From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from kanga.kvack.org (kanga.kvack.org [205.233.56.17]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0C4E3CCA47A for ; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 04:19:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) id 84A348D0208; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 00:19:42 -0400 (EDT) Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 40) id 7D2D28D0207; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 00:19:42 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: int-list-linux-mm@kvack.org Received: by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix, from userid 63042) id 673B68D0208; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 00:19:42 -0400 (EDT) X-Delivered-To: linux-mm@kvack.org Received: from relay.hostedemail.com (smtprelay0011.hostedemail.com [216.40.44.11]) by kanga.kvack.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51D378D0207 for ; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 00:19:42 -0400 (EDT) Received: from smtpin01.hostedemail.com (a10.router.float.18 [10.200.18.1]) by unirelay01.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 13A23612BD for ; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 04:19:42 +0000 (UTC) X-FDA: 79575537804.01.403428E Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by imf27.hostedemail.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8B4F840082 for ; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 04:19:41 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BC60FB81741; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 04:19:39 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 17B41C3411B; Tue, 14 Jun 2022 04:19:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1655180378; bh=hMmh6MFQYrFpqoANaJzb2dlWl/uq5j7z53GVi4306hE=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=P6aclL4Uw4zSJgE7oDf/62QoHQtE0QTLOGTlqsxVsoK7yh5xfurO16qH0W68j+zvc i2rdQMrYvjdN5w+UJ2pzFMIbeWaiVU6sATQRcOCl5ZJvICkvkBIG8dAYx3a5olsCAv 2WGJWwixkQj0igXS4YdgYPWbCXT4FQ8tSApi640zyVrftX4GF9dS2qDmYWR/c0VKaj 4xLzfuT/BxXKpdFlrWitxI8D7VIT90vpcfOqwFAnx57g8W/RlaDRAO70hssXQOygBL KXkRyPwwZ9fz63w6Nqc/QPejjVX47g3girluGB8BErjV/aC8PtQjiHxVud5Gi826hn dn7LruiUU7TdA== Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 07:19:26 +0300 From: Mike Rapoport To: Axel Rasmussen Cc: Alexander Viro , Andrew Morton , Charan Teja Reddy , Dave Hansen , "Dmitry V . Levin" , Gleb Fotengauer-Malinovskiy , Hugh Dickins , Jan Kara , Jonathan Corbet , Mel Gorman , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Peter Xu , Shuah Khan , Suren Baghdasaryan , Vlastimil Babka , zhangyi , linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/6] userfaultfd: update documentation to describe /dev/userfaultfd Message-ID: References: <20220601210951.3916598-1-axelrasmussen@google.com> <20220601210951.3916598-5-axelrasmussen@google.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20220601210951.3916598-5-axelrasmussen@google.com> ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=hostedemail.com; s=arc-20220608; t=1655180381; h=from:from:sender:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references:dkim-signature; bh=onEcfXcxVY3NONvrb6i+8fLHDxOAUumI7qNwDTOWIvg=; b=E0Obru675cUS660JyIsTxRIcA3Xstm6R1yog4nto5IBvupTNMpnOR2Y3NtRqqMwqofCMX4 6AwsIqpWEDzw7TCAtAO/jDGDTnJiaItNxwsoAkAckZp3NwYrOuYf0hUSE72P9Xr058XQLK 6vzCLP40t67rUY1EEgEKho/JsF1w2pc= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; imf27.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=P6aclL4U; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org; spf=pass (imf27.hostedemail.com: domain of rppt@kernel.org designates 145.40.68.75 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=rppt@kernel.org ARC-Seal: i=1; s=arc-20220608; d=hostedemail.com; t=1655180381; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; b=NV1iOHuoUaI5LdC/Fgzp4SxSpina80+IMwT1dmmDOI85tZSeSmKn/43bHX2XRcdBC0PoYR Jv7TzUaWQ6KX6eM5CvGftkqwQcQ4e4ryE4Sljy6JbLk0phYdvETHNY6VbKUwxLRYLXIW3o ICQAgvb2aZgscylxXjF9QGd19Uu5CWU= X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 8B4F840082 X-Rspam-User: X-Stat-Signature: azoh1zn4xs9huxrhppz8a9ewtrfrwzsh Authentication-Results: imf27.