From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C123CC433EF for ; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 10:29:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 15E926B0075; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 06:29:05 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 10D256B0078; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 06:29:05 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id F16B86B007B; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 06:29:04 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from relay.hostedemail.com (relay.hostedemail.com [64.99.140.27]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E3BED6B0075 for ; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 06:29:04 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin28.hostedemail.com (a10.router.float.18 [10.200.18.1]) by unirelay10.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B50C311F5 for ; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 10:29:04 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 79384142208.28.E944607 Received: from dfw.source.kernel.org (dfw.source.kernel.org [139.178.84.217]) by imf03.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D13620019 for ; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 10:29:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by dfw.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5459A61E8A; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 10:29:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C4F27C385A0; Fri, 22 Apr 2022 10:28:59 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2022 11:28:56 +0100 From: Catalin Marinas To: David Hildenbrand Cc: Andrew Morton , Christoph Hellwig , Lennart Poettering , Zbigniew =?utf-8?Q?J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= , Will Deacon , Alexander Viro , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Szabolcs Nagy , Mark Brown , Jeremy Linton , Topi Miettinen , "linux-mm@kvack.org" , "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-abi-devel@lists.sourceforge.net" Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/4] mm, personality: Implement memory-deny-write-execute as a personality flag Message-ID: References: <20220413134946.2732468-1-catalin.marinas@arm.com> <20220413134946.2732468-3-catalin.marinas@arm.com> <443d978a-7092-b5b1-22f3-ae3a997080ad@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <443d978a-7092-b5b1-22f3-ae3a997080ad@redhat.com> X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 3D13620019 X-Stat-Signature: hwkmoe465wxzyexuzbmeg81rhs1sdbz7 Authentication-Results: imf03.hostedemail.com; dkim=none; spf=pass (imf03.hostedemail.com: domain of cmarinas@kernel.org designates 139.178.84.217 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=cmarinas@kernel.org; dmarc=fail reason="SPF not aligned (relaxed), No valid DKIM" header.from=arm.com (policy=none) X-Rspamd-Server: rspam01 X-HE-Tag: 1650623342-858496 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Thu, Apr 21, 2022 at 06:37:49PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote: > On 13.04.22 15:49, Catalin Marinas wrote: > > The aim of such policy is to prevent a user task from inadvertently > > creating an executable mapping that is or was writeable (and > > subsequently made read-only). > > > > An example of mmap() returning -EACCESS if the policy is enabled: > > > > mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0); > > > > Similarly, mprotect() would return -EACCESS below: > > > > addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0); > > mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC); > > > > With the past vma writeable permission tracking, mprotect() below would > > also fail with -EACCESS: > > > > addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, flags, 0, 0); > > mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC); > > > > While the above could be achieved by checking PROT_WRITE & PROT_EXEC on > > mmap/mprotect and denying mprotect(PROT_EXEC) altogether (current > > systemd MDWE approach via SECCOMP BPF filters), we want the following > > scenario to succeed: > > > > addr = mmap(0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, flags, 0, 0); > > mprotect(addr, size, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC | PROT_BTI); > > > > where PROT_BTI enables branch tracking identification on arm64. > > > > The choice for a DENY_WRITE_EXEC personality flag, inherited on fork() > > and execve(), was made by analogy to READ_IMPLIES_EXEC. > > > > Note that it is sufficient to check for VM_WAS_WRITE in > > map_deny_write_exec() as this flag is always set on VM_WRITE mappings. > > > > Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas > > Cc: Christoph Hellwig > > Cc: Andrew Morton > > How does this interact with get_user_pages(FOLL_WRITE|FOLL_FORCE) on a > VMA that is VM_MAYWRITE but not VM_WRITE? Is it handled accordingly? For now, that's just about VM_WRITE. Most vmas are VM_MAYWRITE, so we can't really have MAYWRITE^EXEC. The basic feature aims to avoid user vulnerabilities where a buffer is mapped both writeable and executable. Of course, it can be expanded with additional prctl() flags to cover other cases. > Note that in the (FOLL_WRITE|FOLL_FORCE) we only require VM_MAYWRITE on > the vma and trigger a write fault. As the VMA is not VM_WRITE, we won't > actually map the PTE writable, but set it dirty. GUP will retry, find a > R/O pte that is dirty and where it knows that it broke COW and will > allow the read access, although the PTE is R/O. > > That mechanism is required to e.g., set breakpoints in R/O MAP_PRIVATE > kernel sections, but it's used elsewhere for page pinning as well. > > My gut feeling is that GUP(FOLL_WRITE|FOLL_FORCE) could be used right > now to bypass that mechanism, I might be wrong. GUP can be used to bypass this. But if an attacker can trigger such GUP paths via a syscall (e.g. ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA)), I think we need the checks on those paths (and reject the syscall) rather than on mmap/mprotect(). This would be covered by something like CAP_SYS_PTRACE. Not sure what would break if we prevent GUP(FOLL_WRITE|FOLL_FORCE) when the vma is !VM_WRITE, basically removing FOLL_FORCE. I guess for ptrace() and uprobes that's fine. We could also make this only about VM_EXEC rather than VM_WRITE, though we'd probably need to set VM_WAS_WRITE if we ever had a GUP(FOLL_WRITE|FOLL_FORCE) in order to prevent a subsequent mprotect(PROT_EXEC). Anyway, this can be a new flag. My first aim is to get the basics working similarly to systemd's MDWE. -- Catalin