From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 13/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages
Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 17:30:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZkvrFw1QMtImegQD@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1ce87335-2ea7-41c4-8442-36210656cdca@intel.com>
On Tue, May 21, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> On 21/05/2024 11:15 am, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, May 21, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > On 21/05/2024 5:35 am, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > On Mon, May 20, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > > > I am wondering whether this can be done in the KVM page fault handler?
> > > >
> > > > No, because the state of a pfn in the RMP is tied to the guest_memfd inode,
> > > > not to the file descriptor, i.e. not to an individual VM.
> > >
> > > It's strange that as state of a PFN of SNP doesn't bind to individual VM, at
> > > least for the private pages. The command rpm_make_private() indeed reflects
> > > the mapping between PFN <-> <GFN, SSID>.
> >
> > s/SSID/ASID
> >
> > KVM allows a single ASID to be bound to multiple "struct kvm" instances, e.g.
> > for intra-host migration. If/when trusted I/O is a thing, presumably KVM will
> > also need to share the ASID with other entities, e.g. IOMMUFD.
>
> But is this the case for SNP? I thought due to the nature of private pages,
> they cannot be shared between VMs? So to me this RMP entry mapping for PFN
> <-> GFN for private page should just be per-VM.
Sorry to redirect, but please read this mail (and probably surrounding mails).
It hopefully explains most of the question you have.
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZLGiEfJZTyl7M8mS@google.com
> > Regardless of whether or not guest_memfd supports page migration, KVM needs to
> > track the state of the physical page in guest_memfd, e.g. if it's been assigned
> > to the ASID versus if it's still in a shared state.
>
> I am not certain this can impact whether we want to do RMP commands via
> guest_memfd() hooks or TDP MMU hooks?
>
> > > If we truly want to zap private mappings for SNP, IIUC it can be done by
> > > distinguishing whether a VM needs to use a separate private table, which is
> > > TDX-only.
> >
> > I wouldn't say we "want" to zap private mappings for SNP, rather that it's a lot
> > less work to keep KVM's existing behavior (literally do nothing) than it is to
> > rework the MMU and whatnot to not zap SPTEs.
>
> My thinking too.
>
> > And there's no big motivation to avoid zapping because SNP VMs are unlikely
> > to delete memslots.
>
> I think we should also consider MMU notifier?
No, private mappings have no host userspace mappings, i.e. are completely exempt
from MMU notifier events. guest_memfd() can still invalidate mappings, but that
only occurs if userspace punches a hole, which is destructive.
> > If it turns out that it's easy to preserve SNP mappings after TDX lands, then we
> > can certainly go that route, but AFAIK there's no reason to force the issue.
>
> No I am certainly not saying we should do SNP after TDX. Sorry I didn't
> closely monitor the status of this SNP patchset.
>
> My intention is just wanting to make the TDP MMU common code change more
> useful (since we need that for TDX anyway), i.e., not effectively just for
> TDX if possible:
>
> Currently the TDP MMU hooks are called depending whether the page table type
> is private (or mirrored whatever), but I think conceptually, we should
> decide whether to call TDP MMU hooks based on whether faulting GPA is
> private, _AND_ when the hook is available.
>
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5e8119c0-31f5-4aa9-a496-4ae10bd745a3@intel.com/
>
> If invoking SNP RMP commands is feasible in TDP MMU hooks,
Feasible. Yes. Desirable? No. Either KVM tracks the state of the physical page
using the guest_memfd inode, or KVM _guarantees_ the NPT mappings _never_ get
dropped, including during intra-host migration. E.g. to support intra-host
migration of TDX VMs, KVM is pretty much forced to transer the S-EPT tables as-is,
which is ugly and painful (though performant). We could do the same for NPT, but
there would need to be massive performance benefits to justify the complexity.
> then I think there's value of letting SNP code to use them too. And we can
> simply split one patch out to only add the TDP MMU hooks for SNP to land
> first.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-21 0:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-01 8:51 [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 01/20] Revert "KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level" Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 02/20] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-02 23:11 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-07 17:48 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-01 17:39 ` [PATCH] Fixes: f32fb32820b1 ("KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level") Ackerley Tng
2024-08-01 17:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-01 17:59 ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-08-01 18:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 03/20] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 04/20] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 05/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 06/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 07/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 08/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:51 ` [PATCH v15 09/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-16 8:28 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-16 17:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-21 0:49 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-21 21:49 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-27 12:25 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 10:39 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-29 20:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-31 1:22 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-31 13:10 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 16:47 ` Zhi Wang
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 10/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 11/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 12/20] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 13/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-05-20 10:16 ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 17:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 21:57 ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 23:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 23:41 ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-21 0:30 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-05-20 19:14 ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 14/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 15/20] KVM: x86: Implement hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 16/20] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 17/20] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 18/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 19/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST " Michael Roth
2024-05-13 23:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-14 2:51 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-14 14:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-15 1:25 ` [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Replace KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT with KVM_EXIT_SNP_REQ_CERTS Michael Roth
2024-08-16 21:50 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-08-16 21:58 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-05-01 8:52 ` [PATCH v15 20/20] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-05-07 18:04 ` [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:14 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 2:34 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 1:58 ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Michael Roth
2024-05-10 1:58 ` [PATCH v15 22/23] KVM: SEV: Fix return code interpretation for RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 15:36 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 16:37 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 17:25 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-14 8:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-10 1:58 ` [PATCH v15 23/23] KVM: SEV: Fix PSC handling for SMASH/UNSMASH and partial update ops Michael Roth
2024-05-10 17:09 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 19:08 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:47 ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 13:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 15:27 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 15:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 17:47 ` Isaku Yamahata
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