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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	syzbot <syzbot+3de83a9efcca3f0412ee@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>,
	jack@suse.cz, kees@kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH] secretmem: use SB_I_NOEXEC
Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2025 15:32:38 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aGu-Zr4ltWloFuEf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250707-heimlaufen-hebamme-d6164bdc5f30@brauner>

On Mon, Jul 07, 2025 at 02:10:36PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> Anonymous inodes may never ever be exectuable and the only way to
> enforce this is to raise SB_I_NOEXEC on the superblock which can never
> be unset. I've made the exec code yell at anyone who does not abide by
> this rule.
> 
> For good measure also kill any pretense that device nodes are supported
> on the secretmem filesystem.
> 
> > WARNING: fs/exec.c:119 at path_noexec+0x1af/0x200 fs/exec.c:118, CPU#1: syz-executor260/5835
> > Modules linked in:
> > CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5835 Comm: syz-executor260 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-next-20250703-syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
> > Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
> > RIP: 0010:path_noexec+0x1af/0x200 fs/exec.c:118
> > Code: 02 31 ff 48 89 de e8 f0 b1 89 ff d1 eb eb 07 e8 07 ad 89 ff b3 01 89 d8 5b 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 f2 ac 89 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 48 ff ff ff 44 89 f1 80 e1 07 80 c1 03 38 c1 0f 8c a6
> > RSP: 0018:ffffc90003eefbd8 EFLAGS: 00010293
> > RAX: ffffffff8235f22e RBX: ffff888072be0940 RCX: ffff88807763bc00
> > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
> > RBP: 0000000000080000 R08: ffff88807763bc00 R09: 0000000000000003
> > R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000011
> > R13: 1ffff920007ddf90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000
> > FS:  000055556832d380(0000) GS:ffff888125d1e000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> > CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> > CR2: 00007f21e34810d0 CR3: 00000000718a8000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
> > Call Trace:
> >  <TASK>
> >  do_mmap+0xa43/0x10d0 mm/mmap.c:472
> >  vm_mmap_pgoff+0x31b/0x4c0 mm/util.c:579
> >  ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x51f/0x760 mm/mmap.c:607
> >  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> >  do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
> >  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> > RIP: 0033:0x7f21e340a9f9
> > Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> > RSP: 002b:00007ffd23ca3468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000009
> > RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f21e340a9f9
> > RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000004000 RDI: 0000200000ff9000
> > RBP: 00007f21e347d5f0 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
> > R10: 0000000000000011 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
> > R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/686ba948.a00a0220.c7b3.0080.GAE@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>

> ---
>  mm/secretmem.c | 13 +++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c
> index 9a11a38a6770..e042a4a0bc0c 100644
> --- a/mm/secretmem.c
> +++ b/mm/secretmem.c
> @@ -261,7 +261,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(memfd_secret, unsigned int, flags)
>  
>  static int secretmem_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
>  {
> -	return init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
> +	struct pseudo_fs_context *ctx;
> +
> +	ctx = init_pseudo(fc, SECRETMEM_MAGIC);
> +	if (!ctx)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	fc->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
> +	fc->s_iflags |= SB_I_NODEV;
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  
>  static struct file_system_type secretmem_fs = {
> @@ -279,9 +287,6 @@ static int __init secretmem_init(void)
>  	if (IS_ERR(secretmem_mnt))
>  		return PTR_ERR(secretmem_mnt);
>  
> -	/* prevent secretmem mappings from ever getting PROT_EXEC */
> -	secretmem_mnt->mnt_flags |= MNT_NOEXEC;
> -
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  fs_initcall(secretmem_init);
> -- 
> 2.47.2
> 

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.


  reply	other threads:[~2025-07-07 12:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-07 11:02 [syzbot] [mm?] [fs?] WARNING in path_noexec syzbot
2025-07-07 11:30 ` Christian Brauner
2025-07-07 12:10   ` syzbot
2025-07-07 12:10   ` [PATCH] secretmem: use SB_I_NOEXEC Christian Brauner
2025-07-07 12:32     ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2025-07-07 17:17     ` Al Viro
2025-07-08  7:38       ` Christian Brauner

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