From: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
To: sparkhuang <huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
Valentin Schneider <vschneid@redhat.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fork: reset pointer tag of vmapped thread stack before vfree
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 15:13:31 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <anSVlVpUXrA8ra_z@lucifer> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260806123020.90869-1-huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com>
Hi,
This looks AI-generated but I see no Assisted-by tag, please follow kernel
procedure on this please.
https://docs.kernel.org/process/coding-assistants.html
None of your 4 patches pre-dating the slopularity look anything like this.
Also please use a real name.
On Thu, Aug 06, 2026 at 08:30:20PM +0800, sparkhuang wrote:
> When a thread stack is freed via RCU callback,
> thread_stack_free_rcu() calls vfree(vm_area->addr). In RCU callback
> context (e.g. from rcu_nocb_cb_kthread with BH disabled, or from
> RCU_SOFTIRQ), in_interrupt() returns true, so vfree() routes to
> vfree_atomic().
>
> vfree_atomic() uses the freed memory as llist storage by calling
> llist_add((struct llist_node *)addr, &p->list), which writes 8 bytes
> to the address being freed. With KASAN SW_TAGS enabled,
> vm_area->addr carries a random tag assigned during allocation by
> kasan_unpoison_vmalloc(). If the shadow memory covering this region
> has been set to KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF) — e.g. by
> kasan_unpoison_task_stack() using task->stack, which was already
> reset to 0xFF by kasan_reset_tag() at allocation time — the shadow
> byte (0xFF) no longer matches the pointer tag on vm_area->addr,
> and the write in llist_add triggers a KASAN invalid-access report:
>
> ==================================================================
> BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150
> Write of size 8 at addr c2ffffc0a8f70000 by task rcuop/7/75
> Pointer tag: [c2], memory tag: [ff]
>
> CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 75 Comm: rcuop/7 Tainted: G S W OE
> Hardware name: XiaoMi Xring_o1 UDP PHONE (DT)
> Call trace:
> show_stack+0x18/0x28
> __dump_stack+0x28/0x3c
> dump_stack_lvl+0xac/0xf0
> print_address_description+0x7c/0x25c
> print_report+0x70/0x8c
> kasan_report+0xdc/0x13c
> __hwasan_store8_noabort+0xe8/0xf8
> vfree_atomic+0x90/0x150
> vfree+0x220/0x298
> thread_stack_free_rcu+0x3c/0x4c
> rcu_do_batch+0x308/0xaf0
> rcu_nocb_cb_kthread+0x33c/0x708
> kthread+0x364/0x3cc
> ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
>
> The buggy address belongs to a 8-page vmalloc region starting at
> 0xc2ffffc0a8f70000 allocated at copy_process+0x1ac/0x12e4
>
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffffffc0a8f6ff00: fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe fe
> >ffffffc0a8f70000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
> ^
> ffffffc0a8f70100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
> ==================================================================
>
> The tag on tsk->stack was already reset to KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF) by
> commit c08e6a1206e6 ("kasan, fork: reset pointer tags of vmapped
> stacks"), but vm_area->addr still carries the original random tag.
> This is the same class of bug that was fixed for shadow call stacks
> in scs_free() by commit 528a4ab45300 ("scs: Release kasan vmalloc
> poison in scs_free process").
>
> Fix it by resetting the pointer tag before calling vfree(), so that
> vfree_atomic()'s llist_add write uses KASAN_TAG_KERNEL (0xFF), which
> makes KASAN bypass tag checks for that write in all modes (SW_TAGS,
> HW_TAGS, and Generic).
>
> kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() is not needed alongside kasan_reset_tag():
> in HW_TAGS, __kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() is a no-op without
> KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC (only KASAN_VMALLOC_PROT_NORMAL is passed);
> in SW_TAGS and Generic, the 0xFF-tagged pointer already bypasses
> shadow checks, so the shadow state is irrelevant.
Output from a repro that you don't share, brilliant.
>
> Fixes: 0f110a9b956c ("kernel/fork: use vfree_atomic() to free thread stack")
A 2016 Fixes for some KASAN state bug? Really?
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
And of course Cc: stable...
> Signed-off-by: sparkhuang <huangshaobo3@xiaomi.com>
> ---
> kernel/fork.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index f0e2e131a..2fd6fd25c 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -280,7 +280,19 @@ static void thread_stack_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rh)
> if (try_release_thread_stack_to_cache(vm_stack->stack_vm_area))
> return;
>
> - vfree(vm_area->addr);
> + /*
> + * Reset the pointer tag before vfree(): in RCU callback context
> + * vfree() routes to vfree_atomic(), which writes to the freed
> + * memory as llist storage. Resetting the tag to KASAN_TAG_KERNEL
> + * (0xFF) makes KASAN bypass tag checks for that write in all modes
> + * (HW_TAGS, SW_TAGS, Generic), avoiding a false tag-mismatch report.
> + *
> + * kasan_unpoison_vmalloc() is not needed here: in HW_TAGS it is a
> + * no-op without KASAN_VMALLOC_VM_ALLOC, and in SW_TAGS/Generic the
> + * 0xFF pointer already bypasses shadow checks. This mirrors the
> + * intent of the fix in scs_free() (commit 528a4ab45300).
> + */
Nobody in their right mind does a comment like this for a kasan_reset_tag().
> + vfree(kasan_reset_tag(vm_area->addr));
> }
>
> static void thread_stack_delayed_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
> --
> 2.34.1
>
--
Cheers, Lorenzo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-06 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-06 12:30 [PATCH] fork: reset pointer tag of vmapped thread stack before vfree sparkhuang
2026-08-06 14:13 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) [this message]
2026-08-07 6:53 ` sparkhuang
2026-08-07 7:56 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-08-07 7:57 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-07 7:58 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-08-07 8:00 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-07 9:27 ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
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