> likely work correctly after this change.
>
During V3 patch discussion, I sent my reasoning, but here are summaries:
- As one might have noticed, unlike other flags in memfd_create,
MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is actually a combination of multiple flags. The idea
is to make it easier to use memfd in the most common way, which is
NOEXEC + F_SEAL_EXEC + MFD_ALLOW_SEALING.
- The new sysctl vm.noexec = 1 helps existing applications move to a
more secure way of using memfd. IMO, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING is included by
default because most applications would rather have it than not. In
any case, an app can set F_SEAL_SEAL to disable the sealing.
- MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL has been added for more than one year, multiple
applications and distributions have backported and utilized it.
Altering ABI now presents a degree of risk and may lead to
disruptions.
Best regards,
-Jeff
> I have used Debian Code Search and GitHub to try to find potential
> breakages, and I could only find a single one. dbus-broker's
> memfd_create() wrapper is aware of this implicit `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING`
> behaviour, and tries to work around it[2]. This workaround will
> break. Luckily, this only affects the test suite, it does not affect
> the normal operations of dbus-broker. There is a PR with a fix[3].
>
> I also carried out a smoke test by building a kernel with this change
> and booting an Arch Linux system into GNOME and Plasma sessions.
>
> There was also a previous attempt to address this peculiarity by
> introducing a new flag[4].
>
> [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220805222126.142525-3-jeffxu@google.com/
> [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221202013404.163143-3-jeffxu@google.com/
> [2]: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/blob/9eb0b7e5826fc76cad7b025bc46f267d4a8784cb/src/util/misc.c#L114
> [3]: https://github.com/bus1/dbus-broker/pull/366
> [4]: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230714114753.170814-1-david@readahead.eu/
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Barnabás Pőcze <pobrn@protonmail.com>
> ---
>
> * v3: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240611231409.3899809-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/
> * v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240524033933.135049-1-jeffxu@google.com/
> * v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20240513191544.94754-1-pobrn@protonmail.com/
>
> This fourth version returns to removing the inconsistency as opposed to documenting
> its existence, with the same code change as v1 but with a somewhat extended commit
> message. This is sent because I believe it is worth at least a try; it can be easily
> reverted if bigger application breakages are discovered than initially imagined.
>
> ---
> mm/memfd.c | 9 ++++-----
> tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
> index 7d8d3ab3fa37..8b7f6afee21d 100644
> --- a/mm/memfd.c
> +++ b/mm/memfd.c
> @@ -356,12 +356,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(memfd_create,
>
> inode->i_mode &= ~0111;
> file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
> - if (file_seals) {
> - *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
> + if (file_seals)
> *file_seals |= F_SEAL_EXEC;
> - }
> - } else if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) {
> - /* MFD_EXEC and MFD_ALLOW_SEALING are set */
> + }
> +
> + if (flags & MFD_ALLOW_SEALING) {
> file_seals = memfd_file_seals_ptr(file);
> if (file_seals)
> *file_seals &= ~F_SEAL_SEAL;
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
> index 95af2d78fd31..7b78329f65b6 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/memfd/memfd_test.c
> @@ -1151,7 +1151,7 @@ static void test_noexec_seal(void)
> mfd_def_size,
> MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL);
> mfd_assert_mode(fd, 0666);
> - mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_EXEC);
> + mfd_assert_has_seals(fd, F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_EXEC);
> mfd_fail_chmod(fd, 0777);
> close(fd);
> }
> --
> 2.45.2
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-01 21:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-30 18:49 [PATCH v4] memfd: `MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL` should not imply `MFD_ALLOW_SEALING` Barnabás Pőcze
2024-07-01 21:31 ` Jeff Xu [this message]
2024-07-02 6:24 ` Aleksa Sarai
2024-09-27 22:09 ` Barnabás Pőcze
2024-11-20 17:20 ` Barnabás Pőcze
2024-12-05 4:29 ` Hugh Dickins
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