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.s=k20201202 header.b=P6aclL4U; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=kernel.org; spf=pass (imf27.hostedemail.com: domain of rppt@kernel.org designates 145.40.68.75 as permitted sender) smtp.mailfrom=rppt@kernel.org X-Rspamd-Server: rspam04 X-HE-Tag: 1655180381-168658 X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On Wed, Jun 01, 2022 at 02:09:49PM -0700, Axel Rasmussen wrote: > Explain the different ways to create a new userfaultfd, and how access > control works for each way. > > Signed-off-by: Axel Rasmussen > --- > Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst | 40 ++++++++++++++++++-- > Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 3 ++ > 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst > index 6528036093e1..9bae1acd431f 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst > @@ -17,7 +17,10 @@ of the ``PROT_NONE+SIGSEGV`` trick. > Design > ====== > > -Userfaults are delivered and resolved through the ``userfaultfd`` syscall. > +Userspace creates a new userfaultfd, initializes it, and registers one or more > +regions of virtual memory with it. Then, any page faults which occur within the > +region(s) result in a message being delivered to the userfaultfd, notifying > +userspace of the fault. > > The ``userfaultfd`` (aside from registering and unregistering virtual > memory ranges) provides two primary functionalities: > @@ -34,12 +37,11 @@ The real advantage of userfaults if compared to regular virtual memory > management of mremap/mprotect is that the userfaults in all their > operations never involve heavyweight structures like vmas (in fact the > ``userfaultfd`` runtime load never takes the mmap_lock for writing). > - > Vmas are not suitable for page- (or hugepage) granular fault tracking > when dealing with virtual address spaces that could span > Terabytes. Too many vmas would be needed for that. > > -The ``userfaultfd`` once opened by invoking the syscall, can also be > +The ``userfaultfd``, once created, can also be > passed using unix domain sockets to a manager process, so the same > manager process could handle the userfaults of a multitude of > different processes without them being aware about what is going on > @@ -50,6 +52,38 @@ is a corner case that would currently return ``-EBUSY``). > API > === > > +Creating a userfaultfd > +---------------------- > + > +There are two ways to create a new userfaultfd, each of which provide ways to > +restrict access to this functionality (since historically userfaultfds which > +handle kernel page faults have been a useful tool for exploiting the kernel). > + > +The first way, supported by older kernels, is the userfaultfd(2) syscall. > +Access to this is controlled in several ways: > + > +- By default, the userfaultfd will be able to handle kernel page faults. This > + can be disabled by passing in UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY. > + > +- If vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd is 0, then the caller must *either* have > + CAP_SYS_PTRACE, or pass in UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY. > + > +- If vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd is 1, then no particular privilege is needed to > + use this syscall, even if UFFD_USER_MODE_ONLY is *not* set. > + > +The second way, added to the kernel more recently, is by opening and issuing a > +USERFAULTFD_IOC_NEW ioctl to /dev/userfaultfd. This method yields equivalent > +userfaultfds to the userfaultfd(2) syscall; its benefit is in how access to > +creating userfaultfds is controlled. > + > +Access to /dev/userfaultfd is controlled via normal filesystem permissions > +(user/group/mode for example), which gives fine grained access to userfaultfd > +specifically, without also granting other unrelated privileges at the same time > +(as e.g. granting CAP_SYS_PTRACE would do). > + > +Initializing up a userfaultfd I think 'up' is out of place here. It should be "initializing a userfaultfd" or "setting up a userfaultfd". > +----------------------------- > + > When first opened the ``userfaultfd`` must be enabled invoking the > ``UFFDIO_API`` ioctl specifying a ``uffdio_api.api`` value set to ``UFFD_API`` (or > a later API version) which will specify the ``read/POLLIN`` protocol > diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst > index d7374a1e8ac9..e3a952d1fd35 100644 > --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst > +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst > @@ -927,6 +927,9 @@ calls without any restrictions. > > The default value is 0. > > +An alternative to this sysctl / the userfaultfd(2) syscall is to create > +userfaultfds via /dev/userfaultfd. See Maybe: Another way to control permissions for userfaultfd is to use /dev/userfaultfd instead of userfaultfd(2). See ... > +Documentation/admin-guide/mm/userfaultfd.rst. > > user_reserve_kbytes > =================== > -- > 2.36.1.255.ge46751e96f-goog > > -- Sincerely yours, Mike.