linux-mm.kvack.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: "isaku.yamahata@gmail.com" <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	 Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"michael.roth@amd.com" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	 "pankaj.gupta@amd.com" <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	 "tobin@ibm.com" <tobin@ibm.com>,
	"liam.merwick@oracle.com" <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
	 "alpergun@google.com" <alpergun@google.com>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	 "jmattson@google.com" <jmattson@google.com>,
	"luto@kernel.org" <luto@kernel.org>,
	 "ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	 "pgonda@google.com" <pgonda@google.com>,
	 "srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com"
	<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	"slp@redhat.com" <slp@redhat.com>,
	 "rientjes@google.com" <rientjes@google.com>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	 "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	 "dovmurik@linux.ibm.com" <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	 "thomas.lendacky@amd.com" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	 "vkuznets@redhat.com" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"vbabka@suse.cz" <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	 "ashish.kalra@amd.com" <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	 "linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	 "nikunj.dadhania@amd.com" <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
	Jorg Rodel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	 "mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	 "sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com"
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	 "hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"kirill@shutemov.name" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	 "jarkko@kernel.org" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	"ardb@kernel.org" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	 "linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	 "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 13/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages
Date: Mon, 20 May 2024 17:30:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZkvrFw1QMtImegQD@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1ce87335-2ea7-41c4-8442-36210656cdca@intel.com>

On Tue, May 21, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> On 21/05/2024 11:15 am, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Tue, May 21, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > On 21/05/2024 5:35 am, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > On Mon, May 20, 2024, Kai Huang wrote:
> > > > > I am wondering whether this can be done in the KVM page fault handler?
> > > > 
> > > > No, because the state of a pfn in the RMP is tied to the guest_memfd inode,
> > > > not to the file descriptor, i.e. not to an individual VM.
> > > 
> > > It's strange that as state of a PFN of SNP doesn't bind to individual VM, at
> > > least for the private pages.  The command rpm_make_private() indeed reflects
> > > the mapping between PFN <-> <GFN, SSID>.
> > 
> > s/SSID/ASID
> > 
> > KVM allows a single ASID to be bound to multiple "struct kvm" instances, e.g.
> > for intra-host migration.  If/when trusted I/O is a thing, presumably KVM will
> > also need to share the ASID with other entities, e.g. IOMMUFD.
> 
> But is this the case for SNP?  I thought due to the nature of private pages,
> they cannot be shared between VMs?  So to me this RMP entry mapping for PFN
> <-> GFN for private page should just be per-VM.

Sorry to redirect, but please read this mail (and probably surrounding mails).
It hopefully explains most of the question you have.

https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZLGiEfJZTyl7M8mS@google.com

> > Regardless of whether or not guest_memfd supports page migration, KVM needs to
> > track the state of the physical page in guest_memfd, e.g. if it's been assigned
> > to the ASID versus if it's still in a shared state.
> 
> I am not certain this can impact whether we want to do RMP commands via
> guest_memfd() hooks or TDP MMU hooks?
>
> > > If we truly want to zap private mappings for SNP, IIUC it can be done by
> > > distinguishing whether a VM needs to use a separate private table, which is
> > > TDX-only.
> > 
> > I wouldn't say we "want" to zap private mappings for SNP, rather that it's a lot
> > less work to keep KVM's existing behavior (literally do nothing) than it is to
> > rework the MMU and whatnot to not zap SPTEs.
> 
> My thinking too.
> 
> > And there's no big motivation to avoid zapping because SNP VMs are unlikely
> > to delete memslots.
> 
> I think we should also consider MMU notifier?

No, private mappings have no host userspace mappings, i.e. are completely exempt
from MMU notifier events.  guest_memfd() can still invalidate mappings, but that
only occurs if userspace punches a hole, which is destructive.

