linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Jorge Merlino <jorge.merlino@canonical.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com>,
	Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, oleg@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs/exec: Explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec
Date: Tue, 13 May 2025 13:57:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <D03AE210-6874-43B6-B917-80CD259AE2AC@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <h65sagivix3zbrppthcobnysgnlrnql5shiu65xyg7ust6mc54@cliutza66zve>



On May 13, 2025 6:05:45 AM PDT, Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com> wrote:
>On Thu, Oct 06, 2022 at 08:25:01AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On October 6, 2022 7:13:37 AM PDT, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>> >On Thu, Oct 6, 2022 at 11:05 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
>> >> On Thu, Oct 06, 2022 at 01:27:34AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >> > The check_unsafe_exec() counting of n_fs would not add up under a heavily
>> >> > threaded process trying to perform a suid exec, causing the suid portion
>> >> > to fail. This counting error appears to be unneeded, but to catch any
>> >> > possible conditions, explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec, if it ends up
>> >>
>> >> Isn't this a potential uapi break? Afaict, before this change a call to
>> >> clone{3}(CLONE_FS) followed by an exec in the child would have the
>> >> parent and child share fs information. So if the child e.g., changes the
>> >> working directory post exec it would also affect the parent. But after
>> >> this change here this would no longer be true. So a child changing a
>> >> workding directoro would not affect the parent anymore. IOW, an exec is
>> >> accompanied by an unshare(CLONE_FS). Might still be worth trying ofc but
>> >> it seems like a non-trivial uapi change but there might be few users
>> >> that do clone{3}(CLONE_FS) followed by an exec.
>> >
>> >I believe the following code in Chromium explicitly relies on this
>> >behavior, but I'm not sure whether this code is in active use anymore:
>> >
>> >https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/main:sandbox/linux/suid/sandbox.c;l=101?q=CLONE_FS&sq=&ss=chromium
>> 
>> Oh yes. I think I had tried to forget this existed. Ugh. Okay, so back to the drawing board, I guess. The counting will need to be fixed...
>> 
>> It's possible we can move the counting after dethread -- it seems the early count was just to avoid setting flags after the point of no return, but it's not an error condition...
>> 
>
>I landed here from git blame.
>
>I was looking at sanitizing shared fs vs suid handling, but the entire
>ordeal is so convoluted I'm confident the best way forward is to whack
>the problem to begin with.
>
>Per the above link, the notion of a shared fs struct across different
>processes is depended on so merely unsharing is a no-go.
>
>However, the shared state is only a problem for suid/sgid.
>
>Here is my proposal: *deny* exec of suid/sgid binaries if fs_struct is
>shared. This will have to be checked for after the execing proc becomes
>single-threaded ofc.

Unfortunately the above Chrome helper is setuid and uses CLONE_FS.

But to echo what Eric asked: what problem are you trying to solve?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-05-13 20:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-06  8:27 [PATCH 0/2] fs/exec: Explicitly unshare fs_struct on exec Kees Cook
2022-10-06  8:27 ` [PATCH 1/2] " Kees Cook
2022-10-06  9:05   ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-06 10:48     ` David Laight
2022-10-06 14:13     ` Jann Horn
2022-10-06 15:25       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-06 15:35         ` Jann Horn
2025-05-13 13:05         ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-05-13 15:29           ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-13 20:57           ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-05-13 21:09             ` Jann Horn
2025-05-13 22:16               ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-14  0:03                 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-05-14 15:33                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-14 15:42                   ` Kees Cook
2025-05-15 16:48                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2025-05-13 23:15               ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14  3:18       ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-10-14  3:54         ` Kees Cook
2022-10-14 15:35         ` Jann Horn
2022-10-18  7:09           ` Kees Cook
2022-10-18 11:19             ` Jann Horn
2022-10-14 22:03         ` David Laight
2022-11-28 17:49           ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-10-06  8:27 ` [PATCH 2/2] exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=D03AE210-6874-43B6-B917-80CD259AE2AC@kernel.org \
    --to=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com \
    --cc=avagin@gmail.com \
    --cc=bigeasy@linutronix.de \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
    --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=jorge.merlino@canonical.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=lucien.xin@gmail.com \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mjguzik@gmail.com \
    --cc=mortonm@chromium.org \
    --cc=oleg@redhat.com \
    --cc=omosnace@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=pprahlad@redhat.com \
    --cc=richard_c_haines@btinternet.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tkjos@google.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).