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[91.12.100.174]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id y19sm2147544edc.73.2021.05.06.10.24.43 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 06 May 2021 10:24:45 -0700 (PDT) To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, Andrew Morton , Mike Rapoport Cc: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dan Williams , Dave Hansen , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org References: <20210303162209.8609-1-rppt@kernel.org> <20210505120806.abfd4ee657ccabf2f221a0eb@linux-foundation.org> <996dbc29-e79c-9c31-1e47-cbf20db2937d@redhat.com> <8eb933f921c9dfe4c9b1b304e8f8fa4fbc249d84.camel@linux.ibm.com> From: David Hildenbrand Organization: Red Hat Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: Date: Thu, 6 May 2021 19:24:43 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.8.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <8eb933f921c9dfe4c9b1b304e8f8fa4fbc249d84.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US X-Rspamd-Server: rspam05 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 76F1140002C0 X-Stat-Signature: ha7ejuf6rof5fhobz1zuccu8xrjzggi9 Authentication-Results: imf26.hostedemail.com; dkim=pass header.d=redhat.com header.s=mimecast20190719 header.b=WBwop25y; spf=none (imf26.hostedemail.com: domain of david@redhat.com has no SPF policy when checking 170.10.133.124) smtp.mailfrom=david@redhat.com; dmarc=pass (policy=none) header.from=redhat.com Received-SPF: none (redhat.com>: No applicable sender policy available) receiver=imf26; identity=mailfrom; envelope-from=""; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com; client-ip=170.10.133.124 X-HE-DKIM-Result: pass/pass X-HE-Tag: 1620321877-168543 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: >>>> Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has >>>> gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, >>>> that seems optimistic, doesn't it? >>> >>> Not exactly: there are many types of kernel attack, but mostly the >>> attacker either manages to effect a privilege escalation to root or >>> gets the ability to run a ROP gadget. The object of this code is >>> to be completely secure against root trying to extract the secret >>> (some what similar to the lockdown idea), thus defeating privilege >>> escalation and to provide "sufficient" protection against ROP >>> gadget. >> >> What stops "root" from mapping /dev/mem and reading that memory? >=20 > /dev/mem uses the direct map for the copy at least for read/write, so > it gets a fault in the same way root trying to use ptrace does. I > think we've protected mmap, but Mike would know that better than I. >=20 I'm more concerned about the mmap case -> remap_pfn_range(). Anybody=20 going via the VMA shouldn't see the struct page, at least when=20 vma_normal_page() is properly used; so you cannot detect secretmem memory mapped via /dev/mem reliably. At least that's my theory :) [...] >> Also, there is a way to still read that memory when root by >> >> 1. Having kdump active (which would often be the case, but maybe not >> to dump user pages ) >> 2. Triggering a kernel crash (easy via proc as root) >> 3. Waiting for the reboot after kump() created the dump and then >> reading the content from disk. >=20 > Anything that can leave physical memory intact but boot to a kernel > where the missing direct map entry is restored could theoretically > extract the secret. However, it's not exactly going to be a stealthy > extraction ... >=20 >> Or, as an attacker, load a custom kexec() kernel and read memory >> from the new environment. Of course, the latter two are advanced >> mechanisms, but they are possible when root. We might be able to >> mitigate, for example, by zeroing out secretmem pages before booting >> into the kexec kernel, if we care :) >=20 > I think we could handle it by marking the region, yes, and a zero on > shutdown might be useful ... it would prevent all warm reboot type > attacks. Right. But I guess when you're actually root, you can just write a=20 kernel module to extract the information you need (unless we have signed=20 modules, so it could be harder/impossible). --=20 Thanks, David / dhildenb