> > If it turns out that it's easy to preserve SNP mappings after TDX lands, then we
> > can certainly go that route, but AFAIK there's no reason to force the issue.
> 
> No I am certainly not saying we should do SNP after TDX.  Sorry I didn't
> closely monitor the status of this SNP patchset.
> 
> My intention is just wanting to make the TDP MMU common code change more
> useful (since we need that for TDX anyway), i.e., not effectively just for
> TDX if possible:
> 
> Currently the TDP MMU hooks are called depending whether the page table type
> is private (or mirrored whatever), but I think conceptually, we should
> decide whether to call TDP MMU hooks based on whether faulting GPA is
> private, _AND_ when the hook is available.
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5e8119c0-31f5-4aa9-a496-4ae10bd745a3@intel.com/
> 
> If invoking SNP RMP commands is feasible in TDP MMU hooks,

Feasible.  Yes.  Desirable?  No.  Either KVM tracks the state of the physical page
using the guest_memfd inode, or KVM _guarantees_ the NPT mappings _never_ get
dropped, including during intra-host migration.  E.g. to support intra-host
migration of TDX VMs, KVM is pretty much forced to transer the S-EPT tables as-is,
which is ugly and painful (though performant).  We could do the same for NPT, but
there would need to be massive performance benefits to justify the complexity.

> then I think there's value of letting SNP code to use them too.  And we can
> simply split one patch out to only add the TDP MMU hooks for SNP to land
> first.


  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-21  0:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-01  8:51 [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 01/20] Revert "KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level" Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 02/20] KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-02 23:11   ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-07 17:48   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-08-01 17:39   ` [PATCH] Fixes: f32fb32820b1 ("KVM: x86: Add hook for determining max NPT mapping level") Ackerley Tng
2024-08-01 17:57     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-01 17:59       ` Yosry Ahmed
2024-08-01 18:15     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 03/20] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 04/20] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 05/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 06/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 07/20] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 08/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:51 ` [PATCH v15 09/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-16  8:28   ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-16 17:23     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-21  0:49       ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-21 21:49         ` Michael Roth
2024-05-27 12:25           ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-28 10:39             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-29 20:02               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-31  1:22                 ` Binbin Wu
2024-05-31 13:10                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-30 16:47           ` Zhi Wang
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 10/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 11/20] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 12/20] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 13/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-05-20 10:16   ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 17:35     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 21:57       ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-20 23:15         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 23:41           ` Huang, Kai
2024-05-21  0:30             ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-05-20 19:14     ` Isaku Yamahata
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 14/20] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 15/20] KVM: x86: Implement hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 16/20] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 17/20] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 18/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 19/20] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST " Michael Roth
2024-05-13 23:48   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-14  2:51     ` Michael Roth
2024-05-14 14:36       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-15  1:25         ` [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Replace KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT with KVM_EXIT_SNP_REQ_CERTS Michael Roth
2024-08-16 21:50           ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-08-16 21:58             ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-05-01  8:52 ` [PATCH v15 20/20] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-05-07 18:04 ` [PATCH v15 00/20] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-07 18:14   ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10  2:34     ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10  1:58 ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Michael Roth
2024-05-10  1:58   ` [PATCH v15 22/23] KVM: SEV: Fix return code interpretation for RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 15:36       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:01       ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 16:37         ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 16:59           ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 17:25             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-14  8:10             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-10  1:58   ` [PATCH v15 23/23] KVM: SEV: Fix PSC handling for SMASH/UNSMASH and partial update ops Michael Roth
2024-05-10 17:09     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 19:08       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 13:47   ` [PATCH v15 21/23] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path for private memslots Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 13:50     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 15:27       ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 15:59         ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-10 17:47           ` Isaku Yamahata

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ZkvrFw1QMtImegQD@google.com \
    --to=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=alpergun@google.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=ashish.kalra@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dovmurik@linux.ibm.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@gmail.com \
    --cc=jarkko@kernel.org \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=jroedel@suse.de \
    --cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=kirill@shutemov.name \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=liam.merwick@oracle.com \
    --cc=linux-coco@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=michael.roth@amd.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nikunj.dadhania@amd.com \
    --cc=pankaj.gupta@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com \
    --cc=rientjes@google.com \
    --cc=sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=slp@redhat.com \
    --cc=srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=tobin@ibm.com \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=vbabka@suse.cz \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).