Re: [PATCH v3] memfd,selinux: call security_inode_init_security_anon

[Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>]

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On Sun, 21 Sep 2025, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 17, 2025 at 10:04 PM Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> wrote:
> >
> > Prior to this change, no security hooks were called at the creation of a
> > memfd file. It means that, for SELinux as an example, it will receive
> > the default type of the filesystem that backs the in-memory inode. In
> > most cases, that would be tmpfs, but if MFD_HUGETLB is passed, it will
> > be hugetlbfs. Both can be considered implementation details of memfd.
> >
> > It also means that it is not possible to differentiate between a file
> > coming from memfd_create and a file coming from a standard tmpfs mount
> > point.
> >
> > Additionally, no permission is validated at creation, which differs from
> > the similar memfd_secret syscall.
> >
> > Call security_inode_init_security_anon during creation. This ensures
> > that the file is setup similarly to other anonymous inodes. On SELinux,
> > it means that the file will receive the security context of its task.
> >
> > The ability to limit fexecve on memfd has been of interest to avoid
> > potential pitfalls where /proc/self/exe or similar would be executed
> > [1][2]. Reuse the "execute_no_trans" and "entrypoint" access vectors,
> > similarly to the file class. These access vectors may not make sense for
> > the existing "anon_inode" class. Therefore, define and assign a new
> > class "memfd_file" to support such access vectors.
> >
> > Guard these changes behind a new policy capability named "memfd_class".
> >
> > [1] https://crbug.com/1305267
> > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221215001205.51969-1-jeffxu@google.com/
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
> > ---
> > Changes since v2:
> > - Add WARN_ON when using unexpected class. Return -EACCES instead
> >   of -EPERM
> > - Remove extra new line
> > - Rebase on selinux/dev
> >
> > Changes since v1:
> > - Move test of class earlier in selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec
> > - Remove duplicate call to security_transition_sid
> >
> > Changes since RFC:
> > - Remove enum argument, simply compare the anon inode name
> > - Introduce a policy capability for compatility
> > - Add validation of class in selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec
> >  include/linux/memfd.h                      |  2 ++
> >  mm/memfd.c                                 | 14 ++++++++++--
> >  security/selinux/hooks.c                   | 26 +++++++++++++++++-----
> >  security/selinux/include/classmap.h        |  2 ++
> >  security/selinux/include/policycap.h       |  1 +
> >  security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h |  1 +
> >  security/selinux/include/security.h        |  5 +++++
> >  7 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> 
> Thanks Thiébaud, I'm going to merge this into selinux/dev-staging now
> with the plan to move it over to selinux/dev after the upcoming merge
> window closes.
> 
> Hugh, since the changes between this patch and the v2 you ACK'd are
> minimal and limited to the SELinux error handling code (see diff
> below), I'm going to carry over your ACK, but if you have any concerns
> or objections please let us know.

Sure, please do carry over my ACK - thanks.

Hugh